International Social Development Review, No.1

URBANIZATION: development policies and planning

UNITED NATIONS

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UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1968

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PREFACE

This is the first issue of the *International Social Development Review*. It takes the place of three earlier United Nations publications: the *International Social Service Review*, *Housing, Building and Planning*, and the *Population Bulletin*. The Social Commission recommended that these periodicals be discontinued and replaced by a single review that would focus attention on the ways in which social policy and planning, housing, population, community development and social welfare were related.

The question whether social or economic development takes precedence is no longer important: it is generally agreed that the ultimate goal of all development is social progress. But in the development process economic and social factors constantly impinge and depend on each other. No one aspect of development can be dealt with effectively in isolation, least of all those which relate to population growth and movement, housing, planning and social services. Seldom has this been more apparent than in recent years, when rapid and unplanned urbanization has created problems in all parts of the world. Migration and changing values represent not simply a movement of population but a radical shift in orientation and outlook, and they present one of the key challenges to developing as well as developed countries today.

A United Nations seminar, which took place from 24 October to 7 November 1966 in Pittsburgh in the United States of America, had as its specific theme "Development policies and planning in relation to urbanization". The papers contributed to the seminar form the basis of the present issue although, for reasons of space, most have been condensed and partly rewritten. In some instances, where the facts are open to interpretation, the authors have drawn their own conclusions and the views they express are not necessarily those of the United Nations. The *Review* is in no sense intended to be a definitive document. These varied viewpoints are contributions to the general debate and it is hoped that they will provoke thought.

The second and third articles, which follow the introductory statement, provide the demographic background and statistical data relevant to the subject. The next part outlines the particular urbanization problems of the developing regions in the world. Then follow several articles concerning the economic, social and physical aspects of urbanization policies and planning. This part concludes with two comparative studies of the approach to urban programmes in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. The final article, which deals with the problem of slums and shantytowns, underlines the potential for self-improvement in these places as well as the need for urban "community development".

Urbanization, the subject of the Pittsburgh Seminar, forms the hub of this issue, but like the spokes of the wheel, discussions and ideas point towards the perimeter of over-all development. Future issues of the *Review* will also have a theme or themes serving to highlight or bring into focus some aspect of development — particularly as it concerns the developing countries and the problems of man in a developing society.

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Introduction

AN URBANIZATION POLICY FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

A review of United Nations interest in this area

During the last decade or so the United Nations has become increasingly concerned with questions and problems raised by urban growth, especially in the developing countries of the world. By the mid 1950s, the work of demographers had focused attention on the acceleration of urban growth and urbanization in the economically less developed regions, especially since the end of the Second World War. Consequently, the interest and activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies shifted from a concentration on rural development to a more balanced consideration of development in both its urban and its rural aspects.

The first task was to map out the scope, the character and the main aspects of the urbanization problem in each region. A series of seminars and surveys therefore took place under the auspices of the United Nations and UNESCO in collaboration with the regional economic commissions, the specialized agencies, and other institutions. These were conducted in Abidjan (1954), Bangkok (1956), Santiago and various countries of the Mediterranean region (1959), Addis Ababa and Warsaw (1962).[1] At the meetings and in surveys, the nature and scope of urbanization were assessed, and problems relating to it were studied: rural poverty moving into cities, the deterioration of employment conditions, housing and community facilities, health and nutrition difficulties, and the many problems of social disorganization. The relationships of these urban problems to industrial development, which were also examined, served to point out the lag in industry-created employment and in the development of an urban infra-structure (which is closely related to external economies for industrial growth).

From the middle 1950s to the early 1960s there was a change in emphasis from simple surveys of urban conditions and trends, especially in the developing countries,[2] to the problems caused by rapid urban growth, and subsequently to a detailed consideration of the possible policy approaches to the solution of these problems, and a delineation of social programmes and measures to deal with them. Various United Nations seminars and reports reflect this trend in the study of such special urbanization problems, as community development and social welfare in urban areas (e.g., a seminar in Bristol (1959) and a report by the Secretary-General in 1960), administrative aspects of urban growth (e.g., meetings in New Delhi (1960) and Beirut (1963)), and housing and urban development (e.g., the 1962 meeting of a group of experts in New York).

Closely connected with all these seminars and studies and drawing upon their results and recommendations, operational activities were and are being undertaken by the United Nations and the specialized agencies. This interest led in 1961 to the preparation of a programme of concerted international action in the field of urbanization, based on an analysis of the major problems associated with rapid urban growth. This programme recommended co-operative efforts and specific projects and stressed the need for assistance to countries within the context of development planning, in basic research, city and regional planning, the solution of public administration problems, and in organizing or expanding community services and civic participation.[3] Since then technical assistance in the field of housing and physical planning and of industrial development — the two most critical problems facing the rapidly growing cities in developing countries — has been greatly expanded in both personnel and funds. The outlook, however, in the middle of the Development Decade, shows that still greater efforts are needed in these important areas.[4] The creation of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1965 indicated the concern with industrialization, derived partly from a preoccupation with lagging employment. Similarly, the creation for the Centre of Housing, Building and Planning, also in 1965, was an indication of current concern with these problems.

United Nations activities in the field of urbanization have been characterized recently by a greater emphasis on the development of a comprehensive approach. It is increasingly understood that the interrelation of diverse

[1] For detailed references to reports of these meetings, as well as to other publications by United Nations bodies or prepared under their auspices, see the list of documents at the end of this article. This is arranged in chronological order to illustrate the general trend of interest in urbanization and related questions.

[2] In connexion with the seminars, notably those of Abidjan, Bangkok and Santiago, extensive research projects were undertaken in cities of less developed regions. See, for instance, the studies of Bangkok, Bombay, Dacca, Delhi and Djakarta, included in R. B. Textor *et al.*, *The Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization, Five Studies of Urban Population of Recent Rural Origin in Cities of Southern Asia*, UNESCO, Research Centre of the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia (Calcutta, 1956).

[3] "Proposals for concerted international action in the field of urbanization" (E/CN.5/351).

[4] See "United Nations Development Decade: interim report prepared by the Secretary-General on behalf of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination" (*Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 5, document E/4196 and Add.3); and report of the Committee on Housing, Building and Planning (fourth session) (*Ibid., Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 6*).

economic, social and physical planning policies and programmes must be more thoroughly and systematically explored; in particular, the integration of urban policies and programmes in the over-all national plan for economic and social development requires emphasis. Regional planning is now regarded as a fundamental method of ensuring a comprehensive approach to urbanization questions and problems. With the exception of a few areas, however, progress in this direction has been slow and new efforts are necessary to make effective multi-sectoral development plans and programmes. The dearth of trained personnel with integrative skills is a serious obstacle. Advantage ought to be taken of the experience of those regional development projects which have been successfully initiated recently in certain parts of Latin America, Africa and Asia. One of the main objects of the research and training programme for regional development, begun by the United Nations in co-operation with the regional economic commissions and the specialized agencies, is to minimize the undesirable effects of the over-centralization of population and industry. This involves the training of personnel in development planning, in administration, as well as in social development, in those countries which have the most transferable experience of regional planning.[5]

The lack of capable personnel is not the only obstacle. The following are especially important: (*a*) the inappropriateness of the existing political and administrative machinery in many developing countries to cope with problems of urbanization and comprehensive development, which includes both inadequate legislative provisions for dealing with social, economic and physical planning, and the organizational arrangements for carrying out these functions; (*b*) the complexity and unprecedented nature of social and economic development planning, quite apart from the willingness or capacity of Governments to propose solutions of the urbanization problem; (*c*) the difficulties in transferring from one country to another planning experience closely geared to particular local situations and therefore largely unique (a fact which makes a very strong case for the training of local professionals and technicians); and (*d*) the high cost of planning solutions relative to the limited financial potential of most developing countries (although the long-range economic and social cost of *not* planning is, of course, much greater).

In spite of these difficulties important progress is being made in the field of urbanization policies and planning. This is most noticeable in the present efforts in some developing countries to establish appropriate training institutions; in the steady increase in the number of requests for United Nations technical assistance; in the growing scale of the projects in question; in the increased number of experts in the substantive field under the United Nations Development Programme; and, more difficult to specify but no less important, in the nature and quality of the assistance which is sought.

The Interregional Seminar on Development Policies and Planning in Relation to Urbanization, held in Pittsburgh in 1966, represented a continuation of past interest and trends, but it also marked a new stage in United Nations action in the urbanization field. The central themes of the Seminar were the effects of particular national and regional development policies on urban growth and population distribution, and the formulation of guide-lines for national urban policies and planning. Both the papers discussed and the experience of the participants were thoroughly interdisciplinary. As a background to evaluating national policies and planning, participants examined the scope and social and economic aspects of the urbanization process in the major developing regions of the world; pertinent demographic aspects and trends; economic costs and benefits of different patterns of rural-urban population distribution; analyses of the distribution of social services and facilities between urban and rural populations; aspects of urban and metropolitan physical planning; and the special problems of shantytowns and squatter settlements.

Current United Nations interest represents a change in emphasis from a preoccupation with urban growth and rural-urban migration problems to a more balanced concern both with these and with the more positive aspects of an urbanization policy. While inordinate urban growth and accelerating urbanization pose serious social and economic problems which merit continuing attention and remedial action, the crucial need is to develop national urban policies conducive to economic, social and political development. At the Pittsburgh Seminar, there was no general agreement, either in the papers — a number of which are included in this issue of the *Review* — or in the discussion of agenda items, as to certain basic questions regarding rapid urban growth and urbanization. Nor, with the knowledge and analyses available, could there be. In fact, among the Seminar conclusions, it is stated that "it became clear that the major issues [relevant to development strategy] cannot be settled definitively until more evidence can be made available on a number of basic factors. The roles of and the relationships between population growth, rural density, agricultural productivity and industrial and urban development in the development process are by no means clear".[6] But it was particularly significant that the physical, economic and social problems associated with rapid urbanization were considered not as isolated issues requiring piecemeal remedial action, but within the context of total change in the society, demanding an over-all development strategy.

The following articles illustrate the many and varied problems associated with urbanization. The key challenge is that posed, on the one hand, by the swelling stream of migration from rural areas and small towns to one or a few larger (in particular metropolitan) urban centres and, on the other, by the enormous lag in housing, public services and facilities and employment opportunities. Linked to these basic factors are all major urban problems of the developing world: overcrowding, poor standards of education, sanitation and health, as well as social and invididual disorganization. Of course,

[5] See "Progress report on the research-training programme for regional development" (E/CN.5/409/Add.5).

[6] *Report of the United Nations Interregional Seminar on Development Policies and Planning in Relation to Urbanization*, Pittsburgh, 24 Oct.-4 Nov. 1966 (ST/TAO/Ser.C/97).

these problems are not derived from urbanization and urban growth *per se*, nor even from their present magnitude, but from the uncontrolled way in which these processes occur in the economically less developed countries. Urban problems in the less developed regions are part and parcel of the problem of under-development. Awareness of their seriousness should lead to a policy which seeks to guide urbanization in the ways most favourable to over-all development, rather than to measures which represent an anti-urbanization attitude.

The urbanization processes in the less developed regions today have often been recognized as largely irreversible in character. Attempts to slow down rural-urban migration or to keep the population on the land, are generally seen as unpromising. The real problem is the distorted nature of urbanization in the developing countries, both in terms of over-concentration of the urban population in a few larger primate centres, and in terms of the internal unintegrated physical, economic, social and cultural characteristics of these centres. Action, therefore, is required to redirect the migratory currents, build up alternative growth-poles, implement physical, economic and social plans in the existing cities to make them a more favourable environment for development. Attempts to reverse or delay the urbanization process will only result in scattering meagre resources and achieve too little all-round rural improvement to make any effective impact on the trends of population redistribution.

The search for a positive urbanization policy needs more detailed analyses of the dynamic relationship between urbanization and industrial development, analyses which go beyond statistical correlations. Since these do not exist, it is only possible to speak in general terms.

The ideal urbanization policy depends, of course, on the specific conditions of each country, and especially on the degree and character of existing urban growth and the stage of industrial development. Urban centres have had and still have an important role in initiating the development process. City growth in a pre-industrial society is often related to the country's role as a producer of primary commodities for the international market or the establishment of modern "enclaves" in an otherwise traditional and non-monetary social and economic setting. The Seminar emphasized that such cities offered the most fertile *milieu* (economically — by providing a market for industrial goods, labour, services, and financial and commercial institutions — as well as socially, culturally and politically) for industrial development when conditions became favourable for import-substitution. From this perspective, it may be that in some countries urbanization has not yet produced centres large enough (unwieldy and serious as the associated urban problems already appear to be) to provide the economic and social advantages necessary for industrial development. In these cases policies are required to create at least one viable urban centre with the necessary infra-structure and institutions.

Industrialization elsewhere, having started in the larger urban centres, tends to proceed, by the workings of a complex of economic, social and political forces, with ever increasing concentration in the same general area. Other regions of the country not only fail to develop, but often undergo a process of regression, because of the effect of the more advanced region (or regions) upon their own rural and urban economies. Commonly, however, urbanization continues, becoming more and more divorced from economic development in the backward areas. In these circumstances, a policy for reversing urban and industrial concentration — pursued by means of co-ordinated economic, social and physical programmes — is not only consistent with national development goals, but essential. A policy of urbanization, however, covering the locational aspect of investment (both economic and social) which is most conducive to continuing over-all development, is that of "selective concentration" in a few areas with high development potential, rather than that of "dispersion".[7]

To be successful, such a policy must be comprehensive, ordering simultaneously the "location" of industrial, educational, housing, and other programmes and projects. This conviction permeated discussion at the Seminar. Regional planning, within the framework of national development policy, occupies a strategic role. The United Nations research-training programme for regional development has already identified among the major needs in this area the provision of more trained personnel, and strengthening the social development side of current and future projects.[8]

Remedial action with regard to specific urban problems belongs in the context of development policies and planning. While a comprehensive approach is always desirable, it is indispensable in the developing countries, where the gap between needs and resources is so great. The discrepancy between ideal standards and the available resources is nowhere greater than in the field of housing and urban services and facilities. The article entitled "Uncontrolled urban settlement: problems and policies" in this issue points out policy measures which promise to be more consistent with over-all development than present government action. In its conclusion the Seminar endorsed in principle the position adopted in the paper on which that article is based, recommending that the potential for self-improvement in squatter and peripheral settlements be systematically developed, and that public action concentrate on creating — for example, by provision of land and basic public facilities — conditions favourable for mobilizing savings and initiative among urban settlers.[9]

The major problem remains the achievement of long-range self-sustaining development (with limited resources and often slow maturing economic and social investments), in conditions of ever-increasing demands for the immediate improvement of levels of living. In housing and the urban environment field exploration of the converg-

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[7] See the article entitled "Urbanization and national development"; also the article entitled "Economic aspects of urbanization" for an economic viewpoint.

[8] See "Progress report on the research-training programme for regional development" (E/CN.5/409/Add.5).

[9] A similar policy is advocated by Bernard J. Frieden, in "The Search for Housing Policy in Mexico City", *The Town Planning Review*, vol. 36, No. 2 (July 1965), pp. 75-94.

ing long-range and immediate goals promises to be fruitful.[10]

The Pittsburgh Seminar emphasized the fact that many urbanization problems — such as the proliferation of slums and squatter settlements — were shared by most developing countries, and that substantial knowledge and actual experience already exist. The free exchange of views and of information on action programmes among officials and scholars from different countries and with different professional backgrounds, was one of the most valuable features of the Seminar. At present, policy decisions are hampered by the limitations of local experience and often by the conflicting advice of experts. Empirical knowledge and experience which exist elsewhere are largely inaccessible. Even highly relevant theoretical work is not brought to the attention of administrators. Foremost among the conclusions of the Seminar, therefore, was the urgent need to establish a communications system among developing countries to collect and distribute information regarding urban questions and related policy and planning. The United Nations organizations, drawing on their considerable experience in the field, have an important role to play in exploring the most effective means of creating such a system, and in meeting the challenge to development posed by rapid urbanization in the economically less developed regions.

[10] As the *Ad Hoc* Group of Experts on Housing and urban Development pointed out, the critical importance of housing and urban development is that they are "activities where social and economic progress meet", *Report of the* Ad Hoc *Group of Experts on Housing and Urban Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.1).

List of documents on urbanization by United Nations organs*

Murray McCulloch, "Industrialization in Africa", a report prepared by the International African Institute for UNESCO (December, 1950), pt. 2.

International African Institute, "Social implications of industrialization and urbanization in Africa south of the Sahara," prepared under the auspices of UNESCO (Paris, UNESCO, 1956) (includes papers prepared for the 1954 Abidjan Conference.)

R. B. Textor, *et al.*, "The social implications of industrialization and urbanization, five studies of urban population of recent rural origin in cities of southern Asia" (Calcutta, UNESCO Research Centre of the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia, 1956).

Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East* (Proceedings of the Joint United Nations/UNESCO Seminar (in co-operation with the ILO) on Urbanization in the ECAFE Region, Bangkok, 8-18 August, 1956) (Calcutta, UNESCO, SS.57.V.7.A. 1957).

Report on the World Social Situation, 1957, including studies of urbanization in under-developed areas (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 57.IV.3).

Housing, Building and Planning Bulletin Nos. 12 and 13, Seminar on Regional Planning, Tokyo, 28 July-8 August 1958 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.IV.7).

Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Latin America* (Proceedings of a seminar jointly sponsored by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, ECLA and UNESCO (in co-operation with the ILO and the Organization of American States) on urbanization problems in Latin America, Santiago (Chile), 6-18 July 1959) (Paris, UNESCO, 1961).

Report of the European Seminar on Community Development and Social Welfare in Urban Areas, Bristol, England, 12-22 September 1959 (UN/TAO/SEM/1959/Rep.1).

Report of Urbanization Survey Mission in the Mediterranean Region, November to December 1959, New York (ST/TAO/Ser.C/51–ST/SOA/Ser.T/1).

International Survey of Programmes of Social Development (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.IV.2), chap. XIII: "Programmes and measures for meeting problems of rapid urbanization".

Report of the Regional Seminar on Public Administration Problems of New and Rapidly Growing Towns in Asia, New Delhi, India, 14-21 December 1960 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.H.1).

Community development in urban areas (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.6).

Report of the Ad Hoc *Group of Experts on Housing and Urban Development*, 7-21 February 1962 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.1).

"Report of the Workshop on Urbanization in Africa", Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 April-5 May 1963 (E/CN.14/170 – ST/TAO/Ser.C/57 – ST/SOA/Ser.T/4).

Report of the European Seminar on Urban Development Policy and Planning, Warsaw, Poland, 19-29 September 1963 (ST/ESWP/1962/1 – ST/ECE/HOU/9).

Administrative Problems of Rapid Urban Growth in the Arab States, report of a United Nations workshop held at Beirut, Lebanon, 11-22 March 1963 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.II.H.1).

Report of the United Nations Symposium on the Planning and Development of New Towns, Moscow, 24 August-7 September 1964 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.IV.3).

Report of the Seminar on Planning for Urban and Regional Development, including Metropolitan Areas, New Towns, and Land Policies, Nagoya, Japan, 10-20 October 1966 (to be published).

Report of the Interregional Seminar on Development Policies and Planning in Relation to Urbanization, Pittsburgh, United States of America, 24 October-4 November 1966 (ST/TAO/Ser.C/97).

Anmarie Hauck Walsh, "Administrative aspects of urbanization: a comparative study", prepared for the United Nations (New York, Institute of Public Administration, 1967) (mimeographed).

* In chronological order. Reports of meetings are placed according to the dates of the meetings and not the dates of publication.

Demographic aspects of urban growth and population distribution

WORLD URBANIZATION TRENDS, 1920-1960*

Problems of substance and method

Comparability and relevance

Internationally comparable statistics on urban population are not easily assembled. The two criteria which generally distinguish the urban element in a country's population are the quantitative, in terms of population concentration, and the qualitative, such as the characteristics of the economy and modes of living. The correlation between these two criteria varies with time, location, and the "urban" features of the particular locality. Within countries, definitions are modified in successive censuses, and among countries there is great variation in defining urban and rural localities. Selection of criteria must therefore be made rather arbitrarily, frequently as a compromise between comparability, relevance and the statistics available or estimated. An approximation of the world's urban population, at best, can so far only be derived from a patchwork of figures broadly selected, adjusted and interpolated.

Geographical settlement patterns are considered, leaving for examination at a later date their demographic, economic and social features.[1] The influence of the particular historic period has also had its part in the transformation of settlements into towns and cities.[2] In general throughout the world, where a fundamental change in settlement pattern related to the modern growth of commerce and industry has taken place, some towns of minor importance expanded rapidly, outgrowing original administrative boundaries. Where boundaries were inflexible, the localities were re-defined as "agglomerations". The simultaneous growth of several towns within a small radius often caused them to merge into a "conurbation". In some cases, *de facto* conurbations became incorporated under a single urban administration. In others, the growth of large cities or "metropolises" absorbed adjacent towns, villages, or smaller cities without affecting their political autonomy, even when services such as water and police were supplied under the administration of the agglomeration. With the increase in the number of large cities, the concept of "agglomeration" has gained more generalized use as an alternative to that of "city proper".

The more inclusive classification of "metropolitan area" as for Greater London, Greater New York, Greater Paris or Greater Tokyo, has evolved where a network of road and rail transportation has further expanded the confines of the settlement pattern. But this broader concept has not been restricted to the largest cities.[3]

In comparing urban data, problems arise in connection with the adjustment of municipal boundaries. Where boundaries are flexible, "city proper" data may provide a realistic comparison of urban growth. Where boundaries have proved relatively rigid, the "agglomeration" is more meaningful provided it is redefined at each census, a practice not followed in all countries. Also, there have been instances of drastic urban boundary adjustment which distort comparisons. The growth of motor transport has made it reasonable for some countries to define "metropolitan regions" as including some rural or semi-rural areas serving the growing city for suburban residence and urban facilities.[4] Thus a phenomenon has recently emerged, made up of entire belts or regions comprising cities, towns, their closely related rural areas, and connecting tracts (with a mixture of features which cannot be described as either wholly "urban" or "rural"), which have a recognizable pattern of interdependence.

The standards applied in this study

For the purpose of this study, "urban" population is defined as that of localities with 20,000 or more inhabitants,[5] "rural and small town population" that of smaller localities or the open country. Localities with 20,000-99,999 inhabitants will be referred to as "towns", larger localities as "cities". The figures 20,000 and 100,000

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* This article is based on a study in preparation by the Population Division of the United Nations, and the data presented are subject to revision. For an earlier document on the topic, see "World survey of urban and rural population growth" (E/CN.9/187).

[1] For the study of interaction between changes in settlement pattern and in economic and social circumstances, as affecting an entire population, see "Urbanization and economic and social change".

[2] For a comprehensive discussion, see L. Mumford, *The City in History* (New York, 1961); and P. M. Hauser, ed., "World urbanism: a symposium", *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LX, No. 5 (March 1955).

[3] The most systematic attempt to define such areas comparably is that of Kingsley Davis, *et al.*, *The World's Metropolitan Areas* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, International Urban Research, 1959).

[4] See A. W. Gilmore, *Transportation and the Growth of Cities* (Glenmore, Ill., 1953).

[5] Censuses of most countries define localities of lesser size as urban, but a common international measure is more readily found when the relatively high limit of 20,000 inhabitants separates urban and rural classification. Also, there is more certainty that localities of a mainly agrarian character will be exluded from the urban classification. An early use of 20,000 as a lower size limit in the study of urban population appears in Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz, "The world distribution of urbanization", *Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute*, vol. XXXIII, part IV. Although this definition, which has come into wide use in international research, is available for a large number of countries, it must be used with caution since it may exclude some places that are actually urban in character, while including others that may be merely densely settled rural villages.

suggested the use of a multiplier of five to arrive at a more detailed size classification, viz:

20,000 and over . . .	Urban population
100,000 and over . . .	City population
500,000 and over . . .	Big-city population
2,500,000 and over . . .	Multi-million cities
12,500,000 and over . . .	Metropolitan regions (i.e., those of New York and Tokyo at the present time)

Towns and cities of up to 500,000 residents are so numerous that each town could not be investigated individually and, as censuses are tabulated more often in terms of administrative limits than the geographical extent of urbanized territory, the definition in this article for the two smallest groups is mainly that of "city proper", in the administrative sense. The attempt to measure and estimate the populations included in agglomerations was restricted to big cities and multi-millions cities only.[6] "Cities" and "towns" included in the agglomerations are considered as absorbed in the major agglomeration, and therefore not counted again among cities and towns of smaller size.

One consequence of the more generous definition of big cities is a partial discontinuity in size distribution. Some "cities proper" (i.e., when more narrowly defined) have, say, 300,000 or 400,000 inhabitants but, when defined more liberally, are parts of agglomerations in excess of 500,000. Acknowledging disparity in definitions, such localities are then counted among the big cities, and not among the smaller ones, leaving a gap in the "cities" group. This affects particularly the estimates for Northern America. No attempt has been made to go beyond the concept of agglomeration, or metropolitan region. The world's two largest cities have been defined liberally, so that the metropolitan region of New York includes north-eastern New Jersey, and that of Tokyo comprises Yokohama.

Types of data used

For the various parts of the world, the data differ in definition, period of coverage and number of observations, and recency.[7] Most of the raw data are those of population censuses, variously interpolated to coincide with the selected dates, namely mid-year 1920, 1930, and so forth. Inevitably, many of the provisional figures in this article are affected by arbitrary choices in the use of data.

It is therefore essential to draw attention to some of the principal decisions. For instance, in Canada, the United States of America and Oceania the population of metropolitan regions has been estimated for past dates on an assumption that, with the early spread of networks of motor transportation, there had been a continuous geographical penetration of urban influence into the areas now recognized as metropolitan rings. No such assumptions have been made, on the other hand, in estimates for metropolitan regions in Europe or Latin America, though there the networks of intensive transport have also widened conspicuously in recent years. Comparability cannot be established by such differing methods of estimation, but it has not been possible yet to resolve many estimating problems.

Provisional assessment of trends

World-wide urban and rural population growth

Estimates in table 1 show that the world's total population increased by 209,228,220 and 477 million, respectively, in successive decades from 1920 to 1960. In terms of the present tentative estimates, the world's urban population has shown a threefold growth in forty years, or a net addition of roughly 500 million urban residents. It follows that more than 600 million have been added to

[6] Cities estimated as 500,000 or larger numbered seventy-five in 1920; ninety-eight in 1930; 125 in 1940; 159 in 1950 and 232 in 1960.

[7] See also, on this problem, "World survey of urban and rural population growth".

Table 1. — Distribution of world population by size of locality, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates, in millions)

Size of locality (inhabitants)	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
Total population	*1,860.2*	*2,069.3*	*2,296.9*	*2,516.8*	*2,994.4*
Under 20,000	1,607.3	1,741.2	1,869.9	1,985.3	2,241.0
20,000 and over	252.9	328.1	427.0	531.5	753.4
100,000 and over	160.0	216.6	287.6	360.0	525.5
500,000 and over	94.9	133.6	175.8	224.4	351.6
2,500,000 and over	30.3	48.8	66.5	84.3	139.4
12,500,000 and over	...	...	...	...	27.7[a]
20,000-99,999	92.9	111.5	139.4	171.5	227.9
100,000-499,999	65.1	83.0	111.8	135.6	173.9
500,000-2,499,999.	64.6	84.8	109.3	140.1	212.2
2,500,000-12,499,999	30.3	48.8	66.5	84.3	111.7
12,500,000 and over	...	...	...	...	27.7[a]

[a] Metropolitan regions of New York (including north-eastern New Jersey) and Tokyo (including Yokohama).

rural or small-town localities. This is rather more than a one-third increase.

In the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, the absolute increments in urban population rose gradually, and those in rural population diminished gradually, while in the 1950s, both in the urban areas and in rural areas and small towns the population gain had twice the magnitude of the gains made in the preceding decade. Of the world's total population gain, as estimated, the urban percentage in the successive decades was 36, 43, 48 and 46; the rural and small town 64, 57, 52 and 54.

In relative terms, the world's total population grew by 11 per cent in the 1920s, 11 per cent in the 1930s, 10 per cent in the 1940s, and 19 per cent in the 1950s. Urban population in each of these four decades increased by 30, 30, 25 and 42 per cent; rural and small-town population by 8, 7, 6 and 13 per cent. Both urban and rural localities shared in the fluctuation of the world's population growth — its slight slackening in the 1940s and sharp acceleration in the 1950s. (Acceleration in the growth of rural and small-town population in the 1950s was a striking reversal of a previously more stable trend.)

A simple arithmetic exercise suffices to show that, with the accelerated growth in total population, by 1960 rural population growth would have accelerated enormously if urban population had grown constantly at the 1920 rate throughout the period considered; similarly, had the growth in rural population continued merely at the rates of preceding decades, the number and size of towns and cities would have shown gains to an even greater degree.[8] In actual fact, both the urban and the rural areas shared in the accelerated population growth of the 1950s.

Of the world's total population, the percentage in urban localities rose from 14 in 1920 to 16 in 1930, 19 in 1940, 21 in 1950, and 25 in 1960. Another illustration of the large environmental change is found in the ratio of rural and small-town population to urban population: 6.4 to one in 1920, 5.3 in 1930, 4.4 in 1940, 3.7 in 1950 and 3.0 to one in 1960.

Among the figures for urban population shown in table 1, perhaps those for total urban are more nearly trustworthy. Less confidence can be placed in rural population estimates, particularly for East Asia and Africa. For the larger localities, total estimates are susceptible to increase or decrease depending on the criteria by which agglomerations are defined, or redefined while their physical limits expand. The larger the cities, the more uncertain are their boundaries for purposes of comparison.

According to the tentative estimates given in table 1, the size distribution or urban localities has undergone much change. As these figures indicate, the urban population (20,000 and over) grew in the four successive decades by 30, 30, 25 and 42 per cent; the ci typopulation (100,000 and over) increased by 35, 33, 25 and 46 per cent; the successive increases in big-city population (500,000 and over) were by 41, 32, 28 and 57 per cent; and in multi-million cities (2,500,000 and over) by 61, 36, 27 and 65 per cent. The shifts in structure were less great in the economically depressed 1930s or the war-ravaged 1940s than in the 1920s and 1950s.

Increasing numbers of previously smaller towns and cities which grew into the size-classification of larger localities were in part responsible for the higher rates of growth of the latter. Although a large number of small towns must also have crossed above the lower size limit of 20,000 during the same periods, the accrued population has not been sufficient to permit rates of increase of the magnitude of those in the larger localities. In fact, an increase in "top-heaviness" has been under way in the urban population, for the urban population tripled in forty years while the big-citypo pulation quadrupled.

Urbanization 1920-1960, in eight major areas of the world

Urbanization varied considerably from one major world area to another. The provisional figures compared in tables 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 differ from estimates which

[8] Assuming urban population had grown by 30 per cent in the 1950s (as it actually did in the 1920s and 1930s) the accelerated growth in the world's total population would have caused rural population to grow from 1,985 million in 1950 to 2,302 million in 1960, that is by 317 million, or by 16 per cent. Assuming rural population had grown by 7 per cent in the 1950s (as it actually did on the average of the decades from 1920 to 1950), the accelerated growth in the world's total population would have caused urban population to grow from 532 million in 1950 to 870 million in 1960, that is by 338 million, or by 64 per cent.

Table 2. — Urban population (localities of 20,000 or more inhabitants) in major areas of the world, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates, in millions)

Major area	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
World total	*252.9*	*328.1*	*427.0*	*531.5*	*753.4*
Europe (ex USSR)	104.4	123.3	140.1	147.6	173.8
Northern America	43.5	58.0	64.3	83.2	112.5
East Asia	39.1	56.6	81.6	105.8	160.5
South Asia	27.0	34.6	50.5	77.0	116.1
Soviet Union	16.0	24.0	47.0	50.0	78.0
Latin America	12.9	18.1	25.2	40.6	67.8
Africa	6.9	9.7	13.8	21.5	36.4
Oceania	3.1	3.8	4.5	5.8	8.3

Table 3. — Population in rural areas and small towns (smaller than 20,000) in major areas of the world, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates, in millions)

Major area	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
World total	*1,607.3*	*1,741.2*	*1,869.9*	*1,985.3*	*2,241.0*
Europe (ex USSR)	220.1	230.5	238.7	244.1	250.7
Northern America	72.2	76.2	80.0	82.9	86.2
East Asia	514.3	534.6	553.9	578.9	633.6
South Asia	442.8	494.4	559.6	619.7	741.8
Soviet Union	139.3	155.0	148.0	130.0	136.4
Latin America	76.6	89.4	104.7	121.8	144.6
Africa	136.0	154.1	177.7	200.0	239.3
Oceania	6.0	7.0	7.3	7.9	8.4

Table 4. — Urban population (20,000 and over) as a percentage of total population in major areas of the world, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates)

Major area	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
World total	*14*	*16*	*19*	*21*	*25*
Europe (ex USSR)	32	35	37	38	41
Northern America	38	43	45	50	57
East Asia	7	10	13	15	20
South Asia	6	7	8	11	14
Soviet Union	10	13	24	28	36
Latin America	14	17	19	25	32
Africa	5	6	7	10	13
Oceania	34	35	38	42	50

Table 5. — Decennial increases in urban population (20,000 and over) in major areas of the world, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates, per cent)

Major area	*1920-1930*	*1930-1940*	*1940-1950*	*1950-1960*
World total	*30*	*30*	*25*	*42*
Europe (ex USSR)	18	14	5	18
Northern America	33	11	29	35
East Asia	45	44	30	52
South Asia	26	46	52	51
Soviet Union	50	96	6	56
Latin America	40	39	61	67
Africa	41	42	56	69
Oceania[a]	22	19	29	42

[a] Percentages computed from unrounded data.

Table 6. — Decennial increases in rural and small-town population (localities smaller than 20,000) in major areas of the world, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates, per cent)

Major area	*1920-1930*	*1930-1940*	*1940-1950*	*1950-1960*
World total	*8*	*7*	*6*	*13*
Europe (ex USSR)	5	4	2	3
Northern America	6	5	4	4
East Asia	4	4	5	9
South Asia	12	13	11	20
Soviet Union	11	–5	–12	5
Latin America	17	17	16	19
Africa	13	15	13	20
Oceania[a]	15	5	5	8

[a] Percentages computed from unrounded data.

have appeared in other sources [9] and may require further revision.

In 1920, Europe (without the Soviet Union) had 41 per cent of the world's urban population but, while its urban population by 1960 had grown by two thirds, its share in the world's urban population had shrunk to an estimated 23 per cent. By contrast, East Asia's urban population, grown fourfold from 39 million in 1920 to 160 million in 1960, now approaches that of Europe and, given its steep trend, may soon surpass it. But the comparison is dubious because of varied definitions and characteristics applying to the respective urban populations in these areas.

Approximately fivefold increases are estimated to have occurred between 1920 and 1960 in the urban populations of the Soviet Union, Latin America and Africa, while the smaller urban population of Oceania grew about two and a half times, as did that of Northern America.

The largest relative increase of urban population in a single decade occurred in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, when it nearly doubled. Increases of the order of two thirds in a decade are estimated for Latin America in the 1940s and 1950s, and for Africa in the most recent decade. Increases of urban population by at least one half are also estimated in the 1920s for the Soviet Union, in the 1940s for South Asia and Africa, and in the 1950s for East Asia, South Asia, and the Soviet Union.

On the other hand Europe's urban population is estimated to have gained by less than one fifth in each of the four decades, and in the 1930s the urban gains in Northern America and Oceania were similarly moderate. Because of the destruction and disorganization caused by the war, only small urban increases occurred in the 1940s in Europe, the Soviet Union and East Asia. (The urban population estimates for the Soviet Union and East Asia in 1950, also those for East Asia in 1940, partly depend on rather tenuous extrapolations of either the preceding, or the subsequent, trends.) It is probable that accelerated urban growth in Europe, East Asia and the Soviet Union in the 1950s represents in part a

[9] See, for example, K. Davis, *et al.*, *The World's Metropolitan Regions;* "World survey of urban and rural population growth"; Homer Hoyt, *World Urbanization*, Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin No. 43.

compensation for the retardation of the 1940s. A different condition obtained in South Asia, where the fast growth of cities in the 1940s was followed by somewhat slower, though still very noticeable, growth in the 1950s. It is probable that the large refugee movements resulting from the partition of India and Pakistan reinforced the accelerated growth of cities particularly in the 1940s, but not so much in the 1950s.

Gains in estimated rural and small-town population were also diverse but did not fluctuate so much. Exceptions are the Soviet Union where rural population diminished in the 1930s, and diminished even further in the war years of the 1940s; and Occania, where the apparent gains in rural and small-town population of the 1920s did not continue. In Europe and Northern America, perhaps also in Latin America, relative gains in rural and small-town population gradually slowed down between 1920 and 1950. With the possible exception of Northern America, it is evident that rural and small-town population growth accelerated in all major areas in the 1950s; the acceleration was slight in Europe, Latin America and Oceania, but substantial in South Asia, Africa, and probably also in East Asia. Part of the resumed growth in rural and small-town population in the highly urbanized regions of Europe, Northern America, the Soviet Union and Oceania may be attributable to the spread of improved means of transport, permitting residence in small towns by workers and families who gain their livelihood in nearby cities.

The greatly varied rates of growth in rural and small-town population have made for very uneven gains among the world's major areas. In the entire world, this population is estimated to have increased by 634 million from 1920 to 1960; of that increase, nearly 300 million accrued to South Asia, 120 million to East Asia, 100 million to Africa, and 70 million to Latin America. In Europe, the rural and small-town population gained only about 30 million in forty years, and in Northern America about 14 million, whereas in the Soviet Union it is estimated to have been smaller in 1960 than in 1920.

Northern America, Oceania and Europe have been, and have remained, the world's most urbanized major areas, in terms of the percentage of total population contained in localities of 20,000 or more, while Africa, South Asia and East Asia have been, and still are, the least urbanized. Urbanization progressed most conspicuously in the Sovict Union and Latin America from levels in 1920 that would now be regarded as low to levels in 1960 that would have ranked among the highest some forty years previously.

Growth of big cities and multimillion cities

Proportions in distribution and increase during 1920-1960 are altered when the comparison is confined to big cities, i.e. agglomerations or metropolitan areas of at least 500,000 inhabitants (see tables 7 and 8). The validity of the comparison is limited by numerous difficulties of definition. In particular, it is questionable whether the growth of cities in Europe and in Northern America has been traced comparably. Accepting the tentative estimates at face value, almost one half the world's big-city population in 1920 was found in Europe, while in 1960 there was only one fifth. As compared with big cities of Europe in 1920, those of Northern America had only one half the population, and those of East Asia only one third; in 1960, Northern America's big-city population equalled that of Europe, and that of East Asia surpassedit.

Table 7. — Big-city population (agglomerations of 500,000 and more inhabitants) in major areas of the world, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates, in millions)

Major area	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
World total	*94.9*	*133.6*	*175.8*	*224.4*	*351.6*
Europe (ex USSR)	43.9	54.6	60.7	62.2	72.7
Northern America	21.8	31.0	36.4	50.0	72.0
East Asia	14.7	23.2	34.4	44.2	86.4
South Asia	4.6	6.3	13.4	26.1	42.4
Soviet Union	1.9	6.2	13.8	13.3	26.9
Latin America	5.4	8.4	11.8	19.6	35.2
Africa	0.9	1.8	2.9	6.0	10.8
Oceania	1.7	2.1	2.4	3.0	5.2

Table 8. — Big-city population (500,000 and over) as a percentage of urban population (20,000 and over) in major areas of the world, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates)

Major area	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
World total	*38*	*41*	*41*	*42*	*47*
Europe (ex USSR)	42	44	43	42	42
Northern America	50	53	57	60	64
East Asia	38	41	42	42	54
South Asia	17	18	27	34	37
Soviet Union	12	26	29	27	34
Latin America	42	46	47	48	52
Africa	13	19	21	28	30
Oceania[a]	54	55	54	51	62

[a] Percentages computed from unrounded data.

Regions of varied economic development

Some of the major areas contain regions of varied economic development. Thus, Japan, Temperate South

America, and Australia and New Zealand are economically more developed than other regions of East Asia, Latin America and Oceania. It is of interest, therefore, to differentiate the estimates of urban and rural population for the more developed regions and for the less developed ones. Comparisons are presented for more developed and for less developed regions (types A and B):

Type A

More developed regions . . . All of Europe, Japan, Northern America, the Soviet Union, Temperate South America, and Australia and New Zealand

Type B

Less developed regions. . . . East Asia without Japan, Middle South Asia, South-East Asia, the Caribbean, South-West Asia, Tropical South America, the Middle American Mainland, all of Africa, and Oceania without Australia and New Zealand

As shown in table 9, from 1920 to 1960 total population grew by about 300 million in the more developed regions, and more than 800 million in less developed regions. In both groups of regions, urban population

Table 9. — Trends in total, rural, urban and big-city population in regions of different levels of economic development, 1920-1960

(Rough estimates, in millions)

Group of regions	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
Total population					
World total	*1,860.2*	*2,069.3*	*2,296.9*	*2,516.8*	*2,994.4*
More developed regions	672.3	757.8	821.6	858.0	976.5
Less developed regions	1,187.9	1,311.5	1,475.3	1,658.8	2,017.9
Rural and small-town population					
World total	*1,607.3*	*1,741.2*	*1,869.9*	*1,985.3*	*2,241.0*
More developed regions	487.5	523.6	529.7	527.8	543.8
Less developed regions	1,119.8	1,217.6	1,340.2	1,457.5	1,697.2
Urban population (20,000 and over)					
World total	*252.9*	*328.1*	*427.0*	*531.5*	*753.4*
More developed regions	184.8	234.2	291.9	330.2	432.7
Less developed regions	68.1	93.9	135.1	201.3	320.7
Big-city population (500,000 and over)					
World total	*94.9*	*135.6*	*176.8*	*224.4*	*351.6*
More developed regions	80.1	111.2	133.8	149.8	212.4
Less developed regions	14.8	24.4	43.0	74.6	139.2
Urban population as a percentage of total population					
World total	*14*	*16*	*19*	*21*	*25*
More developed regions	27	31	36	38	44
Less developed regions	6	7	9	12	16
Big-city population as a percentage of urban population					
World total	*38*	*41*	*41*	*42*	*47*
More developed regions	43	47	46	45	49
Less developed regions	22	26	32	37	43
Big-city population as a percentage of total population					
World total	*5*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*12*
More developed regions	12	15	16	17	22
Less developed regions	1	2	3	5	7

Note. Slight discrepancies with figures shown elsewhere are the result of rounding.

was augmented by about 250 million. But the urban population of the more developed regions, initially larger, increased by about 2.3 times while in the less developed regions it grew in the same period by 4.7 times. Between 1920 and 1960, the rural and small-town population of the more developed regions had a net growth of only about 60 million, an increase of less than one eighth the 1920 size. In the less developed regions, meanwhile, the addition to rural and small-town population was nearly 580 million, which is more than one half its size in 1920.

The growth in big-city population, from 1920 to 1960, is estimated as 130 million in the more developed regions, and almost as much also in the less developed regions. But in the first type of regions, big-city population was already of substantial size in 1920, and in 1960 it came to about 2.7 times that size; in the less developed regions, by contrast, where big cities in 1920 were still rather few and not large, the forty years' growth in big-city population was more than ninefold.

In the more developed regions, the level of urbanization (percentage of total population in "urban" areas) rose from 27 in 1920 to 44 in 1960, exceeding the rise in the percentage of urban population in less developed regions, where it increased from 6 per cent in 1920 to 16 per cent in 1960. From a relative point of view, however, it is correct to say that urbanization advanced more rapidly in the less developed regions, for there the level was initially low and the growth in total population was faster. The concentration of urban population in big cities advanced relatively little in the more developed regions (from 43 per cent in 1920 to 49 per cent in 1960), but in less developed regions the share of big cities rose from 22 to 43 per cent of the urban population.

Observations on regions grouped by recency of urbanization

Because world regions differ in pace of population growth as well as in levels, the element of time is specifically examined in connexion with the process of urbanization. Table 10 summarizes estimates for regions grouped according to attainment of 25 per cent urban in total population by specified years. The groups are:

I. Regions at least 25 per cent urbanized by 1920	Western Europe, Northern Europe, Northern America, Temperate South America, and Australia and New Zealand
II. Regions at least 25 per cent urbanized by 1960 but not by 1920 .	Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Japan, Other East Asia, the Soviet Union, Tropical South America, the Middle American Mainland, Northern Africa, and Southern Africa
III. Regions not yet 25 per cent urbanized by 1960	Mainland East Asia, Middle South Asia, South-East Asia, South-West Asia, the Caribbean, Tropical Africa, and Other Oceania

Urbanization progresses fastest at the intermediate level, group II, but not so fast where the level is still low, or where it is already high. In 1960, the total population in group II was nearly twice that of group I, and the total population in group III approximately twice that of group II. On the other hand, total urban populations in the three groups were nearly equal. The distribution of the world's rural population was, accordingly, the more uneven: in 1960, 9 per cent of the world's rural and small-town population was in group I, 24 per cent in group II, and 67 per cent in group III.

The increases in urban and rural population proceeded unequally among the three groups of regions. Between 1920 and 1960, total population increased 52 per cent in group I, 61 per cent in group II, and 63 per cent in group III but during the same time, urban population doubled in group I, multiplied by 35 in group II, and 4.5 in group III; rural population grew by 17 per cent in group I, 28 per cent in group II, and 48 per cent in group III. In short, similar rates of total population growth have produced varied rates of urban and rural growth according to the levels of urbanization: where the level of urbanization was already high, only moderate rates of growth in both the urban and the rural population occurred, but where the level of urbanization was low, both the urban and the rural populations grew with greatest rapidity. Expressed in average annual percentage rates, the phenomenon was:

Type of region	*Average annual rate of population growth, 1920-1960*		
	Total	*Urban*	*Rural and small-town*
I. Early urbanized	1.0	1.8	0.4
II. Recently urbanized	1.2	3.2	0.6
III. Least urbanized	1.2	3.8	1.0

The recent acceleration of population growth in most of the regions of the world, particularly the less developed ones, has merely intensified this phenomenon. Patterns are similar, but rates of growth in urban and rural populations diverged widely.

The average annual percentage rates for the 1950-1960 period are:

Type of region	*Average annual rate of population growth, 1950-1960*		
	Total	*Urban*	*Rural and small-town*
I. Early urbanized	1.3	2.3	0.3
II. Recently urbanized	1.7	4.0	0.8
III. Least urbanized	1.9	4.5	1.5

If this analysis illustrates the nature of the momentum of urbanization, and if the distinctions are relevant, it is suggested that:

(*a*) With a given rate of growth in total population, and a low level of urbanization, both the urban and the rural populations are apt to grow rapidly, and yet the level of urbanization can advance only gradually;

Table 10. — Summary of changes in total, rural, urban and big-city populations in regions of the world classified by recency of urbanization, 1920-1940 and 1940-1960

(Rough estimates, in millions)

Group I: regions at least 25 per cent urbanized by 1920
Group II: regions at least 25 per cent urbanized by 1960 but not by 1920
Group III: regions not yet 25 per cent urbanized by 1960

Group of regions	*1920*	*1940*	*1960*	*1940 per 100 in 1920*	*1960 per 100 in 1940*
		Total population			
World total	*1,860.2*	*2,296.9*	*2,994.4*	*123*	*130*
Group I	297.9	353.9	452.3	119	128
Group II	503.9	648.0	813.6	129	126
Group III	1,058.4	1,295.0	1,728.5	122	133
		Rural and small-town population			
World total	*1,607.3*	*1,869.9*	*2,241.0*	*116*	*120*
Group I	176.6	187.5	206.4	106	110
Group II	426.9	493.6	545.0	116	110
Group III	1,003.8	1,188.8	1,489.6	118	125
		Urban population (20,000 and over)			
World total	*252.9*	*427.0*	*753.4*	*169*	*176*
Group I	121.3	166.4	245.9	137	148
Group II	77.0	154.4	268.6	201	174
Group III	54.6	106.2	238.9	195	225
		Big-city population (500,000 and over)			
World total	*94.9*	*175.8*	*351.6*	*186*	*200*
Group I	57.6	83.4	135.0	144	162
Group II	26.0	60.1	115.6	231	192
Group III	11.3	32.3	101.0	286	313

Group of regions	*1920*	*1940*	*1960*
	Urban population as a percentage of total population		
World total	*14*	*19*	*25*
Group I	41	47	54
Group II	15	24	33
Group III	5	8	14
	Big-city population as a percentage of urban population		
World total	*38*	*41*	*47*
Group I	47	50	55
Group II	34	39	43
Group III	21	30	42
	Big-city population as a percentage of total population		
World total	*5*	*8*	*12*
Group I	19	24	30
Group II	5	9	14
Group III	1	2	6

(*b*) With a similar rate of growth in total population, and an intermediate level of urbanization, urban population can grow rapidly, and the level of urbanization can advance rapidly, without necessarily any rapid growth in rural population; and

(*c*) With a similar rate of growth in total population, and a high level of urbanization, both urban and rural population can grow at relatively moderate rates, while the level of urbanization progresses also at a moderate pace.

These dynamic considerations — in terms of rates of growth — must also take into account the resulting balance in absolute numbers and structural proportions. As compared with urban areas, the rural rates of growth are more moderate, but where the rural population is of large size they give large increases in numbers of rural inhabitants. A comparison is made below of absolute increases in total, urban and rural populations in the three types of regions for the twenty-year period from 1920 to 1940 and the ten-year period from 1950 to 1960. Both periods have been relatively undisturbed by war, and the world's total population has grown about as much in the recent decade as it did in the earlier two decades.

Type of region	*Absolute increases in population (millions)*		
	Total	*Urban*	*Rural and small-town*
1920-1940			
I. Early urbanized	56	45	11
II. Recently urbanized	144	77	67
III. Least urbanized	237	52	185
1950-1960			
I. Early urbanized	56	50	6
II. Recently urbanized	129	87	42
III. Least urbanized	294	86	208

The momentum of urbanization and of concentration in big cities

It is possible that some average relationship may persist between levels of urbanization, general growth in population, and the emergence and growth of big cities. Such a relationship is suggested when comparisons are confined to long time periods and broad geographical groupings, as shown by the following summary figures (derived from table 10):

	Urban population as a percentage of total population		*Gain in big-city population as a percentage of gain in total population*	
	1940	*1960*	*1920-1940*	*1940-1960*
World total	*19*	*25*	*19*	*25*
I. Early urbanized	47	54	46	52
II. Recently urbanized	24	33	24	34
III. Least urbanized	8	14	9	16

Thus, for reasons which are unclear, there is a marked similarity between the percentage of total population in urban places at a given date and the percentage of total population increase (during the preceding twenty-year period) which accrues to big cities.

A TENTATIVE LOOK AT THE FUTURE

A crude method of projection

In view of the shortcomings of the data, only crude methods for projections of urban population are appropriate. The two assumptions which have been applied to projections of total population for each of twenty-one regions [10] are:

(*a*) A logistic curve fitted to the three series of group averages given in table 10, by assuming that together they may constitute a long time sequence, group II in 1920 being linked directly with group III in 1960, and being followed, after an interpolated time interval, by the sequence in group I. It was also assumed that urbanization would never exceed the level of 70 per cent in any world region. With this logistic curve, which fitted the data tolerably well, it was possible to estimate from a given percentage level of urbanization what might be—in conformity with the average of observed past trends—the percentage level of urbanization to be expected twenty years later;

(*b*) That for the projection of big-city population, the relationship observed in the preceding section, i.e., the near-coincidence between the percentage level of urbanization at the end of a twenty-year period and the percentage of the absolute increment in total population during the twenty-year period which is gained in big cities, will hold true in the future.

The present projections may be indicative of plausible orders of magnitude, but are not forecasts related to detailed pertinent conditions. Table 11 gives summary results of these calculations, together with estimates from 1920 onward, by twenty-year time intervals. The projections suggest that, in the world as a whole, the population may increase by as great an amount from 1960 to 1980 as it did in the forty years from 1920 to 1960. The 1960-1980 additions to the rural and small-town population may equal or slightly surpass those of the preceding forty-year period, and future increments to the urban population may be considerably larger than those of the past period. It is possible that the population in the world's big cities may double and this may happen although the 1960-1980 increments in Europe, Northern America and Oceania may be smaller than those of the 1920-1960 period, and the 1960-1980 increments in East Asia and the Soviet Union may not be significantly larger. The acceleration of increments in total, rural, urban and big-city population is likely to become most conspicuous in South Asia, Latin America and Africa. At the same time, there will also occur a further redistribution in urban population among different parts of the world.

The possible implications

The estimates and tentative projections for each region have also been grouped according to more developed and less developed regions (i.e., regions of types A and B, as previously described), and are shown in table 12. The percentage shares of the group of less developed regions relative to world totals is particularly noteworthy. The remarkable observation can be made that of the world's increase in rural and small-town population in the past four decades 91 per cent occurred in the less developed regions, and the tentative projections suggest that almost 97 per cent of the increments in the world's

[10] "World Population Prospects" (ST/SOA/Ser.7). The projections for the areas and regions used in this study are set forth in the annex.

Table 11. — Crude tentative projections of total, rural, urban and big-city population in major world areas, 1960-1980, and estimates for 1920-1960

(Millions)

Major areas and type of settlement	*Estimates*			*Projection*	*Absolute increment*	
	1920	*1940*	*1960*	*1980*	*Estimated 1920-1960*	*Projected 1960-1980*
World total						
Total population	*1,860*	*2,298*	*2,994*	*4,269*	*1,134*	*1,275*
Rural, small-town	1,607	1,871	2,242	2,909	635	667
Urban	253	427	752	1,360	499	608
(Big cities)	(96)	(175)	(351)	(725)	(255)	(374)
Europe (excluding USSR)						
Total population	*324*	*379*	*425*	*479*	*101*	*54*
Rural, small-town	220	239	251	244	31	— 7
Urban	104	140	174	235	70	61
(Big cities)	(44)	(61)	(73)	(99)	(29)	(26)
Northern America						
Total population	*116*	*144*	*198*	*262*	*82*	*64*
Rural, small-town	72	80	86	101	14	15
Urban	44	64	112	161	68	49
(Big cities)	(22)	(36)	(72)	(111)	(50)	(39)
East Asia						
Total population	*553*	*636*	*794*	*1,038*	*241*	*244*
Rural, small-town	514	554	634	742	120	108
Urban	39	82	160	296	121	136
(Big cities)	(15)	(34)	(86)	(155)	(71)	(69)
South Asia						
Total population	*470*	*610*	*858*	*1,366*	*388*	*508*
Rural, small-town	443	560	742	1,079	299	337
Urban	27	50	116	287	89	171
(Big cities)	(5)	(13)	(42)	(149)	(37)	(107)
Soviet Union						
Total population	*155*	*195*	*214*	*278*	*59*	*64*
Rural, small-town	139	148	136	150	– 3	14
Urban	16	47	78	128	62	50
(Big cities)	(2)	(14)	(27)	(56)	(25)	(29)
Latin America						
Total population	*90*	*130*	*213*	*374*	*123*	*161*
Rural, small-town	77	105	145	222	68	77
Urban	13	25	68	152	55	84
(Big cities)	(5)	(12)	(35)	(100)	(30)	(65)
Africa						
Total population	*143*	*192*	*276*	*449*	*133*	*173*
Rural, small-town	136	178	240	360	104	120
Urban	7	14	36	89	29	53
(Big cities)	(1)	(3)	(11)	(47)	(10)	(36)
Oceania						
Total population	*9*	*12*	*16*	*23*	*7*	*7*
Rural, small-town	6	7	8	11	2	3
Urban	3	5	8	11	5	3
(Big cities)	(2)	(2)	(5)	(8)	(3)	(3)

Note. Slight discrepancies with figures shown elsewhere are the result of rounding.

Table 12. — Crude tentative projections of total, rural, urban and big-city population in more developed, and less developed regions of the world, 1960-1980, and estimates for 1920-1960

(Millions)

Type of settlement	Estimates			Projection	Absolute increment	
	1920	1940	1960	1980	Estimated 1920-1960	Projected 1960-1980
			World total			
Total population	*1,860*	*2,298*	*2,994*	*4,269*	*1,134*	*1,275*
Rural, small-town	1,607	1,871	2,242	2,909	635	667
Urban	253	427	752	1,360	499	608
(Big cities)	(96)	(175)	(351)	(725)	(255)	(374)
			A. *More developed regions*			
Total population	*672*	*821*	*977*	*1,189*	*305*	*212*
Rural, small-town	487	530	544	566	57	22
Urban	185	291	433	623	248	190
(Big cities)	(80)	(134)	(212)	(327)	(132)	(115)
			B. *Less developed regions*			
Total population	*1,188*	*1,476*	*2,017*	*3,080*	*829*	*1,063*
Rural, small-town	1,120	1,341	1,698	2,343	578	645
Urban	68	135	319	737	251	418
(Big cities)	(16)	(41)	(139)	(398)	(123)	(259)
			Less developed regions as a percentage of world total			
Total population	*64*	*64*	*67*	*72*	*73*	*83*
Rural, small-town	70	72	76	81	91	97
Urban	27	32	42	54	50	69
(Big cities)	(16)	(24)	(40)	(55)	(48)	(69)

Note. Slight discrepancies with figures shown elsewhere are the result of rounding.

rural and small-town inhabitants may accrue there in the next two decades. Less developed regions have had a rapidly expanding share in the world's urban population, a trend that is likely to continue. Moreover, their share in the world's big-city population, initially low, has increased even more sharply.

Perhaps the following comparisons are most eloquent. In 1960, the more developed regions had a rural population of 544 million and an urban population of 433 million, of which 212 million were in big cities. As tentatively calculated here, in the currently less developed regions the net additions to the 1960 population may by 1980 amount to 645 million rural and 418 million urban inhabitants, of which 259 million are in big cities. The *1960-1980 population increase in less developed regions*, therefore, can exceed the *1960 total population in the developed regions*. According to this projection, an excess would appear in the big-city and rural and small-town populations, while the urban population would be nearly the equivalent of the 1960 urban population in the more developed regions.

ANNEX

Major areas and regions of the world [a]

The major areas are listed below in the order of size of the urban population (localities of 20,000 or more inhabitants) in 1920. Under each major area, regions and the countries comprised in them are listed according to the size of urban population in 1960.[b]

[a] In this study, Berlin, considered as one city, and geographically contiguous with Eastern Germany only, is placed with Eastern Europe; the regions of Western, Eastern and Middle Africa are combined as "Tropical Africa"; and those of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia appear as "Other Oceania".

[b] For brevity, countries without a city of at least 100,000 inhabitants are omitted.

Europe

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland

Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom

Southern Europe: Albania, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia

Eastern Europe: Berlin, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania

Northern America

Northern America: Canada, United States of America

East Asia

Mainland East Asia: China (mainland), Hong Kong, Macao, Mongolia

Japan: Japan

Other East Asia: China (Taiwan), Korea, Ryukyu Islands

South Asia

Middle South Asia: Afghanistan, Ceylon, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan

South-East Asia: Burma, Cambodia, Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet-Nam

South-West Asia: Aden, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey

Soviet Union

Soviet Union: Soviet Union

Latin America

Tropical South America: Bolivia, Brazil, British Guiana, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela

Temperate South America: Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay

Middle American Mainland: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama

Caribbean: Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico

Africa

Northern Africa: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic

Tropical Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania

Southern Africa: Republic of South Africa

Oceania

Australia and New Zealand: Australia, New Zealand

Other Oceania: (Parts of Oceania other than Australia and New -Zealand)

URBANIZATION AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

An exploratory demographic investigation *

Introduction

Most of the world's developing countries experienced rising rates of population growth in the 1950s, as a result of declines in mortality and fairly stable levels of fertility. There was, in addition, a tendency for increasingly larger proportions of the total population to live in urban communities which, for present purposes, have been defined as localities of 20,000 and more inhabitants.[1] The latter trend, due mainly to increased rural-to-urban migration, has greatly influenced economic and social development in the developing countries.

In the developed countries of Europe and Northern America, both "push" and "pull" factors affected rural-urban migration.[2] As the development and modernization of agriculture released surplus labour needed for expanding urban industries, rural migrants were attracted by the growing economic, social and cultural opportunities in the cities. In the developed European countries with centrally planned economies, the recent character and pace of urbanization have been modified by a number of measures, including the decentralization of industry and of certain urban services,[3] and have therefore differed from the process observed in Western Europea nd Northern America.

Much attention has been given in recent years to the analysis of urbanization trends in developed countries, with some tendencies among experts to infer from the experiences of these countries future urbanization trends in the less developed countries.[4] Yet the emerging countries are developing under peculiar economic, social and demographic conditions, which include measures for social and economic progress in both rural and urban areas in the framework of national planning. Technical and financial assistance from industrialized countries are often among these measures. Given these and other differences, the relationships of social and economic changes to urbanization in the developing countries cannot be expected to parallel those which characterized countries whose urbanization was precipitated by the industrial revolution.

Definitions and limitations [5]

This article will explore the interrelationships between urbanization and economic, social and demographic change in an attempt to ascertain whether certain levels, trends and patterns of urbanization are associated with particular levels, trends and patterns of economic and social development. A satisfactory understanding of these phenomena is at present hampered by a deficiency of quantitative information and theoretical studies, as well as by the complexity of the processes themselves, which impedes their statistical measurement and their translation into simplified and serviceable concepts. A further problem is one of comparability of data with respect to both time and place. Hence, the analysis undertaken in this paper is exploratory and the findings, tentative.

The arguments that follow are based on data for a maximum of fifty-four countries (forty-eight developing and six developed),[6] with fewer countries being used for certain analyses when data were lacking. The correlation analysis, for example, is restricted to the six developed and only thirty developing countries. The selection of developing countries was dictated by the quality and availability of information; many had to be omitted for lack of adequate data. A larger number of developed countries could have been included, but were not, because of the desire to emphasize conditions in the developing countries. The countries included in this analysis cannot, therefore, be regarded as representative.

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[1] For a discussion of the limitations of this definition, see the article entitled "World urbanization trends, 1920-1960" in the present issue.

[2] See the report, Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Asia and Far East* (Proceedings of the Joint United Nations/UNESCO Seminar (in co-operation with the ILO) on Urbanization in the ECAFE Region, held in Bangkok, 8-18 August 1956) (Calcutta, UNESCO, SS.57.V.7.A., 1957), chaps. II and III; and Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz, "Urbanization and the development of pre-industrial areas", Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. III (October 1954), pp. 6-26.

[3] E. Mesaros, "Certain aspects of internal migration in the People's Republic of Romania", *Proceedings of the World Population Conference 1954* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 55.XIII.8/ vol. II), pp. 835-841; and *Report of the European Seminar on Urban Development Planning*, Warsaw, September 1962 (SOA/ESWP/ 1962/1 – ST/ECE/HOU/9).

[4] For a more penetrating discussion of this topic, refer to UNESCO, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East* (Calcutta, 1957), chap. III; see also L. Reissman, *The Urban Process* (The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964), chap. VII, pp. 167-168.

[5] Problems of classifying and analysing data on rural and urban population are examined more fully in "World survey of urban and rural population growth" (E/CN.9/187).

[6] In the analyses that follow, Japan, although a developed country by 1960, has been included with the developing countries, because it was in a transitional stage during a large part of the period under consideration.

A wide range of possible indicators could be used to explore the relation between urbanization and economic and social development. However, owing to the problems stated above,[7] the present study has been restricted to nineteen variables, each of which in itself or in combination serves as a simple indicator of level of health, nutrition, education, productivity, communication, housing or demographic conditions, as well as level of urbanization. (These indicators are listed and defined in annex II.)

Variations of levels of economic and social indicators according to stage of urbanization

In the article entitled "World urbanization trends, 1920-1960" some interesting dissimilarities in the pace of urbanization were found between countries that had achieved 25 per cent urban prior to 1920 (group II), countries and territories reaching 25 per cent urban between 1920 and 1960 (group III), and countries and territories that still had not attained 25 per cent urban by 1960 (group IV). These groups have been retained for the present analysis, the last-mentioned group being subdivided into countries and territories with 10 to 25 per cent of their population in urban places (group IV-A) and those with less than 10 per cent urban (group IV-B). The average level of demographic, economic and social indicators for developing countries in different stages of urbanization was then computed (table 1). For purposes of comparison, information on the six urbanized countries (group I) has also been given. (The groups are listed in annex I.)

On the whole, the various demographic, economic and social indicators for these groups tend to vary directly with stage of urbanization.[8] However, some caution must be used in attributing these variations to the stage of urbanization which, by definition, is closely related to the level of urbanization. This level ranged from a high of 56 per cent and 52 per cent for groups II and I, respectively, to a low of only 5 per cent in group IV-B. The reversal of the pattern in groups I and II is attributable to the fact that group I includes Finland and Sweden, which are highly developed but which have lower percentages of population in urban localities than do the countries in group II. The findings with regard to health indicators are especially noteworthy. Expectation of life, for example, ranges from almost seventy-one years for group I countries to only forty-five years for group IV countries; and among the latter there is a significant difference between group IV-A and group IV-B countries, which have an average life expectancy of forty-eight years and forty years, respectively.

[7] Some of the pertinent problems are discussed at length in *Report on the World Social Situation, 1961* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.4), chap. III; and *International Definition and Measurement of Levels of Living* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 54.IV.5).

[8] Indicators with negative values are infant mortality, the dependency ratio, persons per room and inhabitants per physician.

Table 1. — Unweighted average level of indicators according to stage of urbanization

Indicators	*Mean*	*Group I*		*Group II*		*Group III*		*Group IV*					
								Total		*A*		*B*	
Per cent urban	$\bar{X}$	(6)	52	(3)	56	(16)	32	(29)	11	(15)	17	(14)	5
Rate of urbanization	$\bar{X}$	(6)	0.4	(3)	0.7	(16)	0.8	(25)	0.3	(14)	0.4	(11)	0.2
Infant mortality	X_g	(6)	20.1	(3)	71.1	(9)	61.9	(17)	102.8	(9)	76.1	(8)	144.2
Expectation of life	$\bar{X}$	(6)	70.7	(3)	63.7	(15)	57.8	(20)	44.9	(12)	48.0	(8)	40.3
Dependency ratio	X_g	(6)	66	(3)	80	(14)	99	(16)	93	(12)	90	(4)	102
Literacy	$\bar{X}$	(6)	98.2	(3)	88.4	(17)	53.1	(17)	26.0	(12)	31.5	(5)	12.8
School enrolment ratio	$\bar{X}$	(6)	89	(3)	72	(15)	58	(29)	35	(15)	42	(14)	28
Mail circulation	X_g	(6)	176	(3)	30	(10)	22	(13)	9	(10)	11	(3)	5
Daily newspaper circulation	X_g	(6)	369	(3)	162	(15)	68	(25)	11	(15)	22	(10)	4
Cinema attendance	X_g	(6)	8.2	(3)	6.9	(14)	5	(22)	0.9	(13)	1.6	(9)	0.4
Inhabitant/physician ratio	X_g	(6)	990	(3)	977	(15)	2,492	(27)	12,395	(14)	8,337	(13)	18,978
Calorie consumption	X_g	(6)	3,123	(3)	2,726	(9)	2,353	(4)	2,256	(4)	2,256		...
Protein intake	X_g	(6)	89	(3)	90	(9)	61	(4)	56	(4)	56		...
Persons per room	X_g	(6)	1.1	(2)	1.8	(9)	1.8	(10)	2.4	(10)	2.4		...
Energy consumption	X_g	(6)	3,687	(3)	919	(16)	423	(23)	116	(13)	153	(10)	80
Income *per capita*	X_g	(6)	1,066	(3)	320	(14)	292	(10)	137	(10)	137		...
Percentage of gross domestic product derived from non-agricultural activities	$\bar{X}$	(6)	90	(2)	88	(12)	80	(16)	59	(11)	60	(5)	58
Percentage of active males in non-agricultural activities	$\bar{X}$	(6)	83.9	(3)	70.6	(14)	51.0	(14)	29.8	(11)	32.7	(3)	19.4
Rural density	X_g	(6)	102	(2)	67	(16)	288	(23)	140	(13)	135	(10)	145

Notes: numbers in parentheses represent number of countries observed.

X_g: geometric mean.

$\bar{X}$: arithmetic mean.

Group I: developed countries.

Group II: developing countries with 25 or more per cent urban in 1920.

Group III: developing countries that reached 25 per cent urban between 1920 and 1960.

Group IV: developing countries that had not reached 25 per cent urban in 1960:

A. Countries with 10 to 25 per cent urban.

B. Countries with less than 10 per cent urban.

Variations of levels of urbanization according to levels of social and economic indicators

Reversing the approach used above, it is now proposed to examine differences in the level of urbanization in countries classified according to the levels of the other nineteen indicators. In table 2, developing countries have been grouped by tertiles according to the level of the specific indicator under consideration, and the average level of urbanization is shown for all the countries included in each tertile. For example, the top one third of the developing countries with respect to life expectancy have 34 per cent of their population living in urban places, whereas the thirteen countries falling in the lowest tertile with respect to this indicator have 10 per cent of their population in urban places.

The range of variation in level of urbanization among the tertiles is considerable, depending on the indicator. For the dependency ratio, for example, the level of urbanization varies only from 30 per cent in the first tertile to 23 per cent in the lowest tertile. For several other indicators, the gap is as much as from 35 or 36 per cent in the highest, to 8 per cent in the lowest tertile. This lack of uniformity in range from highest to lowest tertile suggests that many countries may be relatively advanced in respect to some indicators, and yet relatively backward in respect to others. These variations notwithstanding, the outstanding fact revealed by the data in table 2 is the clear-cut relationship between the level of urbanization and the indicators. With the sole exception of rural density, each of the indicators (taking into account the inversion for the indicators with negative values) varies directly with the level of urbanization.

Table 2. — Unweighted average level of urbanization in developing countries according to level of economic, social and demographic indicators

Indicators	*Level of urbanization* [a]		
	First tertile	*Second tertile*	*Third tertile*
Rate of urbanization	28.4 (14)[b]	18.3 (13)	13.0 (14)
Infant mortality[c]	34.0 (10)	22.8 (9)	14.4 (10)
Expectation of life	34.4 (13)	25.3 (13)	10.3 (13)
Dependency ratio[c]	29.7 (11)	26.3 (10)	22.7 (11)
Literacy	37.9 (11)	21.8 (10)	14.1 (11)
School enrolment ratio	34.1 (16)	16.0 (15)	11.3 (16)
Mail circulation	37.0 (9)	23.4 (8)	16.9 (9)
Newspaper circulation	35.0 (15)	18.3 (15)	8.1 (15)
Cinema attendance	35.3 (13)	22.7 (12)	8.2 (13)
Inhabitants/physician ratio[c]	36.2 (15)	19.5 (15)	8.3 (15)
Calorie consumption	40.5 (5)	39.9 (6)	19.5 (5)
Protein intake	45.8 (5)	35.9 (6)	19.0 (5)
Persons per room[c]	34.0 (7)	31.2 (7)	15.4 (7)
Energy consumption	36.3 (14)	19.7 (14)	11.7 (14)
Income *per capita*	38.1 (9)	26.4 (10)	20.0 (9)
Percentage of GDP derived from non-agricultural activities	36.6 (10)	22.4 (11)	12.9 (10)
Percentage of males in non-agricultural activities	42.1 (10)	26.0 (11)	14.2 (10)
Rural density	22.1 (14)	18.2 (14)	27.5 (14)
Percentage of active males in transportation and communication	39.4 (10)	19.2 (11)	18.7 (10)
Per cent urban	37.9 (16)	19.2 (16)	5.7 (16)

[a] The average level of urbanization for the six developed countries is 52.2.
[b] Numbers in parentheses represent number of countries observed.
[c] Inverse from low to high.

An example of the complexity of the phenomena under consideration is the inconsistent relation between level of urbanization and rural density. This may reflect the operation of different forces. In some places, high levels of urbanization may stem from the "pull" which the urban centres exert on the rural population, regardless of rural density; in other places, a high rural density may be the major explanation for population movement into cities. As some experts have pointed out, these different forces may result in quite different characteristics in the rural-to-urban migrants.[9] Those who are pulled are generally likely to be more modern and characterized by greater literacy than those who are pushed and, consequently, they may be able to make a greater contribution to urban development.

It is not possible to ascertain from these data the cause-effect relationships between urbanization and the social and economic indicators. It was expected that some insight into this question could be obtained by comparing levels of urbanization with trends of the indicators, and by observing trends in urbanization in relation to the level of the indicators. Efforts to make such an analysis for the groups of countries in table 1 proved unfeasible, however, mainly because of the lack of trend data for a sufficiently large number of countries to make such an analysis meaningful.

Historical aspects of urbanization, economic and social change

Patterns of urbanization in developed and developing countries may be compared by using the concept of "urbanization similarity period", a phase of urbanization which a developed, urbanized country has undergone in the past that coincides with the phase through which a developing, lightly urbanized country is currently passing. The urbanization similarity period is determined as follows: the year at which the level of urbanization in the model developed country was closest to that in the less developed country around 1920 (called the "point of similarity") is identified, and the levels and trends in demographic, economic and social indicators for the two countries are compared for roughly the same number of succeeding years. A useful variant of this procedure is to select a developed and a developing country in which level of urbanization was similar at the same time in the recent past, and to compare trends from that date onward.

Figures I to III pair the trends in selected social and economic indicators for a developed country (Sweden) with those of a less developed country (the Federation of Malaya—before the formation of Malaysia—Ceylon,

[9] See, for example, Bruce M. Russett *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Conn., 1964), pp. 293-303.

Figure I. Demographic, economic and social indicators for Sweden and the Federation of Malaya









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



India) during the urbanization similarity period, as defined above. Figure IV makes these comparisons for a developed and developing country (Finland and Brazil, respectively) in which the level and trends of urbanization were virtually identical over the same time period, 1920-1960. Although Sweden and Finland are not typical of the highly developed countries, in that they are only moderately urbanized, they have been selected to serve as models because they are among the few developed countries with high-quality statistics extending over a sufficiently long time period to permit the necessary comparisons.

An analysis of these charts shows that where the urbanization levels and trends in the paired countries were almost identical during the period under consideration (as in Sweden the Federation of Malaya and Finland/Brazil), a sizable gap still existed for most of the other indicators. The health barometers (infant mortality, life expectancy) in the developing countries changed at a faster pace than indicators of a social and economic nature, thus tending to keep pace with urbanization and narrowing the gap between the developing and the developed countries. As a result of the relatively slow rate of change in the indicators other than health, the Federation of Malaya and Brazil lagged far behind the model countries at comparable stages of urbanization.

Even where the rate of urbanization in the less developed country did not keep pace with that of the developed country (Sweden/Ceylon, Sweden/India), the improvement in health indicators of the developing country kept abreast of, or even outstripped, urbanization. This is not surprising, inasmuch as the developing countries have had the advantage of applying, at a comparatively early stage of urbanization, modern medicine and public health techniques unknown to the developed countries during their corresponding urbanization period.[10] In Ceylon, these health indicators actually attained more favourable levels than those of Sweden by the end of their urbanization similarity period.

A similar analysis carried out for Sweden (1885-1925) and Puerto Rico (1920-1960) shows the levels of most of the indicators for Puerto Rico, including urbanization and the economic indicators, changing at a faster rate and attaining more favourable levels than Sweden's by the end of their urbanization similarity period.

From the limited comparisons made above, a fairly clear pattern emerges: in the developing countries, the health indicators have shown the most rapid improvement, relative to urbanization, while the other indicators seem to have lagged behind. These findings tend to confirm results of previous research.[11] The few examples given here are not conclusive, but they do suggest that there has been, in the past, considerable variation in the course of urbanization and its relationship to economic and social development, not only between countries at different periods of history, but also within a given period of history, and that future social and economic trends in the lightly urbanized, economically emerging countries may very well differ from those observed in the now urbanized, highly developed ones. This is not to exclude the possibility of two or more countries following similar development patterns, especially if the countries are quite

[10] Useful information on this general subject may be found in *Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 53.XIII.3), chap. IV.

[11] See, for example, *Foetal, Infant and Childhood Mortality, Vol. II. Social and Economic Factors* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 54.IV.8).

Figure II. Demographic, economic and social indicators for Sweden and Ceylon











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

similar with respect to natural resources, climate, culture and other conditions. Such was the case in Sweden and Finland during their urbanization similarity period (figure V).

Still another approach, particularly useful where trend data for developing countries are not available, involves plotting the long-term trends of urbanization and a selected indicator for an urbanized, developed country, and identifying on the two curves the positions of the developing, less urbanized countries at a uniform date.[12] This gives some insight into whether the course of change in the developing countries is following the path that characterized developed countries. This is an exploratory method which requires further research in order to establish its suitability for such purposes.

Figure VI presents two curves, by free-hand smoothing, representing trends in urbanization and in the share of gross domestic product derived from agriculture in Sweden 1870-1950. The values of these two indicators around 1960 for fourteen developing countries for which data are available have been identified on the curves. As would be expected, the two indicators for Sweden bear an inverse relation to each other. An analysis of the level of the indicators for the other countries, however, shows that the relation between urbanization and the economic indicator is by no means uniform. For twelve of the fourteen countries, the economic indicator lagged behind the level of urbanization, and for a number the differential was very sharp, possibly reflecting the over-urbanization of these countries in relation to their economic and social development. The findings for Australia, with respect to the level of urbanization and the percentage of males engaged in agriculture from 1881 to 1961, are very similar. These two analyses suggest that the relation of urbanization to the percentage of labour force in agriculture and to the sectoral compo. of the gross domestic product varies in time and s and is probably determined by a series of com factors.

[12] A similar technique was used in the analysis of mortality trends in developing countries. See *Population Bulletin of the United Nations, No. 6, 1962* (with special reference to the situation and trends of mortality in the world). (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.XIII.2), p. 50.

Correlations of the level of urbanization with selected indicators around 1960

To carry the analysis yet a step further, coefficients of correlation (*r*) have been calculated between each of the indicators and the level of urbanization around 1960. The available information limited the number of developing countries on which such correlations could be based. A total of thirty-six countries are included: those in groups I, II, III and a majority of IV-A in table 1.

As shown in table 3, the indicators correlating most strongly with the level of urbanization are economic indicators; this points to the close relationship between urbanization and industrialization. The correlation value of 0.85 for the proportion of the male labour force engaged in non-agricultural activities corresponds almost exactly to the zero-order Pearsonian correlation of 0.86 between urbanization and industrialization which Davis and Hertz identified in their study of urbanization and the development of pre-industrial areas as of 1950.[13]

Table 3. — Correlations of per cent urban with selected demographic, economic and social indicators for thirty-six countries around 1960

Indicator	*Coefficient of correlation* (r)	*Level of significance* [a]
A. *Indicators with high values of* r		
Males in non-agricultural activities	0.85	**
Males in transport and communications	0.81	**
Life expectancy	0.72	**
School enrolment	0.70	**
Newspaper circulation	0.69	**
Literacy ratio	0.65	**
Protein consumption	0.65	**
Cinema attendance	0.62	**
Energy consumption	0.62	**
Letter mail	0.57	**
Income *per capita*	0.56	**
Infant mortality	−0.52	*
B. *Indicators with markedly low values of* r		
Rate of urbanization	0.24	—
Per cent of total population in largest city	0.06	—
Dependency ratio	−0.37	—
Average annual rate of population growth in places of 20,000 plus	−0.32	—

[a] Based on the *F*-test; $N = 1$; $N_2 = 34$. One asterisk (*) indicates level of significance from 95 to 98 per cent; two asterisks (**) indicate level of significance of 99 per cent or higher; no asterisk for less than 95 per cent.

[13] Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz, "Urbanization and the development of preindustrial areas", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. III (October 1954), p. 8.

As has been pointed out,[14] there are a number of measurable correlates of urbanization; altogether, the current analysis has identified twelve with coefficients of correlation ranging between 0.50 and 0.85. Of these, four have correlations of 0.70 and over, a level which accounts for just under half of the variation in one factor in terms of the other. In addition to the economic indicators, indicators of the level of health, education, and communication were also highly correlated with urbanization. In all, this analysis supports the contention, based on the data

[14] Leo F. Schnore, "The statistical measurement of urbanization and economic development", *Land Economics*, vol. 37 (August 1961), pp. 234-238.

Figure III. Demographic, economic and social indicators for Sweden and India



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



in tables 1 and 2, that the urbanization level is significantly related to a host of other social and economic factors.

Intercorrelation matrix among social and economic indicators

The complexity of the relation between level of urbanization and the social and economic indicators is perhaps best illustrated by a multi-variate analysis rather than an evaluation of single indicators against urbanization. Table 4 shows the simple correlation coefficients characterizing each possible combination of twelve social and economic indicators for the thirty-six countries.



The salient fact emerging from this analysis is the generally high level of correlation of the indicators to each other and to urbanization and industrialization. Of the total of sixty-six values, sixty are 0.50 or higher, and twenty-three are at least 0.70. The level of industrialization, as indexed by the percentage of economically active males in non-agricultural pursuits, bears a high relation — 0.85 — to the level of urbanization, and also has the highest average correlation with all other indicators, 0.73. The average correlation value is a very crude measure of the relative importance of each variable with respect to all the others. Eight other indicators have average correlation values falling within a relatively narrow range, from 0.64 to 0.70.

A crude procedure for obtaining some insight into whether certain groups of variables are more intercorrelated among themselves than with variables of another group involves finding the average deviation of correlation coefficients for each indicator about their average correlation, and expressing the average deviation as a percentage of the average correlation. As the data in table 4 show, the average deviations for the twelve indicators range from 0.06 to 0.12. More meaningful are the percentage deviations, which range from 8.6 to 18.5 per cent. Except for protein consumption, which occupies a somewhat intermediate position, the percentage deviations are clustered in two groups at the extremes of the range; the crudity of the measures used, however, dictates against attaching undue significance to this dichotomy. School enrolment displays the lowest percentage deviation, followed by newspaper circulation, males engaged in non-agricultural activities, cinema attendance, level of urbanization, and literacy ratio. All of these have average deviations of only 8.6 to 10.9 per cent of the average correlation values. The indicators with the highest percentage deviations are, in ascending order, infant mortality, life expectancy, energy consumption, income *per capita* and mail circulation. These have

Table 4. — Correlation between each set of indicators for thirty-six countries around 1960

	1 *Per cent urban*	2 *Males in non-agriculture*	3 *Life expectancy*	4 *School enrolment*	5 *Newspaper circulation*	6 *Literacy ratio*	7 *Protein consumption*	8 *Cinema attendance*	9 *Energy consumption*	10 *Letter mail*	11 *Income per capita*	12 *Infant mortality*
1. Per cent urban	—	0.85	0.72	0.70	0.69	0.65	0.65	0.62	0.62	0.57	0.56	– 0.52
2. Males in non-agriculture	0.85	—	0.82	0.82	0.80	0.74	0.55	0.66	0.73	0.71	0.71	– 0.62
3. Life expectancy	0.72	0.82	—	0.83	0.77	0.78	0.43	0.64	0.60	0.58	0.61	– 0.82
4. School enrolment	0.70	0.82	0.83	—	0.69	0.75	0.52	0.62	0.70	0.64	0.70	– 0.73
5. Newspaper circulation	0.69	0.80	0.77	0.69	—	0.57	0.50	0.59	0.70	0.71	0.68	– 0.66
6. Literacy ratio	0.65	0.74	0.78	0.75	0.57	—	0.47	0.58	0.62	0.57	0.65	– 0.61
7. Protein consumption	0.65	0.55	0.43	0.52	0.50	0.47	—	0.35	0.51	0.52	0.45	– 0.34
8. Cinema attendance	0.62	0.66	0.64	0.62	0.59	0.58	0.35	—	0.53	0.49	0.54	– 0.54
9. Energy consumption	0.62	0.73	0.60	0.70	0.70	0.62	0.51	0.53	—	0.93	0.97	– 0.53
10. Letter mail	0.57	0.71	0.58	0.64	0.71	0.57	0.52	0.49	0.93	—	0.92	– 0.55
11. Income *per capita*	0.56	0.71	0.61	0.70	0.68	0.65	0.45	0.54	0.97	0.92	—	– 0.53
12. Infant mortality	– 0.52	– 0.62	– 0.82	– 0.73	– 0.66	– 0.61	– 0.34	– 0.54	– 0.53	– 0.55	0.53	—
Average correlation	0.65	0.73	0.69	0.70	0.67	0.64	0.48	0.56	0.68	0.65	0.67	– 0.59
Average deviation	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09
Average deviation as per cent of average correlation	10.8	9.6	15.9	8.6	8.9	10.9	14.6	10.7	17.6	18.5	17.9	15.3
Rank order of per cent deviation (low to high)	5	3	9	1	2	6	7	4	10	12	11	8

Figure IV. Demographic, economic and social indicators for Finland and Brazil



average deviations of 15.3 to 18.5 per cent of the average correlation values, close to double the range encompassed by the lowest six indicators.

The high degree of intercorrelation among the indicators as well as the clustering of the percentage deviations of certain indicators, suggests the existence of a common underlying structure. Identification of such a structure would require a factor analysis of the data, but such an approach is not in order at the present exploratory stage of analysis. Had one been attempted, however, it might well have led to the same conclusion reached by an expert on this subject: [15] on the basis of factor analysis of twelve

[15] Leo F. Schnore, "The statistical measurement of urbanization and economic development", *Land Economics*, vol. 37 (August 1961), pp. 237 and 238.

Figure V. Demographic, economic and social indicators for Sweden and Finland



Figure VI. Level of urbanization and percentage of gross domestic product derived from agriculture, for Sweden 1870-1950; selected countries around 1960



measures of modernization, the same fundamental variable appeared to underlie the separate correlations. Although not identifying this factor specifically, it was indicated that the cluster of structured interrelationships may well be designated as "modernization".

The present investigation points to the same conclusion. The high correlations between urbanization and other social and economic indicators emphasize the interrelatedness of the diverse aspects of the development process. Although the levels of the separate indicators do not change at a uniform pace, both the cross-sectional and historical evaluations point to the fact that they move together.

Conclusion

In this as in other studies,[16] the question has been raised as to the possibility of identifying clearly the various stages of economic and social development through which the less developed countries will pass as they move to higher levels of urbanization. Research in this sphere is slowly yielding a significant body of knowledge. The results of the present study, though tentative, do reveal a clear-cut relationship of economic and social development to stage and level of urbanization, although there is little uniformity in the pace of change of these components. Some countries would seem to be relatively advanced in respect to certain indicators, but relatively backward in respect to others. Obviously, a large number of variables interact in these processes, and the isolation of specific causal factors leads to oversimplification. There is, possibly, a common underlying structure among the demographic, economic and social barometers that can be called "modernization".

The outstanding point is that in the developing nations urbanization is proceeding more rapidly than improvements in the social and economic indicators, except those related to health. Although the economic indicators, particularly the industrial ones, are most highly correlated with the urbanization level, reflecting their close interrelation, the fact that changes in the level of these indicators often lag behind urbanization suggests that many developing countries are over-urbanized from the standpoint of their economic development. The health indicators, on the other hand, have almost uniformly tended to keep abreast of, and even to outstrip urbanization, as a result of innovations permitting significant improvement in this sphere.

Full understanding of the interaction of urbanization with the host of social, economic and demographic phenomena must await more intensive analyses of the urbanization process, including its antecedents and consequences with respect to the social and economic indicators at various points in time and in different contexts. Research must be directed toward identifying the particular conditions affecting the pace of change in the different variables for specific sub-areas of the world, or even from country to country; it must also aim at an understanding of the uneven rates of change between levels of urbanization and other indicators of development on the one hand, and among the indicators themselves, on

[16] See, for example, Russett, op. cit.

the other. Even first attempts to probe some of these questions demand more complete data.

Because of the nature of the available data, urbanization has here been evaluated in relation to a variety of indicators based on the entire population of a given country. If there is a causal connexion between urbanization and some or all of the other factors considered here, use of rural and urban data combined may well camouflage distinctive patterns which characterize the urban centres *per se*. A realistic appraisal of the interrelation of the various dimensions of urbanization, therefore, ought to focus on the urban population. This would require separate data on the various indicators for urban and rural areas.

Most of the indicators considered as part of this analysis must change significantly with the development process. Moreover, as some authors have noted,[17] it is essential that they change with the least possible time lag if social and economic transformations are to be orderly and efficient. Industrialization, literacy and good health, as well as other indicators of the social, cultural and economic welfare of the population all must move forward together. In a very real sense, one is not a cause or effect of the other, but in a complex way all are both antecedents and consequences. It is to the task of ascertaining the best strategies for understanding and ensuring harmonious change among all of the components of modernization that research and practical efforts must increasingly be devoted.

[17] A. J. Jaffe and Charles D. Stewart, *Manpower Resources and Utilization* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1951), pp. 401-414.

Annex I

Countries included in the study classified by stage of urbanization

Group I. Developed countries: England and Wales, Australia, the Netherlands, United States of America, Sweden, Finland.

Group II. Developing countries with 25 or more per cent urban in 1920: Uruguay, Argentina, Chile.

Group III. Developing countries and territories that reached 25 per cent urban between 1920 and 1960: Venezuela, Japan,[a] Ryukyu Islands, United Arab Republic, Jordan, Mauritius, Panama, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Puerto Rico, Iran, Ecuador, Jamaica, Malaya (Federation of), Algeria.

Group IV-A. Developing countries and territories with 10 to 25 per cent urban in 1960: Iraq, Morocco, Turkey, Cyprus, Senegal, Tunisia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, India, North Borneo, Ghana, Ceylon, Honduras, Nigeria, Pakistan.

Group IV-B. Developing countries and territories with less than 10 per cent urban in 1960: Thailand, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Gabon, Kenya, Sudan, Guinea, Ethiopia, Chad, Tanganyika, Uganda, Swaziland.

[a] Japan, although a developed country by 1960, has been included here because it was in a transitional stage during a large part of the period under consideration.

Annex II

List of the indicators included in the study and their definitions[a]

Urban population: the population living in localities of 20,000 and more inhabitants. Level of urbanization therefore refers to the percentage of the population living in localities of this size. According to this definition, the rural population is that living in localities of less than 20,000 inhabitants.

Rate of urbanization: average annual amount of increase in the percentage of population in localities of 20,000 and more inhabitants.

Infant mortality: deaths of children under one year of age per 1,000 live births.

Life expectancy: expectation of life at birth for both sexes combined, in years, according to available statistics of satisfactory quality around the date indicated.

Literacy rate: percentage of males and females aged 15 years and over able to read and write.

School enrolment ratio: enrolment in primary and secondary schools (related to an adjusted population base, i.e., enrolment is related to a population more nearly corresponding to actual duration of schooling in each country, rather than to mid-year population in the specified age groups).

Letter mail circulation: total number of pieces of mail sent and received, foreign and domestic, per inhabitant.

Daily newspaper circulation: number of copies of newspapers issued at least four times weekly per 1,000 inhabitants.

Cinema attendance: average attendance at cinema per inhabitant per year.

Inhabitants per physician: number of inhabitants per registered physician. (This ratio is not related to visits to physicians.)

Calorie intake: average number of calories consumed per person per day during the year specified.

Protein intake: average number of grammes of protein consumed per person per day.

Housing density: average number of persons per room.

Energy consumption: per capita consumption of kilogrammes of coal equivalent.

Income per capita: US dollar equivalent of annual income *per capita.*

[a] Sources for the various indicators include: *United Nations Demographic Yearbooks, 1948-1964* (United Nations publications, Sales Nos.: 49.XIII.1 to 65.XIII.1); *Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948 to 1964* (United Nations publications, Sales Nos.: 49.XVII.1 to 65.XVII.1); *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.XVII.11). UNESCO, *World Literacy at Mid-Century*, Paris, 1957; *Annuaire Statistique 1963*, Paris, 1964; and FAO, *Production Yearbook 1963*, Rome, 1964.

Gross domestic product (from non-agricultural, or from agricultural activities): value (in "current" prices)[b] at factor cost of the domestic product, before deduction of provisions for the consumption of fixed capital, attributable to factor services rendered to resident producers of the given country.

Males in non-agricultural activities: percentage of economically active males engaged in tertiary and secondary activities. Where the reverse of the term is used, reference is made to the percentage of economically active males engaged in agriculture.

Rural density: rural population per 100 hectares of arable land.

Dependency ratio: number of economically inactive males per 100 active males.

[b] All references are to gross domestic product at "current" prices, including the long series presented in figure VI. According to the source from which the Swedish data were taken, "A requisite for making a calculation [based on a fixed price series] . . . is that the assortment of goods and their quality are the same for the years to which the calculations refer . . . Extremely few of the goods produced in the 1860s have a direct counterpart in the production of the 1950s." O. Lindhal, *Sveriges Nationalproduct, 1861-1951* (Stockholm, 1956), p. 41.

Social and economic problems and processes of urbanization in developing countries

URBAN GROWTH AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Introduction

Although Africa is the least urbanized of the major regions, its urban population growth rate is among the most rapid in the world. According to United Nations revised estimates, between 1950 and 1960 the urban population in Africa increased by 69 per cent, compared with 67 per cent for Latin America. In 1960, it was estimated that about 13 per cent of the African population, or about 36.4 million, were living in cities of 20,000 or more inhabitants.[1] If the recent trend in urban growth should continue, it is further estimated that by the end of this century the figure would have increased to nearly 300 million. This would mean that during the next thirty-four years African cities would have to be capable of accommodating about six times their present population. Unless positive planning measures are taken this rapid rate of urban growth is likely to aggravate present urban poverty and pathology, expand the *bidonvilles*, slums and shantytowns, and lead to considerable discontent and unrest.

It is estimated that between 1950 and 1960 the increase in population for cities of 20,000 and more for Africa as a whole was 10 to 13 per cent, for North Africa 21 to 26 per cent and for Africa south of the Sahara, 6 to 9 per cent.[2] There are regional variations. Thus among capital cities, Conakry may have more than doubled its population in the six-year period 1955-1961 while, during the past decade, Dar-es-Salaam and Luanda nearly doubled and Accra more than doubled. This rate of growth is rapidly increasing the number of African agglomerations. Cities exceeding 200,000 are becoming numerous. Lagos and Ibadan both exceeded 600,000 according to 1963 census results, Dakar has undoubtedly passed 400,000 persons, and Accra may already have reached that size. Cairo now has over 3 million. The trend in urbanization is particularly marked in some regions, such as the north and west with old traditional towns and in the industrialized south. The proportion of total population in urban areas varies widely, from 36 per cent in the United Arab Republic, 20-25 per cent for most of North Africa, and 35 per cent for South Africa, to as low as 1 per cent for Uganda. In Africa south of the Sahara, urbanization would seem to have advanced furthest in two areas, on the west coast comprising Ghana and Nigeria and in the east and south-east, comprising the Rhodesia-Katanga copperbelt and extending to South Africa. Elsewhere the level of urbanization is very low except in Senegal. In Africa, the urban population tends to be highly concentrated in a single city.

[1] See article entitled "World urbanization trends, 1920-1960".

[2] *Ibid.* and "World survey of urban and rural population growth" (E/CN.9/187), p. 21.

All these African countries have drawn up development plans envisaging the extension of transportation and communication systems, education, medical programmes, electrification and industrialization. If these schemes are successful they will undoubtedly contribute to further urban growth. Physically, there is planning of a few new towns and some replanning of a very few old ones as well, but in socio-economic terms there is a general lack of urban policy as well as of any large-scale concerted plan of action on the part of African Governments.

Rural-urban demographic trends and the stabilization of the urban population

The expansion of African towns owes far more to migration from the land than to natural growth, despite the scope of the latter. The levels of birth and death rates are considerably higher in Africa than in industrialized countries. Moreover, while death rates have shown some tendency to decrease, birth rates have remained generally high. It is not clear from the limited data available whether an urban-rural differential in birth rates exists.[3] In a few African cities, however, recent surveys have suggested that the birth rate is decreasing, thus suggesting that a fertility trend similar to that in industrialized countries might be beginning. Moreover, measures in family planning being adopted by a few African Governments should in time further affect population growth. Despite the impediments of national boundaries, migration has for decades been a way of life in much of Africa. But since the Second World War and, in particular, on achieving independence, internal migration has accelerated in many countries.

The cities — and particularly those of rapid and recent growth — are predominantly male cities. These are also young cities, with the bulk of the population between the ages of fifteen and forty-five. This age and sex structure has a variety of effects on a number of economic and social problems in the cities such as employment, education and housing. On the other hand, in the older towns as well as in cities where there are good prospects of work for women, the number of adult women tends to be comparable to that of men of corresponding age. In some towns of North and West Africa there are actually more women than men.[4] This would suggest that the male majority in urban centres, generally observed some decades ago, may be tapering off. The shift of popu-

[3] *Population Bulletin*, No. 7 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.XIII.2), pp. 129 and 130.

[4] "Demographic factors and trends" (SEM/URB/AF/4). Working paper for "Report of the Workshop on Urbanization in Africa" (E/CN.14/170 – ST/TAO/Ser.C/57 – ST/SOA/Ser.T/4).

lation has also changed the ethnic pattern in some cities. For instance, in East Africa since the Second World War, the ratio of Africans to Europeans living in the towns grew from a mere handful of Africans to 59 per cent of the total of Nairobi, 66 per cent of Dar-es-Salaam and 54 per cent of Kampala, around 1960.[5]

The socio-economic factors that link the African town dweller to the countryside are still meaningful and strong. The African migrant to the town often continues to have a home, some land, and his family in the countryside, with benefits which are just as much a part of his real income as the wages earned in town. Probably, as urban real incomes increase, a man's rural asset will provide a declining part of his total income and its pull may be correspondingly reduced. However, the system of freehold is still the exception rather than the rule in most African countries, and to have a farm is a right that cannot be converted into cash or capitalized. Thus, to leave the countryside altogether would entail relinquishing an asset and source of security without any corresponding compensation. Even where there is freehold tenure, the absence of mortgage facilities so depresses land values that the price to be obtained from farms bears no relation to the future stream of income to be derived from ownership. In the country, the wife supplements her husband's income by her labour on the farm while, in many towns, there are few opportunities for her to contribute to the family income. This situation is, however, changing as more economic opportunities such as domestic service, petty trading and professional occupations are opened to women in the towns.

In Africa today, with the acceleration in the flow of migrants from country to town, city growth, in the opinion of some observers, is unhinged from economic and social development. The hope of African Governments to raise living standards through increased agricultural output is being defeated through the drain from the countryside of the most able-bodied, competent, and progressive young men. *Per capita* agricultural production appears to have declined in recent years.[6] Traditional production has suffered, as well as the possibilities of innovation. There are other effects, such as the decline in the construction and repair of rural houses, community buildings, roads etc., and the disruption of normal family life. In the towns, the migrants often add to the growing number of unemployed, strain limited social services and help to perpetuate the unhealthy slums and shantytowns.

Much has been written about the desirability of regulating the flow of migrants to African cities but very little research has been done on the causes of the drift. The information that exists on the subject suggests that the need for jobs tops the list of reasons for migration. The pull of family and friendship ties, and the desire for training and educational opportunities are also important causes.[7] There is also the desire to enjoy the amenities of city life. Until a great deal more research is done on this vital question, it will be difficult to formulate adequate policies and schemes to deal with the problem.

With the exception of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia, African Governments have not applied restrictive legislation to migration to African cities. Most African Governments are probably less concerned about migration to the towns as such, than with schemes, located in the countryside as well as in towns, to improve the employment situation. These schemes are mainly agricultural projects aimed at keeping adult males and youths on the land, while, at the same time, increasing national income. Several countries have also started public work schemes in which large numbers of unskilled workers are employed. Most of these schemes, however, are too limited in scope to deal with the massive problem. Moreover, most of them are still at the experimental stage. Large regional development schemes like Aswan and Volta are expected to go a long way in meeting the problem. Programmes to improve rural social services are included in the plans of several African countries. It is hoped that these services, by improving rural living conditions and making the countryside more attractive, would help to keep many would-be migrants in their villages. Programmes of formal and informal education, better housing etc., with stress on self-help schemes, have been encouraged in many rural areas. However, the effect of raising the expectations of rural people, instead of keeping them where they are, has often resulted in stimulating a move to the cities.

Much of the proposed development policy in African towns involves measures favouring demographic stability; stabilizing the urban labour force is the crux of the problem. However, even those Governments that have found this approach desirable have often been put off by the excessive costs of implementation, which would involve a drastic wage increase for the labourer, a massive outlay for family housing and some form of social security. The question has been raised whether a commuting African labour force might not, in some circumstances, be more desirable than a stabilized one — that is, a more satisfactory situation to the problem might, in some circumstances, be to encourage and create appropriate economic and social conditions to facilitate and improve an African labour force that commutes from choice. A lack of adequate means of communication impedes movement between country and town although, as a general practice, the African "rural-townsman" spends a definite, limited period of time in the city. The need is to provide appropriate residential facilities, as well as improved transportation and other means of communication.

Traditional and modern; metropolitan and indigenous towns

In Africa, as in the industrialized countries, the origin and growth of many urban centres have been stimulated by economic activities facilitated by favourable location and by political and social factors. A large number of these major agglomerations are seaport towns; a few are river ports. Starting usually as trading posts for Euro-

[5] "Urban conditions in Africa", *Town Planning Review*, vol. XXXII, No. 1 (Liverpool, April 1961), pp. 20-22.

[6] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *The State of Food and Agriculture* (Rome, 1965), p. 56.

[7] "Applicability of community development techniques to Addis Ababa" (E/CN.14/SNCD/10).

peans, these ports soon became railway termini, thus giving access to a hinterland of human and material resources. Cities situated as important nodes of land routes owe their importance largely to their commercial functions; some have grown from market towns; others were built around mining activities. Most of these towns became colonial capitals, their administrative and political function adding to their commercial importance. With political independence, the growth of these towns has been further stimulated. Industrialization has also begun to affect some traditional towns, such as the old Islamic cities of North Africa and Yoruba cities of Nigeria, are gradually being modernized in the course of their rapid growth.

Many of the cities of Africa have central cores resembling the structure of western cities, surrounded by large settlements of indigenous populations living in ghettoes in *bidonvilles* and shantytowns. There is some tendency for lower income groups to live near the central area, with higher income groups comprising non-Africans and — in some cases — African *élites* residing in westernized suburbs. But surrounding the entire central core or alternating with well-to-do suburbs, are the shantytowns and *bidonvilles* containing the poorest and newest inmigrants. This picture, however, is over-simplified. There exist so many variations and overlapping differences in African urban characteristics that a classification is difficult to make. For the purpose of analysis, it would be useful to observe some of the main characteristic differences. African towns such as Kano, Addis Ababa and Ibadan are indigenous and traditional in character. However, some traditional African communities, although large in size, are difficult to define as urban. Other cities, such as Dakar and Nairobi, are metropolitan in origin and character. A city like Lagos is partly traditional, partly metropolitan in layout and function. There are also post-independence modern towns such as Tema, in Ghana. The following examples will illustrate some of these differences:

(*a*) In a letter from Nigeria, dated 6 September 1965, a United Nations statistical expert wrote: "There are a large number of other places [in Nigeria] listed in the 1963 census with a population exceeding 20,000. Some of these were called towns in 1952, but now we are satisfied that they are actually large agricultural villages without any of the rural-urban characteristics."

(*b*) The zone which extends to the Sahara north of lat. 6° N. contains most of Africa's indigenous towns.[8] The newest of these cities — Ibadan, Omdurman and Addis Ababa — have grown into innumerable district communities grouped around chiefs' residences or markets, in unbroken circles rather than in streets. Their layouts are the despair of modern town planners and impair the integration of the whole. However, these divisions do have significant social value, since each circle encloses an indigenous neighbourhood community. In some cases, like Addis Ababa, the outer area of the city is a rural, farm type of settlement which intrudes in several places into the city proper.[9] Other old cities like Kano, reflect centuries of slow development and have been created by masses of farmers and traders carving their paths to the central market while the residents gather in gaps between the paths. Through these townships, town planners have laid imposing thoroughfares which, although facilitating motor traffic, are ill-suited to the lives and needs of the inhabitants. It may be difficult in these towns to produce real business centres like those in Western cities.

(*c*) Lagos is an example of the combination of traditional and metropolitan, with more recent attempts at planning new suburbs. The original nucleus of settlement of Old Lagos goes back to the sixteenth century, with its houses arranged in circles around the palaces of the chief and populated mainly by Yoruba and Hausa. There is a so-called "Brazilian" district, which was founded by Africans returning from Brazil and Sierra Leone, and an area developed by Europeans for commercial, administrative and residential purposes. Between the two world wars, the Government attempted to relieve the congestion in Old Lagos by establishing the residential area of Yaba. About 1950, a plan was completed for a central port, industrial area and residential suburbs in the northeast. The slums tend to be concentrated in the old part of the city. The Government has since made attempts to clear limited areas of the slums and to provide low-income houses for those removed from the area.[10] The scheme, however, has not been very successful, owing to the lack of previous studies of the human factors involved.

(*d*) The planned metropolitan towns were developed to serve the administrative and commercial needs of the metropolitan Governments. Most of them developed as a result of non-African enterprises and were treated as major centres of non-African activity, with little or no attention paid to the expanding African urban and peri-urban population. Until recently, some of these towns were not considered as a suitable habitat for permanent African settlement. In recent years, however, some Governments have adopted an urban policy to assist the growth of a more integrated urban society. With few exceptions, these towns now have a predominantly African population. Dakar and Nairobi are two examples of these modern, metropolitan towns, each characterized by special features.

Dakar was laid out in 1862 by the French in a chessboard pattern. A protected port and railway terminus, it was the administrative centre of the former French West African territories. Concentration of the groundnut industry in Dakar after the First World War, which attracted many African immigrants from the interior, created slums. After the Second World War, the French built a multi-purpose capital. A series of suburbs of the luxury type were built on the coast, low-cost houses inland and, on the isthmus, industrial districts were established. The old districts expanded vertically. After

[8] A fuller description of some African towns is given in "Introduction to the problems of urbanization in tropical Africa" (SEM/URB/AF/A/1) (1962).

[9] "Applicability of community development techniques to Addis Ababa."

[10] Peter Marris, *Family and Social Change in an African City*, (Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1962); a study of rehousing in Lagos.

independence, Dakar has remained, perhaps, the most modern westernized town in West Africa; but her slums are also rapidly expanding.

South of the Equator, towns like Nairobi, Elisabethville and Salisbury are significant because of the importance of the non-African element in their development. Nairobi started as a railway shop and became the capital of Kenya to serve the planters of the "white highlands". The major ethnic groups came to occupy three distinct areas. The whites spread westward to live on estates modelled on those of rural England, while an Asian district grew up north of the station and business centre. The post-war period saw an upsurge of the city and today the population numbers about 250,000. With a formerly predominant European and Asian population, the city now has a preponderance of Africans made up, in particular, of rural in-migrants, many of whom occupy slums and squatter quarters.

(*e*) A few new towns are being built but some of them are poorly planned. Housing for various income groups is often segregated and the social aspects of communal life are totally ignored. In some cases, slums are arising even before new construction has taken place. But there are other cases in which the prospects are brighter. Tema, in Ghana, is one example of a comprehensively conceived urban complex designed to meet the needs of the new states of Africa. It is significant also because of its regional approach to the problem of urbanization. The town is being built on the construction schedule of the Volta River project and will eventually become the chief industrial and commercial centre as well as the outlet of the Volta development region. A key feature of the urban plan is the neighbourhood unit, each one to contain between 3,000 and 5,000 people, a number which represents the average size of a typical Ghanaian village, but also justifies the provision of basic social services. The units will be grouped together to form communities of between 12,000 and 15,000, the population necessary to provide for the more advanced community needs which should result in a compact new town. It is planned to unite people of diverse background and beliefs into an integrated, social, commercial and industrial community.[11]

Redevelopment trends: administrative services, housing and industrial schemes

From recent censuses and surveys it is becoming possible to accumulate statistical information of the large proportion of urban Africans living in overcrowded and unhealthy conditions. In some cases, there are indications that the situation is worsening. During the past decade, attempts have been made by a few Governments to replan towns. Over-all plans which include slum clearance, redevelopment and the creation of new pilot neighbourhoods have been projected for Abidjan, Bamako, Lagos and Nairobi. In North Africa, local authorities have taken measures to improve public utilities and to cope with other problems of urban expansion. These schemes are directed more towards the creation of residential areas and industrial estates outside the towns than towards a direct transformation of conditions within cities already built up. There are, however, a few exceptions, such as Lagos, where slum clearance on a limited scale has been carried out. In the traditional African cities like Ibadan, Kano, and Old Lagos, there are many old districts characterized not only by their slums but also by the social solidarity and considerable exchange of economic services between rich and poor neighbours of different social levels. Despite their shabbiness and physical squalor, these slums enjoy the most integrated social life in the city. There is the danger in Africa that slum clearance schemes tend to destroy rather than preserve this solidarity, without attempting to substitute anything comparable in its place.[12] Standards are too often set that are more related to the social values and means of developed countries than to the needs and resources of the people to be housed. In most towns, the housing problem is primarily a question of building enough dwellings for the newcomers who keep flowing into the towns — a problem that has nowhere been solved. Although efforts have been made everywhere to improve housing conditions, the situation remains critical since the cost of adequate urban housing is far above the means of African countries and because decent housing demands far higher wages than those now current in most of Africa. To cope with the housing problem, official, semi-official and private housing corporations have been set up, and a variety of building experiments are being tried out with varying results, but the situation tends to deteriorate in most towns.

Some African Governments including Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, have adopted an urban policy embodying the principle of full security of land tenure to Africans living in the towns and have set up a more efficient urban administration to assist in the control of urban spread and in the development of a more integrated urban society. In these territories, local and central Governments have a body of laws regulating sanitation, layout, housing standards, the provision of basic services, zoning and siting. African local authorities, however, often have neither the staff, resources nor the interest to exercise control over urban development. The interests of African landowners, for example, often run counter to those of the community as a whole, particularly as the political and administrative control exercised by the urban headman or his equivalent is frequently not great. Powerfully entrenched African vested interests, such as property holders and chiefs, often do their best to frustrate changes in policy by more aggressive African leaders. In the peri-urban areas, land and property speculation is rife.

In the peri-urban areas, land and property owners have a wide variety of arrangements with their tenants. Most of these agreements are verbal and extra-legal with the result that little security of tenure usually exists for room tenants or house owners vis-à-vis land and property owners. Rents are often high with services minimal, so

[11] Rita Kaunitz, "A review of experiences with urban and industrial decentralization in Ghana, India, Poland etc." (Preliminary draft prepared for the United Nations, 1964).

[12] See "Introduction to the problems of urbanization in tropical Africa" and Peter Marris, op. cit.

that poorer residents have no incentive to improve their housing. When the house is owner-occupied, it is often of a makeshift character and in some cases it is preferable to build for only one generation. Moreover, title to land cannot always be established in favour of the occupant.

In most African countries during the past decade, Governments have taken steps to induce and facilitate the establishment of industries offering attractive terms and certain services to prospective entrepreneurs by providing improved land in or near main cities as well as utilities, roads, communications and other basic facilities. The primary objectives of these industrial programmes are to stimulate the participation of indigenous entrepreneurs in the development of industry, and to offer strong locational incentive for both foreign and national industrial enterprises. It is also hoped that the schemes will serve as effective instruments for the regulation of land use in urban development or redevelopment and will ease the unemployment situation. Industrial estates for promoting small-scale industries, featuring standard factory buildings for rent, common service facilities and advisory and training centres, are functioning in Ghana, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic. Several other countries, particularly with United Nations assistance, have plans for their establishment or have programmes at various stages of implementation.[13]

The programmes are too recent and too limited in scope to permit a thorough evaluation of experience. However, according to replies of Governments to a United Nations questionnaire on industrial estates sent out in 1964 and 1965, the most successful would seem to have been those whose establishment was based on feasibility studies of the techno-economic and social conditions and prospects for industrial development. Success also appears to be closely related to the integration of industrial areas projects with comprehensive programmes of national or regional development. Despite some benefits from such new investments — a limited amount of employment and some training facilities — there have been some disappointing results. Owing to the general lack of governmental control over site location, the siting of new plants has usually been by persuasion rather than regulation. Some industrial estates are unrelated to or unco-ordinated with broader programmes of social and economic development; while the towns with prosperous industries tend to have the most rapidly developing slums and shantytowns.

Employment and wages

Wages and prices are perhaps the areas in levels of living which are of greatest concern to the African urban dweller. The over-all picture of the levels and trends in employment and unemployment in Africa based on the scanty data available is one of a comparatively small nucleus of persons in regular wage-earning employment, estimated to range from about 15 per cent of the total working population (urban and rural) in North Africa to less than 5 per cent in most of West and East Africa, with Zambia and Rhodesia ranging between 11 per cent and 25 per cent.[14] The number of employed urban wage earners in most of these countries has not shown much increase over the past decade owing chiefly to the falling off of export prices, political uncertainty, lack of modern productive methods and the increasing use of capital-intensive machinery. As a result, in some countries of East, Central and South Africa, there has been marked unemployment, even in areas previously having high employment rates. In other countries, there is an anomaly characterized by a large mass of unskilled, underemployed persons swollen by primary and secondary school drop-outs on the fringe of the labour market along with a shortage of qualified skilled and professional persons.

The towns have been the centre of African and non-African entrepreneurship which has been increasing significantly in recent years. Trade and commerce at all levels in most African countries are mainly in the hands of foreigners. In some areas, non-Africans, e.g., Asians in East Africa and Levantines in West Africa, have been largely responsible for the establishment of modern forms of distribution. They have not generally been willing to employ Africans or to accept them as partners in commercial and other enterprises. In addition, the presence of substantial numbers of European settlers created in East Africa — as in Rhodesia and to some extent in the Congo — a modern type of domestic market economy which was served almost entirely by local and overseas enterprises owned and operated by Europeans. Africans have resented this monopoly by non-Africans.[15] Several African Governments since independence have begun to train and assist indigenous entrepreneurs to participate more fully in the development of local enterprises.

One of the main problems for the African worker is the disparity in wages between urban and rural Africans, between employed Africans and non-Africans and between prices and wages. It is estimated in some places that the town worker earns twice as much as the rural worker for jobs in a similar category. The disparity in wages between Africans and foreigners has had innumerable consequences, which are particularly evident in the towns in which not only most foreigners are concentrated but also the emerging African *élite*, who expect to enjoy comparable levels of living with foreigners. The Africanization of the civil services as well as a number of business concerns has facilitated the rapid movement of a number of Africans up the salary scale. While the process has slightly increased the number of African *élites*, at the same time it has tended further to widen the gap between them and the rural wage earner. A recent estimate taken in East Africa showed that the senior civil servant earns from ten to twelve times as much as the artisan and twenty-five times as much as the labourer; invariably, the peasant earns even less than the labourer.[16]

Disparity between local prices and wages exists everywhere, placing at variance not only city and country

[13] *Industrial Estates in Africa* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.II.B.2).

[14] *Economic Bulletin for Africa*, vol. IV (January 1964).

[15] Theodore Geiger and Winifred Armstrong, *The Development of African Private Enterprise* (Washington, D.C., National Planning Association, 1964).

[16] Guy Hunter, *The New Societies in Tropical Africa* (London, Oxford University Press, 1962).

dwellers but also even the inhabitants of the large towns and ports and those of the smaller urban centres. Surveys carried out in 1959 showed that labourers' average wages were higher in Lagos than elsewhere in Nigeria, and higher in Nairobi than in other towns of Kenya.[17] With the rapid growth of the city, it became increasingly difficult for the city householder to supplement his earnings by gardening or gathering wood or other useful resources of the rural environs. Kinship responsibilities exercise burdensome demands on the urban employee. In Nairobi, in 1953 it was estimated that 50 per cent of the workers in the private sector, and 25 per cent of those in the public sector, were earning less than the basic minimum but sending half their wages to relatives in the country, receiving nothing in return.

Social trends

Studies have shown that urbanization in Africa involves more than a single social trend. In some instances, as in the traditional towns of West Africa, urban life is more or less an extension of life in the tribalized rural areas. In other cases, as in the "metropolitan" towns, the pattern of urban life tends to be westernized and industrialized. In the latter circumstance, the migrant in most countries may chose between a way of life characteristic of rural traditions and one that is more of a westernized-urban character. On the other hand, as a result of the administrative system of the Governments concerned, the migrant to the town might be compelled to continue to orient his life to tribal and rural ways, as is the case in South Africa and Rhodesia. There is, however, overlapping in these trends. At the same time, in many places the countryside is rapidly being enfolded in the same social and economic system as the industrial town. Consequently many individuals who move to the towns are already urbanized to an appreciable extent.

In many African cities, there is much in the social pattern and trend that reflects strong western influence. This is particularly the case in the metropolitan type of city. With the exceptions previously noted, no general restrictions are placed on the migrants' movements, nor on the choice he may wish to make between rural and urban living. The different ethnic groups are being integrated as a part of the urbanization process and a greater measure of co-operation is observed between African and non-African groups. The emergence of an African class structure which cuts across traditional social lines is also discernible. This trend is significant for social development because the leadership in urban administration and development, generally, in most towns, has now passed from expatriates to Africans. The change has come about with independence and the emergence of a small but growing African *élite* comprising high salaried administrators and politicians who, with non-African businessmen, members of the foreign diplomatic community etc., now make up the upper layers of the urban community. The next social group is the middle range of wage earners consisting mainly of clerks, personnel in services, tradesmen etc. At the bottom of the social scale is the mass of the population, most of whom are unemployed, or marginally employed, with a large number occupying the peri-urban areas.

The populations that occupy the peri-urban areas of African cities are sociologically mixed and unstable, made up of people drawn primarily from several different tribal and linguistic groups. The many social surveys of African urban areas conducted in recent years tend to show that the African population is largely one of young in-migrant men who are totally unskilled and hence earn little money. Few of the men can afford to bring their wives with them. The few women who are "available" are either very young or relicts of broken marriages, reluctant to enter into new unions. The young men, new to the conditions of town life, are compelled to make a living under competitive urban conditions, and to adapt themselves to a new social order which makes no provision for the exercise of customary modes of conduct, allows for no privacy and exposes them to a judicial system which may or may not give them satisfaction. Language difficulties are often considerable. Family organization and group life tend to depart from the traditional forms; individuals and groups experience difficulties in adapting to urban circumstances. Tribes, classes and cultures are mixed, and different marriage customs observed. This sometimes gives rise to a confused family and social situation, as well as to the weakening of traditional control. Such corporate groups as are formed under these conditions are usually on the basis of tribe, language, occupation, education, or recreation; the very absence of privacy produces bonds between people who would otherwise have little contact or interest in each other. Fear of thieves, for example, makes congestion desirable as an instrument of security.[18] Although in some areas limited welfare services have started to penetrate, in most cases the inhabitants of the peri-urban settlements depend on their own traditional and voluntary associations for social assistance. The social and economic gap between the different social categories is very wide indeed. This tends to heighten discontent and frustration and has led to social and political unrest in a number of African towns.

African women have gained in status through urbanization. As a result of the weakening of traditional ties in the towns and removal from the restrictions of village life, many women have found new freedom in the cities. A greater variety of jobs, licit or illicit, are being opened up to them in the towns and their participation, often on equal basis with men, is sought in the innumerable voluntary organizations springing up in urban centres. In a few cities, Governments and a few firms, have provided nurseries for the children of working mothers, but many more of these are required. More social welfare facilities in the form of women's clubs, literacy classes etc. are now available to women, and a greater number of girls are provided with the opportunity for education and training. From one African city, it has been reported that the number of girls who obtain a certificate of edu-

[17] See *Nigeria Report on Employment and Earning Enquiry* (Lagos, September 1959); also see *Kenya Report on Cost of Housing Committee* (Nairobi, 1954).

[18] Peter Gutland, "Urban conditions in Africa", *Town Planning Review* (1961), vol. 32, No. 1.

cation has increased ten times in ten years.[19] Some positive measures, such as the easing of some discriminatory laws and practices, have been taken to assist the change in the position of women but much more progress in this area is required.[20]

Several sociological studies made of African towns show that major features of traditional life, such as tribe, clan and kinship, continue to regulate important areas of social life in the towns. At the same time, social changes are quite marked. Western social and economic institutions have been well established. Western goods are in great demand. Radio, television, films and the Press carry a great deal of material that would be familiar to an audience in Paris, London or New York. Indeed, sections of the residential and business areas in some African cities are similar to exclusive areas of western towns. African towns are rapidly acquiring a modern image, although often without many of the western amenities that usually go with it. These studies, especially in West African towns, show that the process of reorientation and adjustment of African townsmen is facilitated by voluntary associations because they largely substitute for (and in good part, derive from) the traditional institutions of kinship and local community. A realistic approach to improving social conditions in the towns might be through government assistance to some of these traditional and voluntary associations that foster social activities and mutual aid. The indications are, however, that most Governments, watching some of them rise and decline, tend to avoid these groups, probably wary of the political repercussions that might result from being too closely associated with them.

Education and youth

In every independent African country, education has been placed in the front line of national planning, and the expenditure which some African countries now incur in this sector amounts to as much as one fifth of their total revenue. However, from this proportionately large investment in education, the towns have been the prime beneficiary, to the disadvantage of the rural areas, in terms of the quality and quantity of the available facilities they receive, as well as in the drain to the cities of the educated and semi-educated youths. Unfortunately, the product of the "new enlightenment" often lacks the kind of education and training more suited to the needs of African nations. Primary and secondary education is designed to make "townsmen" out of youths — but not necessarily the townsmen of a modern technological city.

The spread of primary educational facilities in rural areas, resulting in the rapid increase in the output of the schools, has been accompanied by the slow development of job opportunities in the modern sector, and a rise in the minimal educational qualifications necessary to enter most occupations. Government agencies, which tend to be concentrated in the towns, are the main sources of white-collar jobs available to those who leave school. There has been a proliferation of these agencies as opposed to any rapid expansion of employment outlets within the private sector. Still, the number of jobs offered by these government agencies is quite limited. Furthermore, the indications are that urban workers are recruited in disproportionate numbers from families who have been long resident in the cities.[21] It follows that the larger proportion of unemployed in the towns are likely to be in-migrants from the rural areas. The situation in most African countries is further aggravated by the paucity of mobility mechanisms outside the formal school system — such as systems of apprenticeship and the development of small businesses — to provide alternate occupations and social mobility. As a result of the oversupply of educated and semi-educated persons in relation to job opportunities, a post-primary education has become a critical factor in occupational success. Yet, south of the Sahara (excluding South Africa) no more than 2 per cent of any age cohort enter any form of secondary institution. At the same time, studies have shown that the educational expansion that has taken place has resulted in the dreams of African youths for further educational attainment and occupational success, neither of which, in most cases, they have much hope of attaining.[22] With these expectations, the tendency has been for many rural youths to flock to the towns, often to face keen disappointment. The village youth who suddenly becomes his own master in the town, without the customary restraining hand of his elders, sometimes tends to misuse his new freedom. The indications are that the incidence of juvenile crimes and offences is on the increase in African cities.[23]

African Governments are therefore challenged by the problem of regulating the flow of restless unemployed youths to the towns, and the problem of providing appropriate facilities for training and harnessing their energies for development goals. To this end, a variety of youth training schemes have been introduced, some voluntary, others compulsory.[24] In some of the programmes, youths are recruited for farming schemes or for national construction, in special service corps. The French-speaking countries have made plans to provide work on development schemes, usually on a compulsory basis, for surplus recruits for the army, while several countries have training schemes in manual skills. Many of these projects have been criticized because of their high cost in scarce capital and administrative talent in terms of the modest benefits derived; they have been criticized because it is sometimes a problem to find long-term work that has meaning within the general development of the area. Against these criticisms, however, should be weighed the less measurable

[19] Jeanne-Françoise Vincent, "Women in Brazzaville", *Women Today*, vol. VI, No. 5 (1965).

[20] "Report of the workshop on urban problems: the role of women in urban development" (E/CN.14/241) (1963).

[21] Arnold Anderson, *Industrialization and Society* (UNESCO, 1963).

[22] Philip Foster, "Secondary schooling and social mobility in a West African nation", *Sociology of Education*, vol. 37, No. 2, p. 150.

[23] *International Review of Criminal Policy*, No. 22, 1964 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 64.IV.1), p. 66.

[24] "Youth employment and vocational training schemes in the developing countries", in *International Labour Review* (Geneva, September 1962), vol. LXXXVI, No. 3, pp. 209 ff.

social gains of training in skills and other human resource development, as well as personal discipline, whose benefits accrue on a long-term basis.

In most African countries modern forms of apprenticeship have been introduced, particularly in the cities, and are being expanded especially through western business and industrial concerns. In some instances, government pressure has led expatriate enterprises to admit and train African apprentices. Side by side with these modern efforts there has been operating in some African towns, as in Nigeria, an indigenous apprenticeship system. In the town of Ibadan, it was found that some 2 million apprentices were learning a wide range of arts, crafts and services, from the traditional skills of wood-carving and bronze-casting to the contemporary ones of electrical wiring, dry-cleaning and local trade.[25] However, an increasing number of youths are being trained in skills without job opportunities being offered to them.

To make the benefits to youth effective and lasting, training and employment methods must be co-ordinated with job opportunities and with regional and national development programmes. But only a few African countries are attempting to meet this problem; moreover, an effective follow-through system which could guide and evaluate their experience is usually lacking in these operations. While these efforts on behalf of youth stand out as examples of bold government attempts to cope with a challenging situation, the total effort is nevertheless minimal in the face of such a large and growing problem.

Conclusion

The case for regional development; positive aspects of African urbanization; some recommendations

Much of the motivation behind regional development projects in developing countries is said to come from the rapid rate of the growth of urban population and the increasing concentration of this population on the economic and social activities in one or more major metropolitan centres. In most of Africa, the settlement pattern is generally assuming the form of a growing metropolitan region with a primate urban core surrounded by a tributary hinterland. The primary city drains the material and human resources from a network of settlements usually consisting of hamlets and villages — except in some areas of North and West Africa with a pre-colonial urban tradition, and in the more developed region of South Africa where this network of settlement includes small towns as well. The resulting severe demographic, social and economic imbalances between town and country threaten effective over-all development. High migration rates from rural to urban areas make policy requirements pressing for the protection of the welfare of migrants and city dwellers, as well as for the design of a settlement pattern conducive to rapid and sound development of the region and the nation.

It is also true, however, that African towns have provided the locale, organization, incentive and drive for political, social and economic growth and development. African towns have been centres for national movements that pioneered independence and the headquarters of the trade unions, whose efforts have helped to raise the living standard of the workers. The newspapers, radio stations and other systems of mass communication also operate from the cities, disseminating new ideas that have induced change and development. Most African countries have too few towns, and need more towns and larger towns to provide the organization and incentive for regional and national development. It has been pointed out that growth of scale is associated with economic growth and that the economies of large-scale organizations also result in the growth of towns.[26] Technological progress in agriculture results in the growth of urban occupations, but the economies of large-scale organizations lead to concentration of these urban occupations in even larger towns. Size is important, too, because in Africa, the larger the town, the lower production costs tend to be. The big city exposes the newcomer to new influences and helps to free him from many of those traditional restrictions that hamper development. Economic and social activities are on the increase in African towns and cities have become poles of development out of which the adjacent regions evolve.

In order to cope with this dynamic situation and to establish a rational basis for the growth and expansion of African towns and settlements, a close examination might be made of the institutional and technical framework that must determine the form and character of social, economic and physical planning in the various African countries. Attention should also be given to the size of settlements and the preparation of standards for planning and related purposes, in the light of population and socio-economic growth trends.

For some years now the United Nations has been offering technical assistance to African countries. These efforts have sometimes been retarded by the absence of suitably qualified local technical personnel and appropriate training institutions, but considerable progress continues to be made through the provision of fellowships, expansion of in-service training programmes, and the establishment of training institutions at the sub-professional level and in a few African universities.

The modern African town did not grow out of the needs of, or in service to, its own hinterland. In many cases it has grown beyond the capacity of its hinterland to support it without radical reform. One result is that too much of the food for townsmen has to be imported from abroad. Perhaps the strategy of strengthening the intermediate communities in the region has not received the attention in African planning that it might. It has been observed that a significant element in European, North American and Japanese agricultural development was the small and medium-sized communities, usually towns that everywhere served agriculture and the farm

[25] Archibald Gallway, "Nigeria's indigenous education: the apprentice system", *ODU*, University of Ife, *Journal of African Studies*, vol. I (Ibadan, Nigeria, July 1964).

[26] W. Arthur Lewis, "Is economic growth desirable?", David E. Novale and Robert Lekachman, eds., *Development and Society, The Dynamics of Economic Change* (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1964).

community.[27] These settlements were the critical points of contact between the regional development pole and the resource hinterland. In Africa, these intermediate communities are mostly villages and hamlets and tend to be poor and passive in contrast to the relative wealth and vitality of settlements similarly placed in most developed regions. Moreover in Africa the intermediate settlements lack adequate means of communication with the main metropolitan centres. In the distribution of public services and facilities they tend to be neglected in favour of the large city and have little to offer the farm migrant except a place to stop on his way to the city. Hence, these intermediate communities in Africa are usually the weakest links in the transmission of development opportunities between the regional centre and the hinterland.

It would seem, therefore, that development policies in Africa should give special attention to these intermediate communities which might become important strategic points in the process of modernizing the rural areas and regulating or reducing the flow of migrants to the cities. The strategy would be to expand the holding capacity of the rural sector by appropriate measures. Measures of this kind are in the plans for such major regional development schemes as Volta and Aswan, but they should also be tried out in more modest regional projects.

The regional concept implies a co-ordinated system of human settlements, from the small village as a unit of production, to the intermediate communities and regional centres as units of service and distribution of goods, to the large city — as the centre of the national economy and the administrative system. Some suggest that a major aim of regional development should be to place services and industries in such a way as to bring modern development closer to the farmer. But perhaps the African farmer wants to identify himself more closely with urban development. In this respect, the commuting habit between town and country of many African "rural-townsmen" is often a matter of choice rather than compulsion. Emphasis on the disintegration of family life and the bad social and psychological effects of certain kinds of urban *milieu* naturally has its place in the assessment of African urban life. Nevertheless, this negative emphasis has too often overshadowed the many advantages to the African of his close association with town and village. In consequence, much attention has been given to the ways and means of keeping him in the countryside. While no effort must be spared to make village life attractive for Africans, there is also a strong case for improving the commuting way of life of the "rural-townsmen", provided that constructive thinking and planning can make the system more attractive and rewarding.

A United Nations workshop which recently studied the problems of African urbanization,[28] observed that disparities in the ways and standards of African living between town and country dwellers are so great that the flight from the land seems inevitable. The report suggested that government authorities responsible for urban planning and administration should, therefore, face the concomitant problems rather than hope that rural-urban migration would slow down. Among the recommendations listed are, first, that administrative and economic decentralization measures designed to attract rural immigrants to smaller urban centres should be adopted. Such a policy seems more feasible in Africa than in most other parts of the world because the population is still mainly rural and industrialization only in infancy in most African countries. Secondly, in order to mitigate the problems which the drift from the land, combined with a rapidly increasing population, is causing in the cities, viable industries should be established and attempts made to stimulate the growth of centres other than those cities. Thirdly, Government and local authorities should pursue a forward-looking policy regarding city and peri-urban land and the adjacent areas in order to regulate and control development. Fourthly, self-help schemes such as urban community development programmes and action research centres should be fostered and encouraged. Lastly, programmes of education, training and research are urgently needed to meet the complex and varied socio-economic requirements of African urbanization. African education should be adapted to the changing political, economic and social problems of both rural and urban areas, and more attention should be given to improving educational and training facilities, particularly for youths, women and girls.

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[27] Resources for the Future, Inc., *Design for a Worldwide Study of Regional Development* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) p. 39.

[28] See "Report of the workshop on urbanization in Africa" (E/CN.14/170 – ST/TAO/SER.C/57 – ST/SOA/SER.T.4).

URBAN-RURAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN ASIA *

Background

Rate of urban growth in Asia

Whatever definition of the term "urban" be employed, it is undeniable that the urban population of Asia has been increasing at an unprecedented rate during the last four to five decades. It appears that in the greater part of this vast and populous region, urban population increase has been at a rate of approximately 4 per cent, a little more than half of it being from in-migration from rural areas as opposed to natural population increase. Rural population growth rates in Asia, therefore, which are considerable in themselves, are exceeded by the rates of urban increase. Although the degree of urbanization in Asian countries does not appear to be very impressive when compared to that achieved in more developed countries, the rate of change in recent decades is striking. India, for example, which was 11.4 per cent "urban" in 1921, had an urban population of 13.9 per cent in 1941, 17.3 per cent in 1951 and about 18 per cent in 1961. The urban "population explosion" of South Asia is matched by that of East and South-East Asia as well. In Indonesia, for example, Greater Djakarta, which had a population of about 500,000 in 1931, increased to nearly 3 million by 1961; Bandung increased from about 170,000 to close to 1 million, and Surabaya from 342,000 to about 1 million during this same period,[1] and similar statistics can be cited from virtually all countries in the region. The prognosis for the future is that these trends will continue at least until the end of this century, as a concomitant to development, when it is expected that the degree of urbanization witnessed in the developed countries will be reached.

Urbanization in relation to development

The generalization, based on history, that urbanization favours development may not be wholly applicable to much of present-day Asian urbanization. The major impulse for urban expansion in much of Asia has come not from the growth of manufacturing, as in nineteenth-century Europe, but most often from population pressure and a stagnant rural economy. The best indicator of this is that the proportion of the Asian urban population currently engaged in manufacturing is lower than in a comparable stage of European urban growth. Urban employment in Asia tends typically to be in the service sector, and urban immigrants can find little hope of work in the under-developed urban industry sector.

The non-industrial nature of much of Asian urbanization must also be considered in the context of the long Asian tradition of administrative, trading and religious towns. Indian, Chinese and Japanese cities have long been prominent for non-commercial reasons. Chinese urbanization has traditionally been built around administrative centres serving as focal points; the *hsien* (county) towns were the foundation of the pattern of urban settlement.

Rural-urban migration

Contrary to popular belief, Asian rural population is far from immobile, as the high rural-urban migration rates demonstrate. Migration, which is traditional in many Asian cultures, takes place not only to the largest cities but also to medium-sized and smaller urban centres, where they exist. The rural-urban migration must be regarded essentially as "occupational migration" in that it represents the search by superfluous agricultural labour for alternative and more remunerative employment.

Sources of migration

Although the migrants in cities generally have a lower educational level, poorer work status and lower income than the non-migrants, they none the less compare very favourably in these respects to the rural population they leave behind. Contrary to general supposition, it is not the most depressed rural inhabitants who decide to move to the city; the migrants are more often than not the better educated, younger and socially more favoured elements of the rural community. While illiteracy is no bar to migration in a region which is still predominantly illiterate, the literate villagers are more likely to migrate than the non-literate ones. The fact that education is available more readily in towns than in villages also means that the immigrants can become better educated than their rural counterparts after they migrate. The high correlation observed in Asia between schooling and the disposition to migrate would tend to suggest that rural-

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* This article does not purport to provide an over-all review of all aspects of urban development problems and policies in Asia. Such a review was contained in chapter XIII ("Social development in Asia") of the *Report on the World Social Situation, 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.4), as well as Urbanization in Asia and the Far East, a summary of which was included in an appendix to the *Report on the World Social Situation, 1957* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 57.IV.3). The present article is restricted more specifically to the relatively recent interest in urban-rural population distribution and settlement patterns. It explores the arguments advanced for and against different types and sizes of urban-rural settlements from the standpoint of over-all economic and social growth in the light of recent experience in Asia. The article draws heavily on the writings of other authors in the field.

[1] These unpublished estimates are available in the Population Division of the United Nations Secretariat in New York.

urban migration will become increasingly important in the future as education inevitably becomes more widespread in rural areas. Although migrants include both men and women, men usually predominate.

Causes of migration: "push" and "pull" factors

In Asia as a whole, so-called "push" and "pull" factors have influenced both the scale and nature of rural-urban migration. On the "push" side, the important factors have been lack of opportunities in villages; high density and pressure of rural population; inefficiency and low productivity of rural agriculture; scarcity of arable land; insecurity in rural areas (in some countries); stagnation of village industries; and lack of non-agricultural occupations in villages. The main "pull" factors have been the real and supposed "attractions" of urban life; urban industrialization and economic development (not always very substantial); medical, educational and other social facilities in cities; and the opportunity to shed ascribed social handicaps by moving to towns.

Urban-rural relations

Some writers have stressed the wide social and cultural gulf that exists between urban and rural areas in Asia, and this gap, according to them, is being widened rather than narrowed by recent developments. (They note also that the urban hinterland, is restricted, with no real suburban periphery, and in consequence, sharp urban, rural differences exist.) Others have been much impressed by the overlapping characteristics of the two. In their view, Asian cities are "agglomerations of villages", in the sense that the urban inhabitants remain rural in outlook and mentality, and the village ecological structure is carried over into the "urban" environment. If the rural/urban gaps were indeed vast, it is argued, rural migrants would be unable to adjust to the urban environment as well as they do, and the movement of population from villages would decline. The migratory process is, in fact, at the heart of the "ruralization" of towns; the rural migrants who go to the cities continue to maintain rural ties with their family, returning to their villages of origin frequently, sending money back home and moving back and forth between town and country. The often temporary nature of the migration to towns and the considerable volume of "out-migration" — from the city back to the village — prevents the emergence of substantial and lasting urban/rural gaps. In view of considerations such as these, these writers conclude that there is in Asia a kind of rural-urban continuum, and the cut-off point of what is "urban" must often be arbitrarily determined; a purely demographic definition of urbanization, in the sense of the proportion of population living in communities of, say, 20,000 and over, is thus considered inadequate. Some regions may be more rural in character than their demographically defined level of urbanization would suggest.

Characteristics of Asian cities

Compared to Western cities of similar size, Asian cities are spread out in space (less vertical), and there is often no central business district surrounded by affluent suburbs. The poorest, most recently arrived rural migrants usually squat on the urban periphery, not uncommonly along caste lines (in south Asia); the city is thus "multinucleated". The poverty is represented by the large proportion of slum population. It has been estimated that, even by very modest standards, from one third to two thirds of a typical Asian city population must be considered to reside in slums.

The urban pattern, of course, varies from country to country — at least from subregion to subregion — in some quite important respects. Japan, as the classic exception to most generalizations about Asia, is more developed, has a higher rate of economic growth, is more highly urbanized and has a long indigenous tradition of city growth. The major urban problems of Japan, similar to those of developed countries, include the lack of adequate housing in accordance with prescribed minimum standards, the need for creating a more pleasing urban environment, including recreational facilities and opportunities for cultural growth, the problem of fiscal solvency of local municipal governments, the problem of rapid urban transport, the lack of space for further urban expansion (which is being met in part by the development of coastal cities through reclamation); and congestion and drain on urban services (which is being dealt with through regional development and physical planning). Countries of South-East Asia, too, differ in their pattern of urbanization from the larger countries of mainland Asia. South-east Asian urbanization has no long indigenous tradition and is usually represented by a single dominant city, often a port. Although South-East Asian cities share with the rest of Asia heavy immigration from rural areas, massive poverty and insignificant suburbanization, the fact that the urban tradition is relatively new in this region makes it easier to apply models developed in the advanced countries than is the case with India, China and Japan.

Urbanization and planning

While almost all Asian countries have adopted national economic and social planning as a major instrument of development, few have until very recently concerned themselves much with the locational and spatial aspects of such planning. National planning has been concerned more with allocations to various sectors than with the location of projects and their impact on regional and national development. Only recently has the importance of the spatial dimension been recognized in Asian planning, and there is now evidence of a desire to achieve truly integrated planning, taking into account the economic and social as well as the physical aspects. Some Asian development plans, however, have recently started to explore such questions as the relations of urban and rural growth; the location of projects in cities and towns versus smaller settlements; the selection of "growing points"; the pattern of urbanization that would best promote the economic and social objectives of development; and the optimum demographic distribution of population among settlements of various sizes in rural and urban areas.

Large population concentrations and settlements of a metropolitan type

External economies

There is by no means general agreement in Asia as to whether large urban concentrations or small dispersed settlements better serve the needs of rapid economic and social development. The case for large metropolitan centres rests mainly on the "external economies" that accrue in such settlements. Large urban centres are endowed with the requisite credit institutions, financial and business services; they are centres of communication and innovation; they are the beneficiaries of the "backwash" effects of the hinterland and of the centripetal flows of resources observed in developing countries; they are the repositories of governmental and administrative services, general community facilities, schools, hospitals and other social and economic overheads; they provide readily available transport services and reduce their cost to industries locating within their areas; they provide pools of managerial and labour skills, particularly as the inmigrants from rural areas are better educated than the rural population as a whole; they provide more reliable power and communication services (electricity and telephone services that do not fail recurrently, roads that remain passable even in the heavy rainy seasons, and local technicians to keep these services in working order); they have a labour force that is more adaptable to an industrial way of life; finally, they are characterized by "consumer densities" (that is, readily available markets for industrial products) and greater combined demand made possible by clustering, thereby increasing the opportunities for other ancillary suppliers to locate in the same area as well as the potential for industrial diversification. Moreover, as transportation improves, larger centres have been found to become more competitive than smaller settlements; increasing specialization is made possible thereby and consequently urban sprawl facilitated. In view of considerations such as these, it is not surprising that industry in Asia, left to itself, has shown a marked tendency to cluster in large urban and metropolitan centres. A great deal of the so-called decentralized small town or village industry in Asia will, on closer inspection, be found to be located within metropolitan orbits or on the outskirts of large urban centres.

Problems encountered in decentralizing industry

A major reason for favouring large-sized settlements has been the acknowledged difficulties experienced in establishing truly decentralized industrial enterprises in small towns and villages. Capital for such decentralized industrialization in Asia is just not available or forthcoming in the required amounts, and the possibilities of setting up non-capital-using industries in villages and small towns — other than those that are already there — are very limited indeed. Experience shows that small industries, when established in remote areas, may have difficulty existing by themselves in present Asian conditions; they need the protection of a large urban agglomeration — in the sense of markets, services etc. — in order to survive the first critical stage. Admittedly, some large modern industrial enterprises can survive in rural isolation on a self-sufficient basis, but these industries require large amounts of scarce capital, on the one hand, and, on the other, are unable to utilize the vast reservoir of unskilled surplus rural labour.

Industrial estates have been proposed in a number of Asian countries to provide necessary economic and social overheads to attract and retain industry far from existing large population concentrations. But in practice, the industrial estates that have actually been established are often found in the environs of large urban centres; others, set up in remote rural areas, have often proved impracticable. Industrial estates, which are expensive to establish, do not ensure actual industrial investment.

Difficulty in controlling migration

Some policy-makers have argued that no effort should be made to stop further migration from rural areas to metropolitan and urban centres, for the reason that the migrants appear to be satisfied with their new situation in the city and continue to come at ever increasing rates on the basis of reports trickling back to the villages from those who have preceded them. It has also been pointed out that migration to urban centres reduces rural population pressure and helps in the modernization and technical efficiency of rural agriculture. Others have argued that the process of rural-urban migration should not be controlled because there is little that can be done about it anyway.

Even direct controls on internal migration, where they have been tried, as in mainland China, have been far from successful.[2] Residence permits, food ration cards, and persuasion and propaganda were all used to halt the migratory process; but such evidence as is available indicates that these measures were only partially successful. By 1958, when the "great leap forward" was announced, the official position on internal migration was reversed. The ambitious industrial development programme then launched was largely urban-based and required considerable manpower in cities. Not only were the restrictive measures on rural-urban migration lifted, but positive incentives were offered to encourage such migration. By 1961, after the setback in both the agricultural and industrial spheres, the decision to give priority to agriculture was accompanied by a policy of actively sending people back from city to farm. The methods employed were different now: the system of "assigning" graduates of various types of schools to rural areas has been one of the chief weapons used. Teams and local labour officers periodically visit urban neighbourhoods to "recruit" people for service in villages on a temporary or permanent basis. At the same time, agricultural middle schools have been established in rural areas, both in order to satisfy the craving for further education without necessitating migration to an urban centre and in order to bolster lagging agriculture. In spite of all these measures, however, there is little evidence to indicate that the flow of rural migrants to cities or the internal movement

[2] These control measures were analysed in chap. XIII of the *Report on the World Social Situation 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.4).

of populations has been brought under control in mainland China.

Role in modernization

Large cities influence national social change and induce modernization in ways not always apparent; it is in Asian cities, for example, that the modernizing *élites* of the region have grown up. Even more importantly, cities provide the basis for the emergence of industrial creativity and leadership; innovators may appear in the rural environment but their potential may be lost owing to lack of opportunity. Badly needed leadership is more likely to emerge in the cities, where there are more people and more outlets for creativity.

On the other hand, large-scale migration to urban centres and the development of huge settlements of a metropolitan type in the developing countries have been opposed on grounds of the high incidence of urban poverty that emerges. But the conspicuous nature of urban poverty — in slums and shantytowns — permits action to be taken more readily and effectively with respect to it. Much of the urban poverty of Asia results from a transfer of surplus labour from country to town.

Internal economies

Large settlements are not only the beneficiaries of "external economies" as noted earlier, but also make possible "internal economies" (i.e., "economies of scale"). While large urban centres do not rule out small-scale industry, such centres are particularly conducive to the development of large-scale industrial enterprises, which have a number of built-in advantages in existing Asian conditions: larger firms can draw on their labour supply on a wider geographical basis; they can draw on more varied sources of capital supply; they make possible greater mobility of labour within firms.

Shortcomings of smaller settlements

Asia (with the exception of Japan) has few of the dispersed suburban developments that are encountered in the developed countries and that presuppose an extensive system of communications. There is also some question as to whether "new towns" in the European sense are very practicable in Asia. One of the criticisms of smaller new towns is that they tend very often to be single-industry towns ("steel towns", "company towns" and the like). These one-industry enclaves are unable to provide the "umbrella" necessary for smaller industrial and transitional enterprises, to absorb the abundant supply of surplus, relatively unskilled labour in Asia; large single industries dominating a small settlement tend to require more sophisticated levels of skills than are available in most Asian countries. Nor do small settlements and single-industry new towns, remote from large metropolitan centres, promote the type of non-industrial employment necessary in Asian conditions of underemployment. In addition to all these factors, small settlements (especially new towns) may cost too much to establish if all facilities and services must be provided from scratch, and they do not appear to be satisfactory to the younger generation, which increasingly demands consumer goods and services and other amenities available only in large urban agglomerations.

Large urban agglomerations are not necessarily antithetical to the concept of decentralization. Increasingly, Asian metropolitan centres have begun to comprise small, self-contained subcentres or "urban villages" within the metropolitan orbit, self-sufficient in employment and housing and making possible village-to-city commuting, which also relieves metropolitan housing pressures and thereby reduces the cost of vast urban establishments.

Smaller dispersed settlements

Doubtful role of large centres in modernization

The alleged role of larger settlements of a metropolitan type as vehicles of modernization in developing countries is questioned on two grounds: first, it is pointed out that in as much as Asian urban centres are often no more than collections of villages, their "urban" influence in modernization is exaggerated; they do not always have the same infra-structure of markets, transport facilities etc. found in the urban centres of developed countries, and therefore do not provide the same external economies. Secondly, it is contended that modern attitudes and skills require, in Asian circumstances, specific training facilities rather than something as vague and nebulous as an "urban environment."

High cost of large centres

The outstanding argument in favour of small dispersed settlements in based on the acknowledged high social and economic cost of large urban centres, particularly when it is considered that the very largest metropolitan centres of Asia have only just embarked on their period of massive expansion. The projected increase of some cities, owing to both natural population growth and internal migration, is in the order of tens of millions, and their viability, from the standpoint of provision of services, is seriously open to doubt. The five largest cities of India hold at present only about 3 per cent of the population of the country, as compared to 19 per cent in Japan; the ten largest cities of India account for only about 4 per cent of the population of India, whereas the ten largest Japanese cities hold one quarter of the population of Japan.[3] The implication is that as India reaches the present level of development of Japan, her largest cities will increase three of fourfold, that is, to about 20 or 30 million persons each, unless drastic measures are taken to decentralize industry to smaller settlements or the birth rate is brought down remarkably.

While in the short run, social overheads may cost less in metropolitan-type settlements, in the long run they are bound to cost more. Housing costs more or housing standards tend to be lower in metropolitan areas than in smaller settlements. In medium-sized and smaller settlements, the possibility of village-to-town commuting — and consequent saving in housing costs — is greater than

[3] *Demographic Yearbook, 1964* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.XIII.1). (Figures for Japan as of 1 October 1963.)

in metropolitan areas. Not only are building costs uniformly lower in smaller settlements but land is cheaper. Speculation in land prices in the very largest Asian metropolitan centres has indeed risen to such an extent that urban land prices are higher in the developing countries of Asia than in even the most advanced developed countries. (In most Asian countries, land accounts for one third of the cost of a home in a large centre, but only about one tenth in a small town.) In some Asian countries there seems to be an inverse correlation between the size of a settlement and the amount of housing space available per person. Thus, in India, the proportion of families living in dwellings of one room or less is 34 per cent in rural areas; 44 per cent in urban areas as a whole; 67 per cent in the four largest cities; and 70 per cent in the largest metropolitan area — Calcutta. Housing tends to be particularly expensive for those living near their work in the downtown area; those living farther out encounter transportation problems. Although health services tend generally to be better in larger urban centres, health conditions are not necessarily better, owing to the overcrowding, housing shortage and pressure on public services discussed above — quite apart from the lack of recreational opportunities and psychological tensions of city life.

It is further maintained that, in Asian countries, urban unemployment is not only more conspicuous but also more intense, more debilitating and depressing than rural underemployment. There is in Asian metropolitan centres a constant growth of a low-productivity, underemployed services sector. In addition to widespread unemployment, therefore, there is considerable underemployment, as in rural areas. The urban unemployed and underemployed, unlike their rural counterparts, however, quickly turn to disruptive mob action.

Internal diseconomies of large centres

Although in the initial stages, economic activities in large urban centres may be the beneficiaries of various "external economies" in the long run "over-urbanization" leads to diseconomies — poverty, disease, slums, economic inefficiency, traffic congestion, social problems, political discontent, burgeoning costs of social overheads and public services, separation of residential from work areas and resulting commuting problems, land speculation and misuse, high cost of public welfare, poor conditions of work, a feeling of hopelessness in the idle migrant population.

Decentralized industry feasible and desirable

Small and medium-sized settlements in Asian countries have also been supported on the ground that decentralized industry is not only possible but even desirable in such settlements. The argument that remote rural areas and small towns lack the infra-structure to sustain industry is not applicable in the face of evidence that industrial estates have in a number of Asian countries successfully provided these requirements. Industrial estates are, ideally, a method of achieving industrial decentralization without at the same time sacrificing the advantages of agglomeration and industrial clustering; they make possible sharing of industrial enterprises of common pools of managers, supervisors, skilled workers; they permit economies of scale in public utilities, communications and good transportation systems because the unit is large and complex enough to support superior services; they provide residential industrial, training and credit facilities.

Quite aside from the practicability of locating industry in small settlements, the inherent desirability of such decentralized location policies has been noted. The dispersion of industries to small towns and villages is regarded as an essential factor in creating the market atmosphere in rural areas which seems so necessary in Asia to set in motion a series of economic and social changes. Small towns and rural settlements can utilize village-based idle labour for construction and other undertakings not requiring a very high degree of skill. Large metropolitan centres do not have a ready reservoir of such labour to draw upon, except through incoming migrants who are involved in other problems. Electricity is now becoming increasingly available in Asian rural areas and at fairly low cost in the small settlements. Transportation demands are not too great if local markets are carefully identified for small-scale dispersed operations. Small-scale operations are not necessarily less efficient if closely geared to local markets. Moreover, the transportation situation in the Asian countryside is rapidly improving. It is also wrongly assumed that smaller and medium-size settlements must necessarily be confined to small-scale operations; large undertakings, Asian experience shows, can, if carefully planned, be accommodated in small and medium-size settlements, especially in the larger countries that have many settlements in the middle range (about 100,000 to 200,000 population) with a minimum level of infra-structure. Large countries with diversified resources — India, mainland China, Pakistan, and Indonesia are leading examples in Asia — are more likely to have dispersed patterns of natural resource location, thereby facilitating industrial dispersion in small-sized settlements. In these countries especially, but not exclusively, medium and small-sized settlements could develop, with some official encouragement, as clusters of small enterprises, processing local primary products or even finished products for an essentially local market. The economic history of the developed countries shows that after initial superurbanization these countries later decentralized industry; perhaps Asian countries could, drawing on this experience, avoid considerable waste on a big scale by breaking, through careful planning, this superurbanization/deurbanization cycle.

A major argument for decentralized industry in semi-rural small towns is that villagers can work in factories located in such settlements while continuing to reside in their villages (commuting by bicycle in such a situation is now a fairly common pattern in some Asian countries). Railside and roadside industrial locations, far from urban agglomerations, have often proved in Asian countries to be more profitable than the crowded central city, especially if provision is made for rural labour to commute from their existing village dwellings. Industrial decentralization based on small rural-urban townships can therefore not only minimize the economic cost of

urbanization (housing and transport) but also reduce social cost (in the sense of social disorganization and personal maladjustment).

In Japan, industry has been successfully decentralized following a conscious attempt to move enterprises away from "overgrown" cities. Space-demanding industries particularly have been located on the outskirts of large villages or in satellite towns, some distance away from the main built-up area of the metropolis. The success of the Japanese effort at decentralization has been made possible by a number of factors: the very nature of the organization of Japanese industry; lowering of legal barriers to the easy conversion of wet-rice land to non-agricultural uses in metropolitan regions; the revolution in agricultural technology, which has made available surplus labour in rural areas for non-agricultural occupations; land reclamation programmes near coastal cities, and suburbanization.

Service centres

Decentralized settlement patterns in Asian countries have received considerable support from the recent concept of a "service centre" or a "rural-urban township" serving a group of villages. Such service centres, consisting of larger villages and medium-sized towns, have been increasingly advocated as an optimum settlement pattern for achieving over-all rural and urban, agricultural and industrial, development in Asia. The idea is that a group of villages should be serviced by its own industrial and middle-sized urban centre. These service/market centres would include processing industries and various social, cultural, economic, recreational, and administrative services (such as secondary schools, hospitals, larger dispensaries) which would not be practicable in each small village. The service villages would be selected from among the natural trade and communication centres, and be connected in turn to larger urban centres within the framework of an over-all network. In many cases, these centres would use as a nucleus the traditional market towns, established centres of trade, capital and enterprise to which artisans move spontaneously from nearby villages as the villages become more homogeneous agricultural units in the process of growth. These service villages or town centres would be the basis of agricultural co-operatives, which are proving unworkable on an individual village basis. These settlements of perhaps 20,000/50,000 population may not be attractive to large-scale industry, but they would be crucial for rural and agricultural development and serve as the centralizing point for agricultural marketing, co-operatives, services, and village industries. Such a settlement pattern, involving a group of villages, is bolstered by the long tradition in many Asian countries of inter-village contacts, involving marriage, religion, trade etc. Villagers have traditionally gone to a nearby larger centre for such things as medical advice, higher education, religious functions which can only be performed at a larger shrine and marketing agricultural produce.

Conclusion

The arguments for and against settlements of different sizes make clear that no one pattern could probably be put forward as the ideal one to fit all conditions in a region as heterogeneous as Asia. The future settlement pattern of Asia will depend on rates of population growth on the one hand, and internal migration trends on the other. Both of these factors are difficult to project, but especially migration. There is no doubt, however, that the nature and size of settlements in Asia will have a profound bearing on the future course of agricultural and industrial development.

The fact that there is no one ideal pattern means that decentralization is still a debatable issue in the Asian context. Asian countries wholly committed to industrial dispersion based on small and medium-sized settlements may therefore have to decide carefully whether in their particular circumstances that is indeed the best policy. The crucial questions are: which pattern of settlement will minimize overhead costs and maximize social and economic benefits? Is it cheaper to develop infra-structure — schools, hospitals, electricity, sewage disposal, water supply lines etc. — in small or in large settlements? In the determination of any ideal pattern, costs and benefits must be carefully balanced.

Settlement policy is, of course, not only a matter of industrial location. A decision must be made, too, on whether the surplus under-employed population of Asia is to remain in the country or be encouraged to migrate to cities? There is no simple answer to this question; from a cost point of view, again, it would depend on comparing the marginal productivity and marginal cost of having the surplus population in the city as against maintaining it in the country. The choice between centralization and decentralization, between large and small settlements, depends, in the last analysis, on (*a*) the prevailing situation, and (*b*) the defined objectives and goals.

A large country which already has a number of middle-sized settlements may offer better opportunities for industrial dispersal. According to the 1961 census of India, for example, while 82 per cent of the population lived in "villages" (settlements of under 2,500); the remainder were distributed fairly evenly in settlements of different sizes — 4 per cent in the 2,500 to 20,000 group; 3 per cent in the 20,000 to 50,000 group; 3 per cent in the 50,000 to 100,000 group; and 8 per cent in settlements of over 100,000. There were at the time in India 558,000 settlements of under 2,500; 2,509 between 2,500 and 20,000; 375 between 20,000 and 50,000; 110 between 50,000 and 100,000; and 73 over 100,000. In an existing settlement pattern of this kind, decentralization and industrial dispersion may be more feasible than in a small country where the capital city is the only community over the 100,000 population range.

A clear articulation of the objectives of development is the second factor that influences choice of settlement policy. A country which favours rapid industrial expansion and heavy industries particularly, may be better off concentrating on larger settlements than a country which stresses agricultural development and small-scale light industries.

Where agreed upon, policies of dispersal have been carried out in Asian countries either through negative

means, such as denial of licences to industries seeking to locate in large urban centres, or through positive measures, such as augmentation of social overheads, training facilities, financial and business services, subsidies and promotional inducements. Other measures have included efforts to improve the countryside itself — rural development, in the largest sense — so as to blunt the "push" factor in rural-urban migration. Decentralization has often involved a conscious determination of a pattern of settlement with a hierarchy of "growing points" or "development foci". Perhaps policies of dispersed settlement in Asia have accorded too prominent a role to industrial location; dispersed development may be more effectively achieved by the general improvement of rural areas and small settlements — i.e., by a strategic policy of location of superior social services — than by specific attempts to relocate industry itself.

Granting the strong arguments advanced on behalf of both large metropolitan-type settlements and smaller, dispersed settlements, medium-sized communities have been increasingly favoured as combining the merits of each. Medium-size settlements have cheap land; a fairly low level of density of population; minimal transportation problems; the feasibility of resource saving experiments; adequate services, leadership and enterprise; local markets; a wide range of economic opportunities. There is by no means general agreement on what precise size this "medium-size" settlement in Asia should be; estimates of the ideal middle-sized town have ranged from as low as 20,000 to as much as 500,000 or a million. In any event, the aim of policy should be to attempt to identify in each case the minimum size needed for sustained economic and social growth but which does not at the same time give rise to "internal diseconomies".

RECENT CHANGES IN URBAN AND RURAL SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN LATIN AMERICA

Introduction

The rapid pace of city growth in Latin America, its concentrated character, and its apparent independence of the relatively slow increases in industrial employment have for some years attracted international attention.[1] If the larger centres continue to grow at the present rates, averaging about 5 per cent annually, their populations will double every fourteen years; the metropolitan area of Mexico City will reach 15 million inhabitants within twenty years, while such cities as Lima and Santiago will approach 6 million; the predominance of the capital cities over the smaller urban centres will be maintained or even strengthened. In Argentina and Venezuela, the phenomenon of "conurbation" is already visible, with several cities beginning to merge into a predominantly urban region; elsewhere the primate city stands alone. In a few countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela) the rural population that constitutes the ultimate reservoir feeding city growth is already a minority, stationary or declining in numbers. Elsewhere, however, the rural population still predominates, and the high rates of cityward migration have not prevented it from continuing to grow at rates around 1.5 per cent annually. The capacity of the older agricultural zones to absorb this population increase is very limited, and formidable obstacles stand in the way of any significant enlargement of the present trickle of migrants into the enormous empty land areas that have long been pointed to as justifications for high rates of population increase in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, which together account for about 63 per cent of the regional population, as well as in many of the smaller countries, the forces impelling cityward migration are likely to be stronger in the future than in the past.[2]

Declarations concerning the need for comprehensive planning to deal with the problem of urban rural disequilibrium abound; in a few countries planning agencies or consultants have presented concrete proposals;[3] and a few special-purpose regional schemes offer interesting practical lessons.[4] However, one finds remarkably little evidence of progress towards the application of planning to national population distribution or even towards consistent national decisions on the main lines of policy. Economic planners and physical planners continue to go their separate ways. Discussions of the relative advantages of centralizing or decentralizing investments that will determine the location of future job opportunities continue at a high level of generalization, without being able to refer to integrated analyses of the economic, social and political implications of present trends and practicable alternatives. Urban municipal legislation and administrative systems become more complicated but are not systematically reformed. Programmes aimed at specific problems such as the universal housing shortages are embarked upon, once irresistible pressures have built up, without reference to either economic or physical planning criteria. Agrarian reform and related measures for resettlement of the rural population up to the present show similar deficiencies in their application, in spite of the efforts that have been devoted to studies and drafting of legislation.

The trends in urban and rural population redistribution and resettlement presented below (in a highly simplified form and on the basis of information that is far from adequate) derive from varying combinations of piecemeal public action with the struggles of millions of families to solve their own problems of livelihood and shelter and to relate themselves to national political structures so as to defend their own interests and obtain a measure of protection and aid.

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[1] The most extensive compendium of information and policy recommendations on this question published up to the present derives from a 1959 regional seminar co-sponsored by the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Latin America and UNESCO, *Urbanization in Latin America* (Paris, UNESCO, 1962). More recent statistical information can be found in "Geographical distribution of the population of Latin America and regional development priorities", *Economic Bulletin for Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.II.G.8) and in various other publications of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía. See also Richard M. Morse, "Recent research on Latin America urbanization: a selective survey with commentary", *Latin American Research Review*, vol. I, No. 1 (October 1965).

[2] This article does not enter into the more general implications of the extraordinarily high rates of population increase typical of Latin America. It should be noted that public discussion of measures intended to reduce these rates and support for the introduction of such measures have increased significantly in the very recent past. The momentum of past population growth and present age distribution, however, ensure that such measures cannot begin to affect the trends discussed here for at least a decade after their application.

[3] For example, a study by consultant Paul Lamartine Yates, *El desarrollo regional de Mexico*, published by the Deparamento de Investigaciones Industriales of the Banco de Mexico (1961); the proposals presented by Lauchlin Currie in Colombia (set forth most recently in "Una Politica Urbana para los Paises en Desarrollo", Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1965)); and the "Programme of industrial satellite cities in Chile" presented in 1965 by John Friedmann and Lawrence Mann of the Ford Foundation's Urban and Regional Development Programme in Chile.

[4] In particular, the initiatives of the Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (SUDENE) in Brazil, the Corporación Autónoma Regional del Cauca in Colombia, and the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana in Venezuela.

The larger cities

The capacity of the great cities to accommodate population increase in or near the central core reached its limit some time ago, and their urban areas are generally expanding more rapidly than their population itself, since the peripheral zones have a relatively low density of settlement and are interspersed with patches of land not yet occupied. The redistribution of their population characteristically takes the following forms:

The better-off groups, those able to meet the costs of their own housing under the typical circumstances of inflated land prices and expensively inefficient construction techniques, are moving out of the central parts of the cities, usually in a fan-shaped pattern branching from a few main traffic arteries leading in one direction from the centre; the initial direction of this expansion may have been determined by scenic or climatic advantages of the terrain (including freedom from smog), proximity to beaches etc. The movement is accelerated by strong urges towards innovation and modernism among the groups that can afford to take part in it; the most modern architectural styles are demanded, the housing typical of a few decades ago rapidly becomes unfashionable, and the physical and cultural patterns of urban life deriving from the Spanish inheritance are being replaced in the suburbs by the same patterns accompanying mass automobile ownership in the countries of other regions, including the "shopping centre".

In the central parts of the cities many of the older buildings, including the former houses of the upper classes, are being converted to single-room occupancy or taken over by small industries, while other buildings, including a good many of the older slum housing units, are being demolished and replaced by commercial structures and luxury apartments. In most of the cities, the majority of lower and lower-middle income families still live in densely occupied zones relatively near the centre, but as these groups, continually enlarged by migrants, become more and more crowded and the supply of cheap dwelling units dwindles, they make their way to the periphery of the city.

The trends noted above are similar to well-known processes in the cities of Europe and North America. The centrifugal movement of the lower-income groups, however, takes different forms. These derive partly from the poverty and low housing standards of the families concerned, partly from the geographical characteristics of the cities, and partly from the limited capacity of the city administrations to enforce regulations or provide low-cost housing. The huge settlements that are now springing up in the peripheral zones can be classified into the following major types:

(*a*) Illicit shantytowns without tenure rights or prior organization of their occupants. These settlements house the most impoverished and socially disorganized strata, but quantitatively they represent a less important part of the problem than is sometimes assumed. They are also less characteristically "peripheral" than the other types described below, since they may appear quite close to the city centre, in vacant lots, along railway lines, river banks or steep hillsides, or adjoining garbage dumps. The courtyards or lots enclosed by walls, where the owner rents either hovels or space on which the tenants (usually recent migrants) can erect an improvised shelter, are an important variant in some cities;

(*b*) Zones in process of occupation by upper-income groups, in which large numbers of families enjoy temporary occupancy of vacant lots as caretakers, frequently making a combined livelihood from cultivation of the lot and employment as servants, laundrywomen or gardeners for nearby upper-income families. This type of settlement constitutes a peculiar semi-rural fringe continually dislodged and pushed outward as upper-income settlement advances, and normally has no capacity for local organization;

(*c*) Settlements originating in organized occupation of land by large groups of families. Such occupation has become a very important mode of low-income resettlement in several of the great cities with nearby zones of publicly owned, agriculturally worthless, arid land, as in Lima and Mexico City. Private lands are also sometimes successfully occupied, although police action against the occupants is more likely to be prompt and effective. Settlements of this kind are characterized by relatively systematic self-selection of families and the maintenance of vigorous extra-legal community organization for the purpose, first, or resisting eviction and securing official recognition of tenure rights; secondly, of exerting pressure on the authorities to provide urban services; and, to a lesser extent, of meeting settlement needs through communal labour and monetary contributions. Some occupations of land are initiated by "professional" promotors expecting to profit from them, or by political movements, in which cases the organization of settlers is presumably weaker and less likely to persist, but present information does not permit any general conclusion as to the relative importance of spontaneous and induced organization for land seizures;

(*d*) Settlements originating in the sub-division and sale to individuals of privately owned land. Such settlements are occupied by regularly employed workers and others who are able to pay for small plots and who have some hope of setting aside from their incomes enough to build substantial houses on them. Under typical circumstances in which rural municipalities adjacent to the great cities are overwhelmed by the urban sprawl, however, they get little or no effective protection or guidance in their efforts to house themselves. A good many of the sub-divisions do not conform to legal requirements or city regulative plans, the original title may not be clear, the seller is likely to evade any obligation to provide minimum urban services and the municipality, to be either unwilling or unable to do so. Regulations commonly require that the family proposing to build a house obtain permits from a considerable number of different municipal departments and pay an architect to prepare or approve plans. While realistic measures for supervision and technical advice are badly needed, the function of the present regulations seems to reflect mainly the pressures of professionals and public employees to create a maximum demand for their own services, involving costs and delays that the lower-income families cannot face, and the regulations are generally unenforceable in the

zones occupied by these families. Much of the new construction, including dwellings of tolerable quality, is thus "clandestine" and not entitled to legal protection. The land subdivided for sale under such conditions commonly belongs to large, formerly agricultural estates close to the city or to holdings accumulated in the expectation of city expansion, and the owners belong to families sufficiently influential to hinder the strict enforcement of regulations. One common practice is to sell part of a holding at low prices, without urban infra-structure, then to wait until the families already settled have forced the municipal administration to provide streets, water lines, electricity etc., and take advantage of these services to sell the remainder at much higher prices.[5] In addition to unregulated land sales of this kind, outright fraud is very common. Families are either persuaded to make instalment payments to "co-operatives" whose organizers eventually disappear with the funds, or they find, after they have occupied a plot, that the vendor was not the real owner.[6] The needs for defensive organization of the occupants of this type of settlement may thus become quite similar to the needs of the settlements based on organized occupation of land;

(*e*) Settlements originating in public programmes intended to alleviate the housing shortage or eradicate shantytowns through the provision of cheap "minimum" houses or plots of land plus aid in self-help construction. This type of settlement has been of minor importance until quite recently, since most public programmes have been on a small scale and directed mainly to the lower-middle income strata of public employees and organized workers. Since 1959, however, such settlements have grown to enormous size in Santiago and Bogota, and are likely to come to the fore in the great cities of other countries now beginning to undertake crash programmes of housing directed to families with incomes below the minimum needed to support amortization of the costs of conventional housing. The location of these settlements and the grouping of the families within them depends on the procedures of the housing agency rather than the choice of the families, and the initial conditions for local solidarity are thus less favourable than in the third and fourth types of settlement.

The numbers of families living in the different types of peripheral settlement cannot be estimated reliably, and any present estimate would soon be made obsolete by the rapid growth now under way. Housing censuses distinguish the numbers of "improvised" dwellings and shacks, and of dwellings lacking minimum urban services such as piped water and electricity, but such dwellings are to be found in varying proportions in all the types of settlement, as well as in the central slums, and the criteria used by different public agencies sometimes result in wide discrepancies between the totals they state.[7] The statistics commonly cited on numbers of families living in "shantytowns" or included in the "housing deficit" give only a general impression of the dimensions of the problem, and sometimes carry a misleading implication that the improvised shelter and extreme poverty of the first type of settlement are typical of the families with deficient housing.

Most of the great cities have adopted regulative plans, some of them prepared by outside consultants with world reputations. These plans, however — concentrating on the spatial aspects of city growth and dominated by architectural and aesthetic considerations, and leaving aside such determinants of the over-all process of urban development as the income levels and social characteristics of the families seeking jobs and shelter, the ownership and prices of urban land, and the structure of political power — have proved quite ineffective in controlling the expansion that is taking place.

The upper-income zones, with their insistence on large plots of land, have spread farther and faster than expected. The lower-income settlements have sought cheap land or waste land that might be occupied without reprisal; zones of higher-priced land adjoining the urban centre are often by-passed both by the families trying to buy building plots and by the public housing agencies. Both types of population distribution according to purchasing power have promoted urban sprawl. Co-ordination of settlement location with the location of industries is rare, except in the occasional instances of housing built by the industries for their workers. Continual expansion of the "urbanized" zone under such conditions is placing an increasingly unmanageable strain on the cities' capacity to meet even their most urgent needs for infrastructural investment, public transport and social services.

Even the upper-income suburbs are plagued by deficiencies in water supplies, electrical power, telephone services and policing. Their residents depend on private automobiles for transport between the suburbs and the centre, and are frustrated by inadequate highways and traffic bottlenecks. The newspapers read by the urban upper and middle classes contain abundant evidence of their acute awareness of the problems arising from their own residential preferences, and they are able to exert more effective demand for the allocation of public resources to meet these problems than are the families in the other peripheral zones. In several countries, these suburbs have their own municipal governments, with more adequate resources for meeting local needs than other parts of the metropolitan area, and with a natural

[5] For a description of this tactic, see Jorge Wilhelm, "*São Paulo Métropole 65*", *Corpo e Alma do Brasil*, XVI (São Paulo, Difusão Européia do Livro, 1965), pp. 121 and 122.

[6] According to Chile's Consejería de Promoción Popular, 6,368 families in Santiago alone were engaged in legal proceedings, at the beginning of 1966, arising from victimization in land sales. The Consejería estimates that many times this number are affected by frauds in the hundreds of peripheral settlements of Greater Santiago, and that the problem is nationwide (*El Mercurio*, 1 February 1966). While comparable estimates are lacking, it is well known that similar frauds occur on an important scale in most of the rapidly growing cities of the region. Although these practices are naturally covered by existing laws, the initiative of the Consejería seems to be one of the first official attempts to bring direct protection and advice to the families affected.

[7] A recent statistical study by the Social Affairs Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America of the participation of marginal settlements in urban growth in Chile, cites statistics from three different public agencies giving totals of 36,340; 82,499; and 100,549 for the number of "marginal families", "*callampa* dwelling units", and "families in *callampas*", respectively ("La participación de las problaciones marginales en el crecimiento urbano") (E/LACCY/BP/L.2/Add.3).

interest in maintaining their administrative separateness. It does not appear, however, that in those countries in which the great cities have unified administrations, the ability of the upper-income zones to obtain disproportionate shares of municipal expenditure is diminished.

All the peripheral settlements presumably have populations more youthful than the rest of the city, since the younger couples with growing families are most highly motivated to escape from the crowded urban centres. The settlements created by public housing programmes, in which most of the occupants are selected by point systems giving heavy weight to family size, have particularly high proportions of young children, resulting in immediate overcrowding of the small houses. This age distribution has implications that in the long run may be even more ominous than the often-described evils of unplanned urban sprawl. Even the better of the low-income peripheral settlements represent a drab environment physically segregated from the city proper and lacking many of the stimuli associated with urban life. While most of the men go outside the settlement to work, few of the women and children leave this environment. The new generations growing up in it, with only the most limited formal education, followed by an aimless adolescence, face the prospect of adult life limited to the less secure low-wage jobs in the urban economy. The educational systems and the social structures of the cities, whatever opportunities for upward mobility they may offer to groups starting higher on the ladder, provide very little chance for youth from the settlements to escape from their marginal social and occupational status. The youth form new families at ages as low as seventeen, and these families add to the pressure for further expansion of the settlements.[8] Millions of urban children and youth are thus being brought up under conditions hardly compatible with the requirements of economic development or effective participation in national life.[9]

The simultaneous increase in numbers and the physical redistribution of the urban low-income population are changing its political roles and its demands upon the national societies. On the one hand, the enormous and concentrated potential sources of votes and mass pressures represented by the peripheral settlements, the conspicuousness of their poverty, and the incompatibility between their continued expansion and present forms of urban administration and land ownership are bringing them a degree of attention from political leaders (as well as social researchers and promoters of social welfare) never enjoyed by the families in the older slums, more dispersed among the general urban population and also more concealed behind substantial building facades. On the other hand, the problems encountered by the families in the peripheral settlements are bringing forth new forms of local popular organization alongside the trade unions and political party branches that have represented the interests of limited sectors of the low-income population up to the present. Trade unions have generally been limited to workers with regular jobs in the larger establishments and have not reached the larger masses of workers shifting from job to job in services, construction, and small-scale industries. The struggle for shelter, security and minimum urban services can involve in organized activity a higher proportion of the urban low-income population than struggles over wages and working conditions.[10]

A primary distinction between the two main types of response by the populations of the settlements seems justified. In practice, of course, the local responses are more varied than can be indicated within the limits of the present paper, and the two main responses are likely to co-exist:

(*a*) The settlements often provide mass support for "populist" political leaders. Resentment at neglect by the leadership of the traditional political parties (the so-called "oligarchies"), who are identified with the existing distribution of incomes and opportunities, is an important factor in this kind of movement, but the leaders with populist appeal are more likely to be authoritarian figures (including former military dictators), who promise strong government, an end to "speculators", stable prices and full employment through public works, than advocates of revolutionary change. Strong populist movements may have only rudimentary organization in the settlements themselves, but the populist appeal is typically combined with the distribution — during election periods — of material favours such as clothing, blankets and building materials, with local figures, able to influence votes through friendships and family ties, acting as intermediaries.

Several of the great cities have experienced violent mass upheavals, either as a by-product of the frustration of populist movements or in protest over issues directly affecting the livelihood of the settlements — in particular, increases in transport fares or in prices of basic foods — and the fear of such eruptions is an important factor in the attitudes of the more prosperous parts of the cities towards the settlements and in their relationships with municipal and national authorities. At the same time, there are indications that the settlements' primary anxieties over stable prices and the maintenance of public services can be enlisted by the authorities to counteract pressures from organized labour that seem to threaten these objectives;

[8] Fertility rates in the low-income settlements appear to be generally very high, in spite of the very large number of illegal abortions. In Santiago, at the time of the 1960 census, fertility rates in low-income zones of the city with a total population of 600,000 amounted to 44 per 1,000, far above the national rate of 35-36.

[9] Studies of urban youth that would permit one to go beyond this kind of plausible generalization have not yet been made. A recent field study of sample groups of youth (between fourteen and nineteen years) in a large low-income settlement of Santiago (possibly the first study of this type to be carried out in Latin America) indicates higher proportions engaged in some form of employment or study than might have been expected and a generalized sense of responsibility for contributing to the family income. At the same time, the study indicates a good deal of disorientation or perplexity concerning personal or social goals and ways of reaching them. (Adolfo Gurrieri, "Población y perspectivas de la juventud en una población urbana popular") (E/LACCY/BP/L.2).

[10] The emergence of the *poblador* (settler) as an important new urban organized force is discussed in the Economic Commission for Latin America's study *El desarrollo social de América Latina en la postguerra* (Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1963), and in Richard M. Morse, *op. cit.* The latter source includes references to a number of recent studies bearing on this question.

(*b*) The factors that impel the creation of local organizations for self-defence, self-help and pressure on the authorities have already been indicated. The typical organisms of this type (*juntas de vecinos, comités de pobladores, sociedades amigos de barrio*) consist of committees informally elected by the interested adults of a settlement or neighbourhood. The degree of spontaneity and of democratic participation varies widely even between adjoining settlements, but a present trend towards the formation of city-wide or even nation-wide federations, together with a trend toward official recognition and regulation, favour increasing uniformity in their organizational characteristics. Some of the most vigorous originate in spontaneous groupings of families for the purpose of occupying land.[11] In other settlements, the initiative comes from the local militants of political parties, who may set up competing neighbourhood councils, or from official or private social service and community development agencies.[12]

Local organization is by no means confined to the low-income settlements commonly labelled "marginal", and it does not necessarily imply a strengthening of common interests among the organized groups. In fact, such organization seems to characterize most of the newer peripheral parts of the cities, in contrast to the central parts, where occupational, religious and other non-local ties are usually more important organizationally. All the newer settled areas, no matter whether prosperous or poor, need to make their voices heard to obtain services from overburdened municipalities or to keep existing services from deteriorating. Moreover, practically all, no matter how poor, are anxious to exclude "undesirable" neighbours. The dwellers in eradication settlements and public housing projects and the purchasers of building lots fear the springing up of illicit shantytowns close by and deplore clandestine taverns that attract alcoholics and criminals. The settlers in upper-income neighbourhoods resist nearby low-income public projects etc. These struggles are carried on at the strictly local level, sometimes involving violent feuds between neighbourhoods, and also at the level of the municipal or metropolitan government. The new organizations have their origin in part in the inadequacies of the municipalities as arbiters of the distribution of public services between different zones.

In principle, national authorities usually favour the growth of local organization, which offers tempting prospects of getting things done through self-help that the state cannot afford to do with its own resources. In practice, the attitudes of official agencies are likely to be ambivalent. The local organization typically see more advantage in pressure on the state to meet their needs than in direct self-help. To the extent that they really express the demands of their members they make it harder for national or municipal agencies to distribute resources according to their own conceptions of priorities or to ignore inconvenient problems. The local organizations are also likely to be in conflict with influential proportion interests. Their initiatives toward federation imply a strengthening of their future political role, and the political parties that are contending for the support of the urban low-income population find attitudes of non-party local solidarity, such as those expressed in the quotation (foot note 11), incompatible with their own organizational objectives. At the same time, frequent cases of the exploitation of local organizations for personal gain support arguments that regulation is needed. The efforts of various Governments to institutionalize the local organizations through laws specifying their legitimate functions, composition, procedures for election of officers etc.[13] can be compared to the elaborate legal controls that have been imposed on the trade unions over the past three decades, and likewise respond to mixed motives of support and control.[14]

Some recent meetings of representatives of the settlements and some interviews with local leaders provide limited indications of a quite different trend. The settlements are no longer neglected by national and international opinion. Some of them have been invaded by considerable numbers of would-be leaders and organizers from political parties, social agencies, religious bodies etc., and have even received considerable material aid.[15]

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[11] Recent studies of a large settlement originating in a public housing programme for the eradication of shantytowns (Cardenal Caro in Chile) found a striking contrast between the limited participation in local organization in this settlement and the strength of such organization in a smaller adjoining settlement that began with illicit occupation of land. A leader in the latter settlement explained the contrast thus: "We started off with only the bare site and then the *junta de vecinos* was organized. We fought for water, because in winter one had to walk in the darkness to reach the taps, and in summer the supply was often cut off. We fought for light; actually, in the beginning, we stole it. Our *junta* is very representative and we have reached this point perhaps because we had nothing, not even a house, because we took the land with sacrifices, illegally, out of need. We are not like Caro in which they gave them everything ready-made. In the *junta* there are many ideologies, but we get things done through the directors, never through the politicians."

[12] The social agencies seem to be generally more successful in organizing the women of the settlements than the men. The former spend more of their time in the settlement, are more in need of activities to vary their daily lives, and are more interested in the kinds of assistance in improving levels of living and child care that are offered in the community centres maintained by social agencies.

[13] Colombia has enacted regulations specifying parity between the two major political parties and *ex officio* membership by various local functionaries in communal councils. A draft law now under consideration in the Chilean Congress attempts to safeguard the non-political character of the *juntas de vecinos* and to relate their functions systematically to those of the municipal administrations.

[14] The dilemmas faced by the local organizations when called upon to subordinate their demands to national development priorities are also like those faced by the trade unions. For a discussion of this question see Frank Sonilla, "The urban worker", in John J. Johnson, ed. *Continuity and Change in Latin America*, (Stanford University Press, 1964): "...the union is under strong pressure almost everywhere to participate 'responsibly' in economic development, however haphazardly programmed, and to collaborate with the various austerity measures periodically introduced to combat inflation and other monetary imbalances...the collaboration demanded seems premature or at least extremely one-sided under present conditions. Moreover, unified labour action along these lines requires a degree of control over internal dissidence that is hardly compatible with the strengthening of democratic practices within labour organizations".

[15] The studies already mentioned of a low-income settlement in Santiago indicate that during 1965 almost every family (in a total population of 100,000) received some food aid from a foreign private agency, in addition to supplementary foods for mothers and children distributed through the National Health Service.

A few of them may be beginning to feel a surfeit of social investigators and questionnaires. Local spokesmen are expressing resentment of paternalism in the programmes directed to the settlements and are demanding that the organizers of such programmes listen to local opinion. In some instances, educated outsiders who come to live in the settlements under political or religious inspiration, with the intention of providing leadership, are rejected. Even if they are prepared to live as meagrely as their neighbours the fact that they do not have to work for a living and can concentrate on community organization is resented. These trends are reactions to outside initiatives that are themselves relatively recent, and generalization would be unsafe. There are grounds for expectation however, that the settlements will be able to formulate increasingly articulate and realistic demands and that they will produce leadership capable of dealing on equal terms with the movements that have approached them as passive raw material for political organization or "social development".

The sources of migration to the cities

Half or more of the population increase in the great cities derives from in-migration, and a similar proportion of the annual natural increase of the rural population is moving out of the countryside. It does not follow, however, that the peripheral settlements are occupied mainly by uprooted peasants, and the oft-repeated generalizations on the "lure" of the great cities to rural migrants need to be viewed with caution. Available evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of the persons who move to the settlements have lived in the city for some time. Otherwise they would be unable to buy plots of land, organize themselves for land seizures, or qualify for public housing. Moreover, the majority of in-migrants to the great cities appear to come directly from the smaller urban centres, whether or not they are of ultimate rural origin. Recent migrants predominate in some of the more precarious illicit shantytowns, but they are also distributed through the older slums; large numbers of the women migrants go to private homes as domestic servants and move to a settlement only later, when they marry. The opportunities for recent migrants to move into the third, fourth and fifth types of settlement described above would normally be limited to persons with relatives or friends already living there and prepared to accept them as lodgers. The peripheral settlements can thus be viewed as the last stage in a complicated and imperfectly understood series of migratory pressures starting in the countryside.

The relevant factors at the rural end of this process include the following:[16]

(*a*) The numbers of families of resident workers on the large estates, although continuing to account for a major part of the rural population, are stationary or declining throughout the region. Mechanization of agriculture, shifts in commercial crops, and the landowners' fears of the resident workers' claims to land in case of the application of tenure reform laws are among the reasons. Consequently, one finds growing numbers of landless workers, dependent on seasonal employment, living in clusters of shacks along the roadsides or on the peripheries of the small towns and provincial cities. In spite of their rootlessness, most members of this group are inhibited from moving directly to the great cities or to pioneer zones by their complete lack of education and of previous opportunities to acquire initiative;

(*b*) The nuclei of small cultivators are undergoing a multiple squeeze from population increase, deterioration of their land through unavoidable over-use, and declining opportunities for local seasonal wage labour on the large estates. This group is higher in initiative than the resident estate owners or the landless seasonal workers and its efforts to improve its lot take many forms: petty shopkeeping and liquor-selling; organized demands for division of the lands of the large estates; migration and land-clearing in the tropical interior of the continent (where, unfortunately, the squatter-settlers cannot avoid reproducing the pattern of *minifundio* cultivation, destructive land use and conflict with large holders); temporary migration to work in plantations, mines and highway projects, as well as in urban unskilled jobs; and, finally, permanent migration to the cities. This part of the rural population may be the principal origin of a highly mobile, adaptable, and aggressive cultural type, detached from rural localism and traditionalism without identifying itself with the values of the urban upper and middle strata; men of this type, described by some recent observers, are assuming the role of middlemen between the rural-agricultural population and the wider society as traders, itinerant truck owner-drivers, leaders of peasant unions and local political movements.[17] Similar human elements are appearing in the new leadership of the urban peripheral settlements, and in some instances appear to derive directly from the mobile semi-rural groups;

(*c*) The commonest type of rural-agricultural settlement in most of Latin America, whether of resident workers, landless workers or small cultivators, is a small and loosely organized cluster of families, constituting a primary neighbourhood and usually found in combination with still more dispersed settlement by single families. Large agricultural villages deserving the name of "community" can be found but are not typical. Present rural trends, in spite of population increase, seem to be in the direction of even greater dispersal and impermanence of rural settlement, including the springing up of many irregular "line settlements" strung out along the roads, and of nuclei of cheap and flimsy shelters wherever temporary jobs are offered. Rural migratory currents flow out of the relatively isolated and traditional zones, mainly in the highlands, where ties to a

[16] For a more detailed presentation of these trends, see "Rural settlement patterns and social change in Latin America", *Economic Bulletin for Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.II.G.6).

[17] See Anibal Quijano, "La emergencia del grupo 'cholo' y sus consecuencias en la Sociedad Peruana", *Sociologia y Sociendad en Latinoamérica*, (Bogotá, Asociación Colombiana de Sociologia, 1965) vol. I; and William A. Mangin, "A classification of highland communities in Latin America", Proceedings of Cornell University's Conference on the Development of Highland Communities in Latin America (March 1966).

neighbourhood and plot of land are strong, to zones of modern commercial agriculture and wage labour, mainly in the coastal lowlands, and thus, even if the new environment is strictly rural in terms of settlement size, bring the migrants closer to urban patterns of life. Present settlement patterns and trends place obvious difficulties in the way of bringing public services to the countryside, the attainment of an effective network of public schools, or the improvement of housing. Experiments in the concentration of rural settlement in planned villages with community centres have been made here and there, but both the high expense and the preferences of the rural people seem to stand in the way of duplication of this policy on an important scale. Small cultivators, including beneficiaries of land tenure reforms, usually find it more convenient to live on their separate plots, while workers who must move long distances in search of employment cannot tie themselves down to a substantial house in a village.

The local and intermediate urban centres

The countries of the region differ widely in regard to the practicability and economic desirability of policies that would attempt to hold a higher proportion of the rural population increase on the land. In Argentina and Venezuela, for example, the case for such a policy is much stronger than in Colombia, Mexico, or Peru. In general, it is taken for granted that most of the new jobs that must be created will be outside agriculture, and will involve some kind of resettlement of most persons filling these jobs.[18]

In the circumstances outlined above, the lure of the cities does not have to be very compelling to ensure a continued outflow of population from the countryside. At the same time, the previously sharp dividing line between urban and rural in Latin America is beginning to become blurred — although not in exactly the same ways as in the older urbanized countries — by the geographical mobility of population groups seeking a livelihood wherever it can be found, unable to commit themselves either to industry or to agriculture as a way of life, without specialized qualifications and with very low educational levels, but with a widely diffused knowledge of relative opportunities in one setting or another. The penetration of the countryside by urban mass communications and consumer appeals (particularly through the channel of the now ubiquitous transistor radio) is already too pervasive for it to be practicable to leave any of the major rural areas to maintain a growing population at a bare subsistence level while national policy concentrates on rapid development elsewhere. If the large cities cease to offer even the marginal sources of livelihood that now support their poorer strata the outflow of migrants might be temporarily dammed and a reverse flow of urban unemployed to the countryside started, but this would quickly make the rural situation even more explosive than at present. Any socially acceptable strategy for relief of the migratory pressures leading to uncontrolled expansion of the great cities will have to focus on the capacity of the local and intermediate urban centres to retain a larger part of the migratory flow. Present trends in these centres can be summed up thus:

(*a*) The small towns that are the traditional administrative, marketing and servicing centres for the rural neighbourhoods have never carried out these functions very effectively; in most of the region they are now stagnating and in danger of losing the few functions they have. The local upper and middle classes that have provided leadership are deserting them for the cities, or their children are doing so, along with many of their artisans and workers. In parts of the region they are being replaced by families of landless rural workers for whom the town is simply a base for job-seeking — a process that has been called "ruralization" of the towns, and that may also be bringing aggressive new leadership from the socially mobile elements described above. In general, the small towns are growing no faster than the rural population itself, and like the rural neighbourhoods, many of them are hampered by a differential out-migration of young adults. Improvements in roads and changes in marketing make it inevitable that a good many of the small towns should wither away, but policies for their selective revitalization should be practicable as well as highly desirable. Such policies should include reform and democratization of the municipal administrative structures, provision of a range of public services enabling the towns to function effectively as community centres for their rural hinterland, and promotion of small industries. The towns could thus offer permanent jobs for a part of the population leaving the land and a certain degree of preparation for urban life for other migrants who would use them as way-stations;

(*b*) The cities that lie between the extremes of the great agglomerations and the small local centres show diverse trends but one finds a general lack of effective regional planning defining their functions within a national urban network. They include: (i) provincial capitals that have not acquired major industries or other new functions (except, in some instances, exploitation of their colonial architecture and other attractions for tourism). Some of these capitals are now being "ruralized" in the same way as the smaller towns, others have retained a good deal of vitality and economic viability in spite of their traditional traits, and the fact that the urban infra-structure is well-developed and not overburdened in the manner of the great cities makes it particularly worth while to envisage their planned growth; (ii) rapidly growing centres of diversified manufacturing

[18] This generalization would not be affected by a speeding up of land tenure reforms, on the assumption that such reforms will give due weight to needs for increase in marketed food production. A recent report by the Inter-American Committee on Agricultural Development (*Policies of agrarian reform* LARC/65.CONF. 3, presented to the Latin American Conference on Food and Agriculture in 1965) proposed — on the basis of studies of land tenure in six countries, as a "reasonable objective" for agrarian reform — programmes benefiting half the families of landless workers now in agriculture, *minifundio* holders and cultivators with insecure tenure within the next decade, or 5 per cent of such families annually plus an allowance for increase in their numbers. The report indicated that the number of beneficiaries of reform would have to be increased if the cities did not continue to absorb surplus rural population at present rates. It does not seem likely, however, that more than one or two countries in which the rural population is already a minority will attain the proposed rate of agrarian reform in the near future.

and commercial services for important hinterlands. All of the large countries have at least one or two centres of this kind, and a few of them are solving the problems of urban development planning more satisfactorily than the great centres. The contrast between the growth of these cities and the relative stagnation of the first type has given rise to a certain amount of economic and sociological speculation, as yet inconclusive;

(*c*) Coastal resort cities. The extremely rapid growth of a few centres of this type, dependent on one or another of the national capitals, and the enormous investments in luxury housing occupied only part of the year, can be considered a kind of extension of the upper-income suburban expansion already described, and the diversion of public subsidies for housing to stimulate their growth is one of the most conspicuous aspects of lack of urban development policies oriented to national priority needs;

(*d*) New cities arising from the creation of industries dependent on local raw materials — principally steel and petroleum products. The Pacific coastal ports that have become centres of fish-meal processing can also be placed in this class. These centres face the same problems as the great cities, frequently in more intensified form because of their small initial size and very rapid growth. Some of them, lacking any provision for public housing or controls of land use, are hardly more than agglomerations of shantytowns. In most instances, opportunities for employment at relatively high wages have stimulated an influx of unskilled labour larger than could be absorbed; this has occurred even in the carefully planned development of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela;

(*e*) Brasilia is the only example in Latin America of a completely new urban centre planned for political and administrative functions and intended to divert population from the congested older centres to a nearly empty part of the country. Here too, however, the unforeseen scale of migration of families seeking jobs in construction and services seems to have resulted in prompt reproduction of the peripheral settlements of the older centres.

One of the important areas for study and action at present should be the identification, within a national framework for regional planning, of additional provincial centres suited for rapid growth and the assumption of new functions, and the working out of principles for urban planning and democratic local administration that will bring their growth into closer correspondence with human well-being.

Conclusion

A brief panoramic survey of resettlement trends in a huge and diverse region where social investigations are lagging far behind the tempo of change cannot indicate with any confidence whether present trends are compatible with long-term development, or whether the greater emphasis should be placed on disorganization and marginality or on the new popular initiative and forms of local organization that show the resilience of human beings coping with formidable problems. It should be evident, at least that the peripheral settlements of the great cities are concentrated manifestations of much wider problems of population growth, economic transformation, distribution of incomes and of opportunities to participate in political decision-making.

Policies focused on such settlements, whether to stifle their growth or to bring them up to accepted standards for housing and public services, cannot have more than local and temporary successes until they can be related to consistent national policies taking into account all the above factors along with objectives for the geographical distribution of employment opportunities and public services. It should also be evident that the capacity of the national authorities to apply such policies depends very largely on the correspondence of policies with rational and organized demands from the population strata that need them, of a strength sufficient to overcome bureaucratic inertia and the pressures that have determined the distribution of resources up to the present.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, URBAN GROWTH AND PLANNING IN SOME MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

Over-all population growth

Population trends

It is perhaps not generally appreciated that the Middle East, the region reviewed in this article, has a rapidly emerging population problem, although the nature and dimensions of this problem are somewhat different from the widely advertised "population explosion" of a region such as south Asia. Reliable demographic data for the area are by no means adequate,[1] but the best available information indicates that, although the group of countries covered here, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, now have a rather modest population of about 30 million in a relatively large land area, by 1980, 16 million persons will be added to them — an increase of more than 50 per cent.

In an international perspective, this means that the rate of population growth in this region will, over the next fifteen years, be one of the highest in the world. The long-term trend is apparent from an analysis of actual changes over the last five years; from the data available it can be inferred that the population of the countries covered in this article (excluding Yemen) increased from 22 million in 1960 to 25 million in 1965 (a 2.6 per cent rate of annual growth, compared to the world average of 1.7 per cent) in this same period. Moreover, no one country alone among those reviewed here accounts for the spectacular population growth rate; the high rate is common to all.

Population and planning

The development plans of the countries reviewed [2] have not fully taken into account the nature and magnitude of the population increase referred to above, partly because development planning is still at an early stage in the region, partly because of the lack of expertise in this respect, and partly because of lack of adequate data. Such efforts as have been made to relate population trends to development objectives have been of the simplest and crudest type, in the sense that the anticipated rate of growth of the population and the target for the rate of growth of the gross national product are set out in juxtaposition, but the two are not systematically brought into relationship through careful analyses of such factors as the supply and demand of various types of labour, and manpower planning.

Migration and urban growth

Migration as a factor in urbanization

Internal migration, which includes rural-to-urban and town-to-city migration, has accounted for about a fifth of the total urban growth in the Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo, about a third of the urban growth in Iraq, and up to half of the urbanization of Jordan. The flow of migration has been typically from rural areas to metropolitan centres and from towns to metropolitan centres rather than from rural areas to intermediate-sized towns, which are few in this region. The role of smaller towns in the rural-urban migratory process has not been studied in this region but clearly deserves further investigation.

Precise data are not available for the countries under review on the rate of natural increase in urban areas as opposed to rural areas. Urban population is, however, known to be growing faster than the rural population, owing to the well known and very disturbing phenomenon now witnessed everywhere in the world, that cities and villages are subject not only to a net natural increase in population but also to an ever-increasing flow of migrants from rural areas. In Iraq, for example, 60 per cent of the total population increase in the country between 1957 and 1965 occurred in the twelve main cities.

It should be noted that not all of the increase in the urban population of this region is attributable to natural increase and internal migration. A significant increase in the main metropolitan centres has come from migration from other countries in the area (in the case of movement to the oil-rich countries) and from the migration of Palestine refugees.

Causes of rural-to-urban migration [3]

As in other developing regions of the world, the drift of the rural population towards the cities has received its chief impetus from the "push" of rural poverty and dreariness on the one hand, and from the "pull" of the real and supposed attractions of urban life on the other. The pressure of population on the limited arable land, the limited employment opportunities available

[1] Recent census data are available only for Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Kuwait, supplemented by a survey made in Saudi Arabia in 1963.

[2] Development plans of varying scope and emphasis have now been prepared or are being formulated in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

[3] The term "migration" in the context of urbanization has not been precisely defined in the literature to indicate inclusion or exclusion of temporary migrants or commuters from rural areas in cities.

in rural areas, coupled with the prevalence of extensive underemployment, the growing relative unattractiveness of the rural environment, and the slow rate of progress in government efforts at rural development, have all stimulated migration from villages to towns.

The unattractiveness of the rural environment is reflected in the absence or inadequacy of social, educational, health and recreational facilities in the villages of this area as compared to the cities. Perhaps the most sensitive indicator of the dreariness of rural life is the villagers' conception of their own environment and capacities. A survey carried out in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan led to the conclusion that city dwellers had a much greater belief in their capacity to solve their own private and public problems than had the traditional population of the villages; the villagers also declared themselves to be unhappier than their urban counterparts.[4]

Rural-urban population distribution

Metropolitan-dominated urbanization

One of the most interesting and significant features of urbanization in the countries considered in this chapter is the predominance of large urban centres (over the 100,000 population range). About one quarter of the total population of Jordan and Syria, 40 per cent of the population of Iraq and Lebanon, and 70 per cent of the population of Kuwait (admittedly an exceptional case) live in cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants. All the countries covered (except Yemen, for which complete data are not available) have at least one metropolis of over 100,000; Iraq has five such cities (Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Kirkuk and Najaf); Saudi Arabia, three (Riyadh, Mecca and Jeddah); and Syria, four (Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama).[5]

Metropolization, "primacy" and the domination of large centres in the urban pattern are essentially evidence of the broader problem of uneven distribution of the population as a whole in the region. This unevenness obviously results from an imbalance in economic opportunities. Irrigated or irrigable areas in the Middle East are small pockets in a vast land area, being limited often to coastal plains and river valleys, a situation of which population clustering is the inevitable result.

Settlement pattern and level of urbanization

Aside from the high population concentration — the key to the emerging population "problem" referred to above — and the metropolized urbanization, the settlement pattern of the countries reviewed here is characterized by a large number of rural localities of very small size, on the one hand, and a relative scarcity of medium-sized settlements, on the other.

Migration from rural areas tends to bolster the existing settlement pattern as the bulk of the spontaneous migratory movement is directed towards the largest metropolitan centres, particularly capital cities. Governments of the area have not, however, taken any concrete steps to guide the tide of migration to smaller centres, partly because of the absence of an integrated national policy dealing with the causes of migration itself and partly because of the absence of agreement on the desirability of decentralized growth. Experts who have addressed themselves to this question cannot agree whether in the existing circumstances of this region (or any other region, for that matter) a centralized settlement pattern — as represented by large metropolitan centres and primate cities — or smaller decentralized settlements are more conducive to development. The economic history of the developed countries appears to indicate that the tendency towards primacy has been intimately associated with the initial industrial breakthrough, particularly in view of the various external and internal economies inherent in large centres. On the other hand, attention is called to the high social costs of large urban centres and to the desirability of diversification in space. Conflicting appraisals of this kind have understandably added to the hesitation of Governments in this area to embark upon a systematic policy of stimulating the medium-size and smaller centres through industrial location and other policies.

The largeness of the chief metropolitan centres in relation to the total population gives a relatively high over-all rate of urbanization for the countries covered in this review. The seven countries, taken as a group, have about 40 to 45 per cent of their population residing in urban areas, a degree of urbanization more than twice that of neighbouring developing regions such as Asia and the Far East, although smaller than that of industrialized countries such as Japan (63 per cent), the United States of America (70 per cent), Sweden (73 per cent), England and Wales (80 per cent) and Australia (82 per cent). Judged by the criterion ofd egree of urbanization[6] — one often used in international comparative analysis — the region covered in this paper lies midway between the developing countries and the economically advanced countries; the 40 per cent rate of urbanization already achieved here is considered to be the level that will be reached by the other developing regions after a certain stage of economic development and industrialization. The degree of urbanization attained in this region should, however, be considered to be a result of special circumstances (such as a small population base, a land prevalently arid, and dominant metropolitan centres) rather than as an indicator of the level of development as such.

Characteristics of urban population

Data for the countries under review confirm the expectation that, compared to the rural population, the urban population tends to be predominantly male, more literate, younger and more economically active. Farm-to-city migration, a significant element in the urbanization of the countries reviewed, has, as in the other developing

[4] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of the Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1958).

[5] The data presented in this section are drawn largely from an analysis of census materials.

[6] Urbanization has been defined as the process whereby people come to live in "urban" areas; "urban" areas are defined in demographic terms as settlements of over 20,000.

regions, been mainly the migration of men; as in Asia and the Far East, rural migrants tend to leave their wives behind with other family members, returning frequently to their villages of origin and making periodic remittances from urban earnings. This is quite different from the situation in the economically developed countries whose cities tend to have a greater proportion of females.[7]

The age structure of cities is basically a reflection of past rural emigration patterns, which, if allowed to continue, could accentuate the dependency ratio in villages and eventually lead to rural devitalization and stagnation on the one hand, and uncontrollable urban sprawl and congestion on the other.

Government measures and policies relating to urbanization

Classification of measures

The response of countries in the area reviewed to the massive growth of cities has been at two levels: first, the development of short-range practical programmes and measures to deal with the symptoms, manifestations and consequences of urban growth itself; and, secondly, the development of broad, long-term policies dealing with the very causes of the city-ward flow of rural population, planned urban growth through rural development, regionalized national planning [8] (for example, industrial location policies) and metropolitan planning.

Short-term measures and sectoral programmes

Many of the short-term measures are addressed at least indirectly to the rural migrants arriving in towns and cities, particularly in the largest urban centres of the area covered, such as Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Kuwait, where the problem is most serious in this respect. Few countries in the region have deliberate policies for the voluntary or involuntary relocation of rural migrants to the villages of their origin (or to other rural areas) or for the absorption and integration of migrants into the urban milieu.[9] Such programmes as exist deal with the migrants as part of the over-all population, especially in the low-income groups.

The continuing in-migration from rural areas has given rise to shanty towns, *sarifas* and squatters' settlements in urban areas or on their periphery. Some migrants share dwellings with those who have preceded them from the same locality of origin, which adds to the existing pressure on housing and community facilities and contributes to the increasing cost of rent. Most Governments in the area have undertaken urban housing programmes; the chief beneficiaries of such programmes however, often tend, at least in the initial stages, to be the civil servants in the capital cities or the larger provincial towns. In spite of the efforts made, urban housing programmes are beset by financial, personnel, administrative and technical difficulties, and have not yet come near meeting the growing housing needs of the cities of the region. There is a very high rate of private construction, which is the favourite investment in the large cities of this region, but housing in this category is beyond the means of low-income groups.

Low-income urban populations in general, and recently arrived rural migrants in particular, face a number of other problems besides housing — adaptation to new urban ways, family breakdown, destitution, malnutrition, poor health, absence of adequate schooling — which are being tackled on an *ad hoc* basis through social welfare and other programmes. No country in the area reviewed has the equivalent of "reception centres" to aid new migrants with their immediate problems, the only exception being services provided to migrant workers. The new migrant does, however, sometimes benefit from regular employment services such as those known to exist and function in Syria and Lebanon. Iraq, Syria and Kuwait have recently introduced legal measures to protect unskilled new workers against exploitation by unscrupulous contractors or brokers in urban areas.

Public assistance programmes are under way in most of the countries under review and the principal beneficiaries of such programmes tend to be rural migrants recently arrived in cities. In contrast to public assistance, modern social security, which has been introduced in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, covers the working population. Although, in principle, public assistance and social security programmes based on contributions by workers or employers or both are intended to cover citizens in rural as well as urban areas, in practice the benefits of these programmes are available only to urban dwellers. Migrants benefit more from public assistance than from social security, as many of them are not employed, and even for those newly employed a certain lapse of time is required before entitlement to social security benefits is assured.

The effects of maladjustment in a new urban environment are more perceptible among migrant youth than in any other age group. As in other regions and countries, migration does not cause urban criminality, but it is a contributory factor to it and evidence indicates that in the countries under review juvenile delinquency has increased in direct proportion to the rise in rural-to-urban migration. The concern with problems of youth welfare, migrant and non-migrant youth alike, is reflected in the establishment of new administrative units dealing with youth welfare in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

From a policy point of view, three aspects of the measures reviewed above must be stressed. First, the programmes concerned are basically not addressed directly to the urban population, the migrant population or the low-income groups; they are designed to include the

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[7] There may well be a significant relationship between the source of migration to the city and characteristics of migrants; for example, migrants from medium-size settlements may move as families, whereas migrants from villages may more likely be predominantly male. Data of this type are not, however, available.

[8] Regional planning undertaken at the national level.

[9] It should be noted here that not all migrants to cities represent a "problem" of integration. Many fill the needs of rapidly growing cities for unskilled manpower and adapt themselves quickly to urban ways, especially in the smaller countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, where the urban and rural areas are inevitably in close proximity.

entire population, although their effectiveness is largely confined to the urban areas. Secondly, they are essentially sectoral programmes and by nature short-term measures, in the sense that they deal with the symptoms and consequences of urban expansion rather than with its underlying causes through long-term planning. Finally, the measures reviewed, in particular public assistance, health, educational and social services, which are centred in urban areas, serve as an additional attraction for the rural population and thereby stimulate rather than deter rural-to-urban migration. This is probably one of the foremost "pull" factors in urban expansion through migration referred to earlier.

Regionalized planning

National blueprints of population distribution

The Governments of the countries reviewed in this article have, like others everywhere in the world, become increasingly sensitive to the spatial aspects of national development planning. It is no longer considered sufficient for development planning to provide the framework for the over-all allocation of resources and sectoral programmes within that framework; the specific location of projects included in the development programme is considered to be an equally important element in the planning exercise. This, in turn, has meant growing recognition of the interdependence of the physical, economic, social and administrative aspects of planning at a regional as well as the national level.

The latest development plan of Iraq (1965-1969) and the five-year plan of Syria have, for example, stated as one of the objectives the geographical distribution of development projects designed to favour the most backward regions within these countries. National programmes in particular sectors have also in some cases taken into account the desired settlement pattern and distribution of population. In Iraq, the Development Board is preparing a long-range national housing and community facilities programme, within the framework of over-all development that involves the establishment of settlements on a sound basis, that is, taking into account the economic and technical potential of the country.

Perhaps the most ambitious endeavour anywhere in this regard has been in Lebanon, where a comprehensive and systematic study for the provision of a network of urban centres of different size, on the basis of a rational distribution of economic, social and administrative functions among these centres, was made.[10] The study has not been translated into an actual plan, but reference is often made to it in connexion with policy discussions or decisions related to development problems in Lebanon.

Regional blueprints of settlement patterns

The experience of countries where economic, social and physical planning have already reached an advanced stage indicates that the integration of these different aspects, and the determination of desired patterns of human settlement, can be more effectively achieved in smaller territorial units within the nation, such as "natural regions", "administrative regions", metropolitan regions and rural districts, than at the national level; at the more manageable regional level, it is possible to interrelate demographic with economic trends, and location of employment opportunities with the settlement pattern, more realistically than at the remote national level, especially in the large countries.

In the countries reviewed comprehensive regional planning has mostly taken the form of river basin and other major water-control projects; this is understandable as, apart from oil, the rivers are the most important natural resource in this part of the world.

Industrial location policies

Policies governing the deliberate location of industry in particular areas are potentially among the most effective instruments available to Governments for influencing the population distribution. In the countries reviewed in this chapter, however, the decentralization of industry as a deliberate method of reducing urban congestion has neither been declared as a systematic policy objective nor applied in practice, with the possible exception of Kuwait. Such decentralization as exists is spontaneous, resulting from the accident of local resource endowment — oil in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and mineral deposits in Jordan.

The limited experience with industrial estates (zones and districts) in the countries reviewed indicates that, thus far, systematic industrial location policies are rudimentary, with industrial estates having as their primary purpose the provision of facilities, for the development of industry itself and for local employment opportunities, rather than the relocation of enterprises with a view to relieving urban congestion or achieving a more rational distribution of population and economic activities.

Metropolitan planning

Metropolitan master plans

The effect of urbanization on static, old-style cities having little growth potential has been that each year the old city areas constitute a smaller proportion of the total urban area in such metropolitan centres as Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus and Aleppo. There has been an astonishingly high rate of private investment in building construction — using a variety of building materials, from the reinforced concrete of Beirut to the stone of Damascus and the mud-brick of Baghdad — but this construction has rarely taken place on a planned basis.

The ordered growth of cities and larger metropolitan regions surrounding them has been undertaken mainly through the preparation of physical master plans, although these have been fully implemented only in rare instances. Most large cities, many towns and even several villages in the countries under review have master plans of one kind or another. Barring a few major cities which have the requisite staff and resources to prepare their

[10] République libanaise, Ministère du plan : *Besoins et Possibilités de Développement du Liban* (1960-1961) (3 volumes), summarizing the main conclusions and recommendations of a mission from the International Institute for Research and Training with a View to Harmonious Development (IRFED).

own master plans, this is usually undertaken by ministries charged with municipal affairs in the central governments.

Measures for planning at the metropolitan level

The major effort in metropolitan planning in the countries reviewed has thus far been through the preparation of physical master plans, which set out the physical scope and blueprint for the ordered growth and development of a broad region surrounding and including an urban centre. Metropolitan planning as an integral aspect of national economic and social planning is not yet a reality, mainly because national development planning itself is still in such a rudimentary stage. However, a number of specific measures have been taken to make metropolitan planning more realistic and effective. These include: the extension of the area of municipal planning; the creation of the necessary machinery for metropolitan planning, and a broadened interpretation of metropolitan planning going beyond pure physical master planning.

One of the first prerequisites of successful metropolitan planning is the administrative designation of a "metropolitan" area. The extension of the municipal region may, however, in some cases have unexpected adverse consequences: in Baghdad, this resulted in the municipality spreading its activities too thin and in a wave of land speculation, which raised the cost of building for the middle and lower classes, who needed housing most and who might otherwise have built houses on their own initiative without governmental support. In some instances, as in Beirut, a "metropolitan area" is created for technical purposes only, without necessarily involving extension of municipal limits, in order to permit integrated planning for the city and its suburbs, in response to the rapid growth of the urban area, the high population concentration and the high rate of construction. In Jordan, the rapid growth and development of the entire Amman area during the last ten years has led the Municipal Council of Amman to extend its "planning area" by 50 square kilometres; this established the "Amman Planning Area", an area holding one quarter of the population of the country, without necessarily implying extension of the administrative boundaries of the municipality.

A second prerequisite of effective metropolitan planning is the existence of an administrative authority capable of planning at that level. In this connexion, the countries under review are attempting to establish over-all metropolitan planning bodies for the purpose of taking over the metropolitan planning function from the municipalities on the one hand, and the national ministries responsible for urban affairs on the other.

Finally, the concept of metropolitan planning itself is being extended beyond pure physical master plans for the capital cities. Plans are being envisaged for Greater Baghdad, Greater Beirut, and Greater Kuwait, these plans being viewed as regional plans rather than as master plans, with a foundation of socio-economic research and surveys.

Obstacles to regional and metropolitan planning

Regionalized planning as well as metropolitan planning in the countries reviewed have been handicapped by administrative and personnel difficulties, absence of adequate socio-economic data, financial limitations, the very newness of over-all development planning, and land speculation.

Administrative and organizational bottle-necks include problems in vertical and horizontal co-ordination, lack of competent personnel, and complicated administrative procedures. At the metropolitan level, planning has thus far been carried out either by individual municipalities, which lack the authority to plan on a wider geographical basis as well as the staff and resources to proceed effectively, or by town planning offices attached to central government ministries (such as ministries for municipal affairs).

Policies and planning related to urban growth and population distribution

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF URBANIZATION

Background

The major purpose of this article is to indicate the kind of economic information necessary to urban planners and policy makers for undertaking or recommending actions in the national interest of developing countries, as distinguished from the interests of a single area, group or region.

Since the article is primarily concerned with some of the possible economic effects of alternative rates and patterns of urbanization and urban growth, no real attempt is made to consider systematically the social and political ramifications of the alternatives. Where it appears unavoidable, some obvious non-economic implications are recognized and parenthetically noted. This is not to imply that economic factors are necessarily the most important or even the "first" consideration, but the self-imposed terms of reference prescribe a more limited field of discussion.

While it does not represent a recommendation or even a suggested basis for an urban development policy, the article attempts an empirical inquiry into some of the real alternatives that confront decision makers concerned with the problems and possibilities of urbanization and urban growth.

It is necessary to distinguish between these two concepts at the very beginning. Urbanization is a worldwide phenomenon. For analytical purposes, however, it is usually considered within a national or regional framework. In the broadest sense, an adequate definition would be "a relatively faster rate of population growth in urban areas than for the country (or region) as a whole". In most cases this results primarily from rural-urban migration, together with natural population increases in the urban areas. Urban growth, on the other hand, is seen as the topographical expansion of a particular urban area, which may or may not take place simultaneously with equal or even greater rural population growth. The view taken here is that there is nothing inherently negative in either process. On the contrary, these phenomena are seen as natural concomitants of the development policies of most developing countries. The policies themselves, while of course always subject to question, are not critically examined, but accepted as the conscious objectives of self-determining States.

The primary objectives of developing countries, as stated in the various planning documents — to increase *per capita* income and to raise the level of living of the general populations — are accepted as a working assumption. Also accepted are the typical economic policies adopted by the Governments of those countries to achieve these objectives. With appropriate variations dictated by factor endowments, the level of development and political-cultural attitudes, these economic policies normally involve increasing agricultural production, increasing and diversifying exports, and increasing industrial output. The processes of urbanization and urban growth are, therefore, viewed against this background.

Urbanization and economic development

The trend towards increasing urbanization in most developing countries suggests consideration of the points which follow.

The effect of urbanization on agricultural production

Increasing agricultural production is one of the primary objectives of most development plans. The dismal statistics are only too well known, and the inability of developing countries to achieve a sufficient level of output per agricultural worker to support the non-agricultural investments necessary for sustained economic growth is a problem common to most countries not blessed with natural resources (such as extensive petroleum deposits) for which there is strong and continuing demand by world markets. Not only is the agricultural sector unable to produce the surplus necessary for industrialization or provide a dependable export but the typical low-yield, highly labour-intensive operation leaves a large part of the rural-agricultural population (usually the majority) with barely a subsistence income.

At least one result of this low output-low consumption situation has been a steady movement of the rural population away from agriculture and towards whatever occupations may be found in the urban centres. This seems a rationally motivated reaction, but its cumulative effect is a problem to policy makers. This concern arises over the inability of cities to provide enough jobs or an adequate environment for the migrants on the one hand, and the siphoning off of the most ambitious rural workers on the other. A frequently suggested antidote to this trend involves, among other things, programmes of land reform, specifically, redistribution of land holdings on a more egalitarian (and generally smaller) basis. This approach, while understandable in human and political terms, is not always consistent with the evolution of agricultural production in the economic development of the richer countries.

The sequence of events in the economically advanced countries leads, in almost every case, to consolidation of land holdings; greater use of capital and higher land/man ratios. Thus, a constantly declining percentage of the total population has been able to produce food and

fibre for a growing majority engaged in non-agricultural activities as well as for the export market. The increase in output per worker would not have been particularly useful or even welcome had there not been an accompanying shift of rural populations to urban centres. This was necessary not only to permit the increase in *per capita* investment and output in the agricultural sector (or as a result of it) but to form the markets for the absolute increase in agricultural products.

The importance of shifts in population from rural to urban centres and the accompanying reallocation of resources is analysed in considerable detail in a recent book based on Colombia's development experience.[1] The author estimated that under a programme of accelerated conversion to modern agricultural production, from 60 to 70 per cent of the agricultural labour force could be released within a relatively short time.[2]

While this rate would undoubtedly be excessive for many countries, it indicates the magnitude of the potential transfer from rural to urban-oriented occupations. Of course, it is not assumed that the mere shifting of population will by itself increase the productivity in either the sector left behind or the one receiving the migration. Appropriate structural changes must also take place. In the agricultural sector this would involve consolidation of inefficient, subsistency-type operations (probably under public auspices) and the application of capital and modern techniques such as crop rotation, seed selection and use of chemical fertilizers. On the other hand, large but unproductive holdings would also have to be more fully utilized. Whether this would come about by the force of competition from the newly consolidated, state-initiated operations or through other persuasive measures is not relevant here. But essential to the whole process is a revolution in the total agricultural sector.

Assuming that this exodus from agriculture takes place and that production is increased, the all important question of markets for the increased output becomes essential. This would present no particular problem if the former agricultural workers were now employed in non-agricultural activities that were at least as productive as their former occupations. The key then becomes employment opportunities in secondary and tertiary industries and services in urban centres.[3]

Urbanization and industrialization

For the sake of this discussion it is assumed that the importance of industrialization in the development process is an accepted tenet, and that the importance of urban centres as loci of economic activity is appreciated. It is further assumed that some degree of urbanization is an inevitable and necessary counterpart to industrialization. It may be useful, therefore, to examine briefly some of the mutually reinforcing links between continued urbanization and industrial development. These are taken up in outline fashion as follows:

1. *Labour supply:* one of the fundamental components of the industrialization process is the specialization of labour. To permit maximization of this principle it is necessary to have an available supply of workers capable of being trained to undertake tasks ranging from simple hand labour to the most complex technical and managerial processes. Thus it may be argued that the very existence of a large urban population is beneficial to industrial progress and that young persons and the urban-born children of rural migrants in particular, are engaged in a learning process not available to them in rural areas. While much of this educational process is free or cheap in the general urban environment, perhaps the most important benefit is the availability of formal education far beyond that to be found elsewhere. The significance of this learning and educational process cannot be overemphasized and may be one of the most important contributions of urbanization to national development. Positive correlations along these same lines are to be found in the field of health and sanitation, and in the important area of social attitudes. Urban residents appear to be, on the whole, better trained and educated; they are longer-lived and possess attitudes more amenable to social and economic progress than rural populations.[4]

2. *Market concentration:* to remain in business and to prosper, industrial enterprises must be able to sell their products. The availability of a concentrated market which effectively demands these goods is perhaps one of the strongest incentives to further industrialization. Assuming for the moment equal productivity and equal incentives between rural and urban populations, the firm producing consumer goods would naturally prefer its customers to be as close at hand and as concentrated as possible, to reduce the important element of shipping and handling costs. Moreover, throughout the world *per capita* incomes in urban centres are higher than in rural areas. This is observed even where there is a substantial degree of urban unemployment and marginal employment. Evidently, urban-oriented jobs are on the average more productive than rural occupations, as measured by conventional indices.

3. *The availability of capital:* perhaps one of the most striking examples of urban-centred location in developing countries is the tendency of banking and other financial institutions to concentrate in the large metropolitan cities. Whether this persistent tendency is beneficial to national development objectives is open to question, but there is little doubt that it is an enormous advantage to city-based enterprises. In addition to the accessibility of the institutional framework, another factor influencing the general availability of capital is the comparatively higher rate and more favourable form of savings by urban populations.

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[1] Lauchlin Currie, *Accelerating Development* (New York, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1960).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[3] Perhaps an equally important requirement is the development of marketing systems that encourage the free flow of agricultural production to urban dwellers at fair prices.

[4] It may also be speculated that it is more advantageous to the society to have marginally employed individuals in urban rather than rural areas, since they could be more easily mobilized for socially useful tasks, e.g., public works projects to provide the urban facilities which will eventually be required in any case. It is recognized that they could also be mobilized for socially destructive acts.

A recent study conducted in India reveals that in urban areas 43.9 per cent of gross savings is available in the form necessary for the extension of a long-term credit, compared to only 26.9 per cent for the country as a whole.[5] The difference is even more noticeable when each type of savings is viewed as a percentage of disposable income. Here it is seen that the percentage of an urban household's disposable in come saved in long-term financial assets is more than four times greater than that for the country as a whole.

The implications of this analysis pose some very hopeful possibilities. It is evident, for example, that urban households not only save a greater proportion of their incomes but that the institutional framework available for depositing and investing savings in urban areas encourages the accumulation of easily transferable capital forms and the development of credit. This can only be beneficial to national development in the long run.

4. *Managerial and entrepreneurial talent:* it has often been stated that the lack of managerial and entrepreneurial talent may be the single most important obstacle to economic development, but it should be added that the degree of concentration of this talent may be equally important. Since it takes at least two to conduct business, and usually a great many more to undertake a complex commercial-industrial enterprise, it follows that in a situation which facilitates the juxtaposition of the necessary entrepreneurial and managerial talent, there will be a greater chance for a new enterprise to be established. Thus as rural populations migrate to urban areas, the total number of chances of matching entrepreneurial genius with managerial experience are far greater than if each had remained in his original locality, that is, an exponential function of population concentration.[6]

The list of favourable correlations between urbanization and industrialization could undoubtedly be expanded many times. But it should be sufficiently apparent that the two tend to reinforce each other. Does this then imply that developing countries are on the right track and it is only a question of time before the desired phenomenon of sustained economic growth takes place? Apparently not. For while this is essentially the pattern of economic development followed by the industrially advanced countries, and the results of these shifts in population and resources allocation in the richer countries are also desired by the developing countries, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of planners to follow the same physical patterns of urban and regional growth that occurred in the industrialization period of the nineteenth century. This reluctance is reinforced by the less favourable options available to currently developing countries. It is argued that, unlike the countries of Europe and North America during their early industrialization periods, today's developing countries are faced with a set of conditions that lead to premature urbanization and "unbalanced" urban and regional growth. This may be explained briefly as follows:

The current rate of urbanization is felt to be premature primarily for two reasons: (*a*) because there are not enough industrially linked jobs for the migrating populations over and above the incremental populations in the urban centres themselves, and (*b*) because the physical plant and services in the existing urban centres are inadequate to absorb much additional growth, and the economic and technical resources necessary for physical expansion are not likely to be available when required.

On the other hand, the location of urban growth is felt to be unbalanced in that the direction of the migrating populations and the natural increases of urban populations tend to reinforce the existing patterns of heavy urban concentration in a few metropolitan areas. Faced with what may appear to be a slow death by centripetal strangulation, a number of developing countries have, in recent years, officially embraced a policy involving decentralization of industrial growth and diversion of migrating populations either to newly developing urban areas or to existing smaller and medium-sized towns. In many cases there may also be a corresponding (though not necessarily co-ordinated) policy of encouraging rural populations to remain in the agricultural sector through a variety of incentives such as the land reform efforts mentioned above, community development programmes and publicly financed industrial estates.

Economic costs of metropolitan-centred urbanization

The most familiar objections to continued large-city growth generally contain all or some of the following elements:

(*a*) There are not enough productive jobs in the existing urban centres to support the migrating populations, plus natural urban growth. As a result, the least skilled (usually the most recent imigrants) are forced into a marginal, service type of occupation of low productivity at barely subsistence wages;

(*b*) Unlike subsistence wage-earners in rural areas and small towns, the urban poor expect, and to some degree obtain, goods and services that are generally neither expected nor provided in the traditional sector. These include such personal consumption items as non-essential food-stuffs, housing, fuel, entertainment, and apparel suitable for city life. In addition, and perhaps more costly in the aggregate, public facilities and services such as health care, education, transportation, electricity, roads, sanitation, police and fire protection and public administration are all necessary at *per capita* costs higher than in the villages and the small and even medium-sized towns;

(*c*) Metropolitan cities are strained to the breaking point by the sheer numbers of existing and incremental populations and their combined needs and demands. There is little prospect for additional revenues in sufficient amounts to cope with needs. And very often, the original city structure together with the haphazard and unplanned pattern of subsequent growth, render city life demoralizing and dangerous to the health and welfare of the indi-

[5] National Council of Applied Economic Research, *Urban Income and Savings* (New Delhi, 1964).

[6] The importance of face-to-face meetings in the promotion of new enterprises is strikingly evident in Vernon and Hoover's *The Anatomy of a Metropolis* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959) one of the volumes of analysis of the New York metropolitan region for the Regional Plan Association.

vidual and the community, and uneconomic for commercial and industrial enterprises;

(*d*) Additional in-migrants, unable or unwilling to squeeze into the already overcrowded and unhealthy centre-city slums have established themselves in squatter settlements on vacant land through a variety of legal and extra-legal means. These settlements are viewed as obvious evidence of the "overurbanization" of the large cities and felt to be antithetical to urban planning and urban life;

(*e*) Finally, it is argued, the over-concentration of industrial activity in the major cities not only leads to diseconomies of scale (at least for the community) but is detrimental to growth in the non-metropolitan regions. This tends to perpetrate regional income differences and the dualistic nature of the economy; both of which are viewed as undesirable and uneconomic in the long run.

Alternative approaches

A number of alternative policies designed to correct or at least postpone the trend towards metropolitan-centred urbanization have been advanced in recent years. In fact several countries, both developed and developing, have officially adopted various versions of the anti-concentration schemes which generally have been categorized under the oversimplified (and only partially accurate) rubric of "decentralization".[7] The purported objectives of the decentralization policies are to prevent further overconcentration in large cities and to promote balanced urban and regional growth. Some of the most common decentralization proposals involve industrial dispersion, restriction or deflection of population migrations, and/or creation or expansion of urban complexes in peripheral regions.

While it is recognized that many industrially advanced countries are also experiencing continuing urbanization and urban growth, their problems are of an entirely different dimension from those in developing countries. The real alternatives available to industrialized countries faced with urban sprawl, centre-city decay and transportation bottle-necks, are far wider than those confronting newly industrializing countries. As the richer countries of the world approach an age of affluence, national objectives (and actions) place less emphasis on merely increasing *per capita* income. A major concern in these countries is how best to utilize and distribute, in more socially meaningful ways, the wealth they are already producing. It is a question of equity and quality, not merely of quantity.

Most pre-industrial nations, despite their very sincere desire to improve the general welfare, have as the primary economic objectives now, and for decades to come, an increase in national output and income *per capita* which will eventually raise the living levels of their populations. The question of where, and at what rate industrial and urban growth should take place has enormous implications for the achievement of the economic objectives of developing countries. When reduced to the simplest and most fundamental concepts, it becomes a question of which alternative growth pattern will yield the greatest margin of output relative to cost. The equation has two sides, costs and output; and the relation between the two is the more meaningful measure of economic value. Unfortunately, the available data, while generally scarce for all accounting purposes, appear to be more readily available on the expenditure than the income side.

Costs and output in relation to city size

As for the public sector, in the course of searching for empirical data relevant to this discussion it was found necessary to rely primarily on existing studies and analyses where they could be found. Unfortunately, there is a scarcity of data on these questions in developing countries, and the material analysed here refers only to the United States of America. Nevertheless, the main conclusions on the question of municipal costs in relation to city size were so overwhelmingly consistent on at least one point that some reference to them is felt to be appropriate.

Six major studies on the question of the relation of city size and municipal costs in the United States were consulted.[8] The major points, on which there was general agreement, can perhaps best be summarized by quoting directly from the papers. In their study of 196 Californian communities, Scott and Foster found that, "*Per capita* expenditures for all local government services taken together were not significantly affected by population size". In a review of municipal output, Schmandt and Stephens concluded that the important consideration is not *per capita* expenditure but levels of service and that "there is a distinct possibility that economies of scale exist for some municipal functions when service levels are considered". In their later study on local government expenditures throughout the United States on a county aggregate basis, the same authors concluded that "neither population nor density appear to affect total *per capita* spending in any significant measure". Occasional reservations and disagreements apart, these statements are generally consistent with the findings of others.

It appears, then, that while the *per capita* cost for similar units of community facilities and services does not increase with city size and may even show some tendencies towards economies of scale (at least in the United States), it is probably true that the level and quality of services demanded and provided increase with the size of urban areas (and with higher average incomes).

[7] No attempt will be made to discuss alternative policies involving general anti-urbanization, which is felt to be a demonstrably misguided principle.

[8] Harvey E. Brazer, "City expenditures in the United States", *National Bureau of Economic Research* paper No. 66 (1959); Werner Z. Hirech, "Expenditure implications of metropolitan growth and consolidation", *Review of Economics and Statistics* (August 1959); Henry J. Schmandt and G. R. Stephens, "Local government expenditure patterns in the United States", *Land Economics* (November 1963); "Measuring municipal output", *National Tax Journal* (December 1960); Stanley Scott and Edward L. Foster, "Factors associated with variations in municipal expenditure levels" (Berkeley, 1957); Harvey Shapiro, "Economies of scale and local government finance", *Land Economics* (May 1963).

Thus, people in large urban areas normally demand, receive and pay for more and better services.

When the minimal services provided to slum dwellers and squatters are considered, particularly those requiring large amounts of capital and physical resources, for example, water and sewer systems and other heavy construction, it is doubtful whether their presence represents much of a burden to the community. Housing, commonly cited as the single most costly good required by urban dwellers, continues to be a perplexing problem. But as with many other services and facilities, its assumed heavy cost to the community is largely a product of estimates of aggregate needs rather than actual expenditures.[9]

In fact, the very size of large urban centres, as poorly planned as they may be in some cases, permits incremental growth up to a point, without immediate proportional increases in public services and facilities. Of course, there is always a point beyond which additional population cannot be absorbed without providing additional and admittedly costly facilities. Somes cities may have reached this point already, but there is no evidence that they predominate among the major centres of developing countries.

The choice between the provision of additional facilities and the diversion of migrants is largely a function of the productivity of industrially linked employment in large *versus* smaller urban centres, relative to the cost of investment in the alternative locations (and the cost of necessary social and economic overheads in each situation). Time, which is the other element to consider, is related to the ecological process of urbanization itself as a function of over-all economic change.

Productivity and costs in large versus *smaller urban centres*

There are a number of studies planned or under way which should shed some light on the crucial question of productivity or output *versus* cost of investment as it relates to location. A study undertaken at the Joint Center for Urban Development, on the effect of city size on manufacturing productivity in the United States, measures the value added per worker, by industry, in some seventy-odd metropolitan areas, using an aggregation based on a two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC). The tentative findings show a positive correlation between size and productivity up to the 2-million population range. Beyond that no statistically significant correlation was evident.[10]

Whether the same positive correlation between productivity and city size obtains in developing countries is an important but, as yet, unanswered question. Faced with the almost absolute absence of data of this kind we are forced to return to less fashionable methods of analysis and evaluation, in the hope that there is some value in attempting to make some useful deductions from empirical observations.

External economies and urban concentration

Although there is no need to go into the theory of scale economies and externalities in this discussion, it is important to consider the effects of these factors on industrial and population location choices. As has been noted by many observers, external economies derived from the existence of urban infra-structure and existing commercial, financial and industrial activities exert a strong positive influence on the locational decisions of new enterprises and migrant populations. The self-reinforcing effects of this phenomenon have also been duly observed. In fact, this effect is sometimes cited as one of the adverse aspects of urban concentration. But the essential meaning of the term may be overlooked in the heat of discussing alternatives to urban concentration. The phrase implies "economies", and unless those who continue to locate in urban centres are economically quite irrational, it is necessary to give serious consideration to these economies before adopting a policy which would not only limit the potential utilization of this "free good" but possibly substitute for it, external diseconomies. This is not to imply that all decentralizing proposals involve diseconomies, but that this is an extremely important item to consider in any cost-benefit analysis of alternative locations. Moreover, the full range of externalities should, ideally, be considered. This would involve not only the obvious savings to firms by virtue of mutual proximity to labour and other factor supply, government and financial centres, markets, and complementary commercial-industrial activities; but also the less easily measured externalities of an acceptable social atmosphere for persons with managerial and other high-level skills; of the attractiveness and prestige to former rural residents of living in a "name" city with known amenities and advantages; of the lower cost of the search for labour on the part of firms; and of the jobs and business opportunities for individuals.

Optimally, further urban growth would begin to diminish when the marginal benefits to the community were just offset by marginal costs. Unfortunately, this point is not only extraordinarily difficult to determine by those concerned with the general welfare but it is not even relevant to individuals and firms seeking to maximize their own welfare. Individuals and firms would tend to relocate when external diseconomies become internalized. But this does not necessarily coincide with the maximization of the community's welfare. However, unless there is clear evidence that further growth is inimical to aggregate community welfare, that is, to the national welfare, policy makers should be constrained to exercise great caution in substituting choices dictated by other than collective preferences.

This is particularly applicable to decisions based on the desire to promote "balanced" regional growth. Given the primary economic objective of most developing countries to increase national output and *per capita* income, programmes designed to promote regional or geographically balanced growth should (at least in the

[9] This is borne out by United Nations studies which show that housing production in most developing countries is less than three per 1,000 of population, about one third of the rate in industrialized countries (E/C.6/32/Add.1).

[10] It is interesting to consider, however, that in urban centres above this size the tertiary sector becomes relatively more important, e.g., commerce, finance and government.

economic context) be evaluated as they relate to national objectives. Decisions made for other reasons — political, social, or esthetic — should be justified in terms of national welfare, and not limited to the region itself. Of course, for each region or other subdivision, the objective would be towards optimizing development within the region. Unfortunately, the distinction between national and local or regional objectives occasionally becomes blurred, and policies purported to achieve national goals may really only serve local interests.

Economies of scale

"Economies of scale", as applied to industrial activity, implies diminishing unit costs as output is expanded. Thus it favours plant expansion up to the point where marginal costs equal marginal returns. Its effect on the location of industry, however, may be less important than such other factors as whether the industry is market or resource-oriented and the effect of externalities as discussed above. Industries which are characterized by large-scale operations for internal production reasons may or may not tend to concentrate in urban centres for external reasons. According to Hoover, " the economies of urban concentration rest on the same basic principles as those of the individual producing unit: multiples, massing of resources and bulk transactions".[11]

It follows, then, that market-oriented industries, whether largescale (assembly plants) or small scale (garment manufacturers), tend to concentrate near large cities. Resource-oriented industries, on the other hand, locate at some point which minimizes transport costs of both raw materials and the final product. This is important to bear in mind when considering patterns in developing countries. It is particularly important with respect to future trends.

As was pointed out at earlier United Nations seminars on urbanization,[12] urban-industrial concentration in both Latin America and Asia is largely a heritage of economic development originating in a colonial past. Thus the trend towards consumer goods produced for the domestic market, superimposed on a colonially stimulated background of primary-goods export and of central administration, may well have produced the heavy concentrations in large urban centres today. If this is correct, certain considerations should be kept in mind. Whether the pattern of urban growth produced by this background was desirable or not, the fact remains that it occurred, and the resulting economic forces cannot be disregarded. Neither can one ignore the fact that individuals and firms continue to desire to locate in these cities. The costs of diverting or preventing these choices must also be fully considered. There are " natural" forces already at work — weak in some cases, more apparent in others — that can lead to the eventual development of the non-metropolitan regions if given adequate time and attention.

This last point is one of the most heartening possibilities on an otherwise rather bleak horizon. In the United Nations/UNESCO studies referred to, it was pointed out that urban employment in the currently developing countries did not parallel the historical pattern in the older industrialized countries of western Europe and North America. More recently developing countries have shown a tendency to urbanize at higher rates and in shorter periods of time. One result of this compression has been a higher degree of employment in less productive, tertiary industries in the later developing countries at comparable levels of urbanization. This tendency, it is felt, is an indication of overurbanization since there is not enough secondary industrial activity, that is, manufacturing, to warrant the current levels of urbanization.

But when the historical background of urban development and the pattern of economic-industrial development are considered and, more importantly, when current incipient trends are taken fully into account, apocalyptic projections of urban self-destruction do not appear as inevitable as some critics would insist.

As pointed out above, the sequence of industrialization followed by most currently developing countries has led from the processing and exporting of primary goods to the manufacture of import-substituting consumer goods for the domestic market. This type of industrial process is market oriented and tends to concentrate in or near the large urban complexes. But, as the United Nations/UNESCO reports observe:

> " It is only recently that one can discern the beginnings of an active industrial development with potentialities for changing the whole conspectus of urbanization. New industrial and mining towns and other specialized, single-function towns and cities are slowly making their appearance . . . "[13]

and,

> " Latin America could not continue to base its development on import substitution in respect of consumer goods. Henceforward its growth will have to depend upon the substitution of domestic production for imports of raw materials, intermediate products and capital goods. These activities generally choose production sites close to the necessary raw materials, most of which are to be found nearer to the centre of the continent, or, at any rate, seldom coincide with the present large consumer centres. The development of this new type of activity will tend to provoke a trend toward continentalization accompanied by the renascence of old towns or the creation of new urban centres ".[14]

[11] E. M. Hoover, *The Location of Economic Activity* (McGraw Hill), p. 120. It is interesting to note that in the same context Hoover points out that " Exploitation of the advantages of urban concentration does not necessarily require a downtown location. For many types of business it is sufficient to be somewhere near the city... and the suburbs may be most suitable " (p. 121).

[12] See Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East* and *Urbanization in Latin America* (Proceedings of a seminar jointly sponsored by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, ECLA and UNESCO (in co-operation with the ILO and the Organization of American States) on urbanization problems in Latin America, held in Santiago, Chile, 6-18 July 1959) (Paris, UNESCO, 1961).

[13] *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, p. 141.

[14] *Urbanization in Latin America*, p. 39.

Demographic evidence of these historically predicted trends has been found in different studies in both regions. In a study on small-town development in Asia,[15] Kenneth Watts, investigating the familiar proposition, "the larger the city, the greater the rate of increase", found that in three of the smaller countries of Asia—Burma, Ceylon and the Federation of Malaya—the "growth rates were comparable for all towns throughout the size spectrum". In India, an analysis was made of the growth rates of towns during the decade 1951-1961 for five provinces. As the following table indicates, "In not one of the provinces is the proposition borne out: indeed in all of the five, the growth rates of small towns in 1951 were comparable with those of larger cities during the succeeding decade".[16]

Percentage increase in population during decade (1951-1961) for towns classified in size groups according to 1951 census data for five Indian provinces

Population groups (1951)	*Andhra Pradesh*	*Bihar*	*Madhya Pradesh*	*Punjab*	*Uttar Pradesh*
I. (100,000 plus) . .	21	31	37	29	29
II. (50,000-100,000) .	32	47	34	18	18
III. (20,000-50,000) . .	29	28	57	37	23
IV. (10,000-20,000) . .	23	44	34	31	24

In fact, it is interesting to note that the very highest population increase occurred in the medium-sized towns between 20,000 and 100,000.

Another study on urban migration and economic development in Latin America found that while "We might hypothesize that the biggest capitals would also be those growing most rapidly, the data refute this guess... More promising is the hypothesis that the capital grows in an inverse relation to its relative size...that is, capitals small relative to the populations of their countries, will grow more rapidly than relatively large capitals".[17] Data for Mexico, Cuba and all the South American countries except Bolivia supported the second hypothesis.

Given the observed trend towards the development of new capital goods and secondary industries which are resource oriented and, therefore, more likely to locate in interior regions, developing countries should concentrate their decentralization and regional development efforts on those locations which have natural comparative advantages such as ore or petroleum and other mineral resources, agricultural marketing and processing centres and strategic location, instead of pursuing a course of general decentralization for the sake of geographically balanced development, or even regional development that is not consistent with national goals.

The experience of Turkey in developing the Anatolia region, with Ankara as the urban nodal point, has been well documented in a recent report.[18] The principles expressed in this highly interesting study and reaffirmed by the author's findings are that:

> "Area development efforts are most effective when made on a selective concentrated basis in peripheral regions of high growth potential [and] the commitment to extend modernization beyond national centres involves a corollary commitment to guide the selected regions continually through the growth process".[19]

The author goes on to conclude that "We have also seen that a dispersion policy might gain short-run political objectives, but is unsuited to stimulation of long-term economic growth". And he recommends finally, in discussing the use of area development authorities, "We cannot in good conscience advocate that a nation establish a number of such development authorities simultaneously in several areas... One, or at the most two, comprehensive area development agencies may be all that a nation can absorb at the same time".[20]

Since the writer was speaking primarily from his experience in Turkey, his caveat may not necessarily apply to a developing country as large and diversified as, say, India or Brazil. By the same token, the problems and possibilities of urban concentration in older Asian metropolises such as Bombay and Calcutta are not comparable with those in African countries south of the Sahara, many of which do not yet have a single city large and concentrated enough to pass the critical minimum threshold of external and scale economies necessary to stimulate sustained economic growth internally, or to provide the spin-off effects necessary to stimulate national or even regional development. The situation in each country clearly must be examined in the light of its own stage of development and urbanization and its national factor endowments. And policies best suited to national objectives in type, place and time can only be devised in the full knowledge of alternative costs and benefits. This calls for information and analysis of a level and magnitude not yet even considered in this field of investigation.

Summary and conclusions

The several observations and arguments presented in this article do not and are not intended to add up to a "hands off" policy with regard to urbanization and urban development in developing countries. This would be as futile as a policy of deliberate anti-urbanization. The Governments of most developing countries are already actively engaged in planning and investment programmes in agriculture, industry and infra-structure that collectively have a substantial impact on the rate and direction of urban growth and population movements. The essential argument is, rather, that

[15] Kenneth Watts, "Small town development in the Asian tropics", *The Town Planning Review* (April 1963).

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 20 and 21.

[17] Bruce H. Herrick, *Urban Migration and Economic Development in Chile* (MIT Press, 1965).

[18] Malcolm D. Rivkin, *Area Development for National Growth* (Praeger, 1965). Several more recent examples are discussed in other papers presented at this seminar. e.g., the Damodar Valley region in India and Guyana in Venezuela. (See also article entitled "Urbanization and national development".)

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 201 and 202.

central Governments should exercise great caution when considering policies leading to generalized or non-specific decentralization.

The high visibility of physical and social disorder in the older and larger urban centres throughout the developing world does not necessarily reflect economic decline. As long as the primary economic objective of developing countries continues to be the increase of *per capita* income within a reasonable planning period, then every policy and programme that might interfere with or retard the achievement of this objective must be justified on its own merits, and with the full knowledge of its effects on national economic goals.

Large urban centres are seen as important agents of economic development, and on strictly economic grounds, their continued growth should not be restricted to the point where aggregate marginal costs exceed marginal incomes. Conversely, deliberate decentralization and the artificial development of new urban centres through central government direction and financial support are economically justified only where output can be shown to exceed costs by a sufficiently large aggregate margin (over a reasonable planning period). That is, the cumulative benefits over, say, a twenty-year period, should be at least as great as the benefits forgone in the alternative situation (the existing urban centre). However, as stated at the very outset, it is fully recognized that decisions, particularly those that so directly affect individual advice, are not made solely or even primarily on economic grounds. Still, in order to make rational decisions in the national interest, the economic consequences of policies affecting individuals and enterprises must be clearly understood.

If, after carefully weighing the costs and benefits to the community of alternative locations for future urban growth, it is decided that the economic and social benefits of continued growth in existing metropolitan areas [21] exceed those in other locations, then it is up to urban administrators and planners to find ways to accommodate this growth.

If man's future does lie in the city, as the title of a recent book by a well-known author suggests,[22] then its potential residents should have a chance to make it more livable — for themselves and for future generations. They cannot hope to contribute to this future if they are discouraged from entering into modern, urban life in the first place. There is nothing inherently evil in large urban concentrations or agglomerations, provided they are anticipated. The history of urbanization may, however, be one case where the lessons of the past have served to intimidate rather than enlighten the planners of today. But the lessons are there and they will have to be learned. The people will come in any case.

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[21] The movement of populations and business enterprises within or contiguous to metropolitan areas is not considered decentralization in the sense usually advocated.

[22] Charles Abrams, *The City is the Frontier* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1965).

URBANIZATION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT *

The problem stated

Policy makers in developing countries must be concerned with urbanization as both a prerequisite for and a result of economic development. Cities, with their attendant commercial services, *entrepreneurs*, trainable labour, markets, supplies of power, and other utilities are essential seedbeds in which the processes of industrialization and modernization take root and grow. At the same time, however, economic growth is such an expansive phenomenon that its very existence breeds further rounds of urban growth. A country caught up in the business of development is one whose urban population, urban industry — and urban problems — are increasing as well.

As aspects of urban structure that are relevant to national development are examined, one is confronted by evidence of close interrelationships between economic and physical characteristics of cities. The nature of a city's productive activity, housing and services and the flow of necessary transport between these functions provide it with much of its physical form. On the other hand, the physical environment — its quality, character, capacity and locational patterns — profoundly influences efficiency of production, satisfactions of community living and the ability of an urban population to perform its economic tasks.

Although the city plays a crucial role in national development, the growing body of national economic planners and national economic plans pay surprisingly little attention to urbanization and the importance of organizing in harmony the functions and activities which are juxtaposed within the urban context. Sectoral programming for such broad categories as industry, agriculture, transportation and housing [1] (on a nation-wide or, at best, regional basis) continues to command almost exclusive attention.

The physical planners — those architects, engineers and designers whose responsibility is the planning and design of cities in the developing world — quite often fail to conceive of the significance of the city as an economic tool or as a stimulus for growth and change. Their overemphasis lies on the techniques of design, on the static form of an environment, on location and construction of facilities without sufficient reference to potential in the dynamic activities which the facilities must house. Through this unawareness on the part of both physical and economic planners, the national development process is hindered.

Dimensions of urbanization

The so-called developed nations are already quite highly urbanized, and their current city growth patterns and problems are outgrowths of forces long in motion.

In 1960, for example, 40.3 per cent of Europe's total population resided in communities of 20,000 or over,[2] while in North America the figure was 46 per cent.[3] Population in north-western Europe — the most highly industrialized portion of the continent — was 54.2 per cent urban, while that in southern Europe — the least developed — was only 26.9 per cent.[4]

By 1975, according to a United Nations estimate, 44.3 per cent of Europe's population will be living in localities of 20,000 or over. In the United States, not only will the bulk of the citizenry be urban residents, but by 1980 it is expected that about half of the total population will be living in the fifty-two largest standard metropolitan statistical areas (major cities and communities of metropolitan character), as opposed to 44.9 per cent in 1960.

As nations reach the stage of advanced urbanization where the forced stimulation of new economic growth is no longer an overriding issue, some special problems presented by physical environment become of sufficient magnitude to tax severely the structure and resources of Governments.

The increased demand for land is one problem, for the affluent societies are absorbing relatively more land for housing, economic activities and services than at any earlier time. Densities are decreasing as people demand more open space, and the increasing use of privately owned automobiles allows urbanization to spread without regard to municipal boundaries.

In the United States, most urban growth is taking place outside the core cities. Between 1950 and 1960, population of all of the six largest metropolitan areas grew considerably (from 12 to 54 per cent), but the core

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[1] Indeed, it is not uncommon to discover economic planners who equate concern for urbanization with housing and housing only.

[2] *World Housing Conditions and Estimated Housing Requirements* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.IV.8), p. 37.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[4] Urbanization in southern Europe has in recent years been more rapid than on the remainder of the continent — a 16 per cent growth in urban population between 1950 and 1960 compared with an 8 per cent rise in Europe as a whole. Much of southern Europe is still in the early stages of economic development where rapidity of urban growth is characteristic.

Table 1. — Population growth, 1960-1975, total and urban [a]

(Percentage)

Area	*Urban population as proportion of total population*				*Estimated average annual total population growth*			*Increased urban population growth*		
	1960	*1965*	*1970*	*1975*	*1960-1965*	*1965-1970*	*1970-1975*	*1960-1965*	*1965-1970*	*1970-1975*
Africa	13.4	15.0	17.1	19.3	2.3	2.5	2.6	4.6	5.0	5.2
Asia	16.6	18.2	19.9	21.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	3.8	3.8	3.8
Latin America	32.2	37.1	42.9	48.3	2.9	2.9	2.9	5.8	5.8	5.3

SOURCE: *World Housing Conditions and Estimated Housing Requirements.*

[a] Urban population is that population living in cities of 20,000 or more inhabitants.

city populations of five of these areas actually decreased.[5] Predictions for New York in 1985 indicate that the metropolitan region will absorb another 6.5 million people (beyond 1960 figures) at densities so low that "[we will be]...urbanizing in the next twenty-five years as much land as we have in the last 300".[6]

Spread development appears to occur in Europe also.[7] For example, between 1900 and 1945, the area of Copenhagen increased four times, while its population increased only twice. Studies in Sweden on urban expansion suggest a correlation between space *per capita* and gross national product. Increased demands for educational and cultural facilities, recreation areas, usable open space etc., as well as decreased sizes of households are partially attributed in these studies to improved standard of living.[8]

While a spread city has certain advantages for individual families, the public burdens are often substantial. In lieu of adequate planning and land controls, poor and conflicting land use patterns arise. While demands for services increase, spread development and (in the American setting) the fragmentation of local government often prevent an adequate supply of these services and make what is supplied extremely costly.

Central cities, burdened with a disproportionate number of low-income residents and a flight of taxpaying industry to suburban areas, are faced with substantial welfare loads, severe political tensions and revenue-raising difficulties. By the same token, municipal budgets in suburban areas are strained to support the influx of people and plants which demand higher levels of services and amenities than they left behind.

Governments are becoming aware of the urban poor and are seeking new devices to eliminate poverty, on the one hand, and to eradicate the physical slums in which poverty flourishes, on the other. Yet evidence of severe disorders stemming from social disorganization amid affluence indicates that these Governments are faced with a long and costly task. Crime rates are increasing in many developed societies.[9]

To meet the problems, sharp rises have been noted in both municipal taxes and expenditures. Between 1952 and 1962 revenues of United States local governments derived from taxes rose by 55 per cent, while their general expenditures (for education, highways, public welfare, hospitals and health, police and fire departments, parks and recreation, etc.) rose by 56 per cent.[10] It is in the largest, most dynamic communities where expenditure for services and welfare appears to be the highest.

Relatively little conclusive research has been done on the matter of municipal costs related to city size or development level from which generalizations can be made. In many respects European conditions differ from American, and the foregoing material, therefore, should be considered illustrative rather than definitive.

The techniques now being tried to grapple with these conditions — urban renewal, subsidized satellite new towns, metropolitan councils and planning agencies, poverty programmes for the distressed minorities — are techniques which have grown from the circumstances of affluence and from the particular cultures and political systems that mark these nations at this stage of their development.

While developed nations are worrying about the quality of environment under affluence and the adequacy of supporting services, the less fortunate nations are most fundamentally concerned with housing of any quality and services at any level.

Although the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America are considerably less urbanized than Europe or North America, their cities are growing at an extremely rapid rate. Table 1 above shows that 1960 proportions of population in localities of 20,000 and over in Africa, Asia and Latin America were 13.4 per cent, 16.6 per cent and 32.2 per cent, respectively. The table also estimates the rapid increase in these proportions expected by 1975.

At present the degree of urbanization varies widely among the less developed continents and within them, and care must be taken with respect to generalization.

[5] Data compiled from United States Bureau of the Census *City and County Data Book : 1962* (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1962).

[6] Regional Plan Association, *Spread City* (New York, 1962), p. 3.

[7] Conference of the International Federation for Housing and Planning, *Report : Growing Space Needs in the Urban Region* (Stockholm, National Swedish Board of Building and Planning, 1965), p. 4.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[9] *Report on the World Social Situation, 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.7), p. 114.

[10] United States Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments : 1962*, vol. VI, No. 4 *(Historical Statistics of Government Finance and Employment)* (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1964).

In Africa, the least urbanized continent, the northern portion is most highly urbanized, with 27.4 per cent in urban areas (as defined above), while the eastern section has only 4.8 per cent in urban areas.[11] Asia shows great diversity in the degree of urbanization. For example, Japan is highly urbanized, whereas in 1960 only about 14 per cent of India's population lived in urban areas.[12] Latin America, too, shows great diversity. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay approximate the high levels of urbanization in north-western Europe; Costa Rica is less than 20 per cent urbanized, while in the continent's largest countries, Brazil and Mexico, urbanization levels are between 20 and 40 per cent.[13]

The rate of urban population growth appears to be increasing sharply. Table 1 estimates that between 1960 and 1965 the annual average growth rate of urban population (4.6 per cent, 3.8 per cent and 5.8 per cent in Africa, Asia and Latin America, respectively) was about twice the rate of growth of total population. This contrasts with recent growth of urban population in the developed world. For Europe, the estimated rate for the comparable period is 1.4 per cent.[14] Projections to 1975 indicate that urban populations will continue to grow faster than total populations in the developing world.[15]

Urbanization is not only occurring more rapidly in the less developed world but also appears to be centred primarily in the larger cities. Table 2 shows that large cities in developing countries have been growing far more rapidly than total population, whereas in developed countries the rates of total population growth now often exceed large city growth.

The rapid growth of large cities in developing countries is reflected in the emergence of huge metropolitan areas. Of the world's thirty-six largest urban agglomerations as defined by the United Nations, seventeen are in developing countries.[16]

Large colonies of squatters abound in these great centres and present problems of unemployment, lack of decent housing etc. Far from diminishing with economic change, the squatter settlements are on the increase. If the urban housing demands of the developing world are to be met, a level of production comparable to or higher than those in the developed nations may be required, a seemingly impossible task.

To the actual housing must, of course, be added requirements for utilities and services. In India, for example, these services have been estimated to comprise from 25 to 33 per cent of the total cost of residential construction.[17] In Africa, for each $1,000 spent for housing in the early 1960s, expenditures of $250 for street and sewers, and $300 for shops, hospitals etc. were required.[18] Conditions in the larger urban areas are particularly severe, and provision of housing and urban services is more costly than in smaller cities and rural areas.

One of the principal reasons for the high cost of housing in large cities is the high price of land. Speculation is rampant; land control by government ownership or taxation is rare and lack of transportation to outlying areas makes demands high for both in-city residential and industrial land. In developing countries, land costs often amount to 60 per cent of the total cost of a house.[19] Possibilities for supplying inexpensive self-help housing (which costs Rs 900-1,500 per unit in India)[20] become more and more limited as the supply of inexpensive land becomes smaller.

Table 2. — Growth of total population and growth of cities with populations of 100,000 and over

	Period	*Total population*	*Annual percentage rates of increase— population residing in cities with populations of 100,000 and over*
Developing countries			
Algeria	1948-1954	2.72	9.95
Ghana	1948-1960	4.98	6.65
Tunisia	1947-1960	1.72	1.28
Dominican Republic	1950-1960	3.50	7.29
Jamaica	1953-1960	1.32	4.32
Mexico	1940-1950	2.69	6.72
Panama	1950-1960	2.94	7.89
Brazil	1940-1950	2.59	5.03
Chile	1940-1952	1.46	3.25
Colombia	1938-1951	2.23	8.12
Ceylon	1946-1953	2.84	2.35
China (Taiwan)	1940-1956	3.12	7.27
Federation of Malaya	1947-1957	2.56	6.55
India	1951-1961	1.99	4.07
Indonesia	1930-1961	1.52	5.94
Iraq	1947-1957	3.15	5.20
Pakistan	1951-1961	3.52	6.02
Philippines	1948-1960	3.18	3.73
Turkey	1955-1960	2.93	6.69
Developed countries			
Canada	1956-1961	2.55	2.56
United States of America	1950-1960	1.75	1.42
Austria	1951-1961	0.20	– 0.05
France	1946-1954	0.67	1.09
Sweden	1950-1960	0.64	1.81
Switzerland	1950-1960	1.39	1.22
United Kingdom	1951-1961	0.51	– 3.15

SOURCE: *Compendium of Social Statistics, 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.XVII.3), pp. 86-90.

[11] *World Housing Conditions and Estimated Housing Requirements*, p. 9.

[12] "World survey of urban and rural population growth" (E/CN.9/187), p. 11.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 10 and 24.

[14] *World Housing Conditions and Estimated Housing Requirements*, p. 38.

[15] "World survey of urban and rural population growth", p. 22.

[16] Kingsley Davis, "The urbanization of the human population", *Scientific American* (New York, September 1965), p. 43.

[17] "Housing construction and related community facilities within industrial development", Seminar on Social Aspects of Industrialization, Minsk, 11-25 August 1964 (Working Paper No. 6), p. 4.

[18] *Report of the* Ad Hoc *Group of Experts on Housing and Urban Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.1), footnote 7, p. 12.

[19] Charles Abrams, "The uses of land in cities", *Scientific American* (New York, September 1965), p. 152.

[20] Catherine Bauer Wurster, "Urban living conditions, overhead costs, and the development pattern", in Roy Turner, ed., *India's Urban Future* (Berkeley, University of California, 1962), p. 284.

If all the migrants to great cities in developing countries were gainfully employed, solutions to the lack of housing and services might be more easily devised. This is not often the case, however, and the fundamental difficulties of developing nations revolve around low productivity and the lack of economic well-being. Cities are essential to the economic development process. Faced with the desperate difficulties of squatters and slums, shortages of housing and basic services, the Governments of developing nations will require great skill and ingenuity to utilize urban resources effectively as a tool for attaining economic growth.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

An understanding of the relationships between economic development and urbanization and of the process by which urban growth helps to transform a nation's economic and cultural life is an essential base from which practical development policies can be formulated.

The initial concentration process

Many nations possess large cities even before they industrialize. These are *entrepôts* for imports and exports of goods, commercial trading centres, national capitals or centres of colonial power. Quite often the various urban functions coincide and one or two major centres are dominant in nations largely rural in character, culture and economy.

As the process of industrialization begins, some industries are, of course, bound to the sites of raw materials. But the multitude of enterprises that are not held to extractive locations tend to gravitate towards the few large diversified centres already established during a nation's pre-industrial period. Several reasons account for this early tendency to concentrate. Ownership of new enterprises often comes from the commercial and trading classes already established in the large cities; these are the people who have been most exposed to contact with other, more advanced societies and who have accumulated *entrepreneurial* capital. Should the new industries rely on imported raw materials or machinery, location at the *entrepôt* or at a major transportation junction becomes the most accessible to sources of supply. Furthermore, the few financial and commercial institutions already in existence are usually in the largest centres. Access of *entrepreneurs* to high government officials is often essential; and in socialist nations, where the Government itself conducts industrial development, the proximity between new enterprises and the sources of power is quite often essential. Then, too, the existing large cities offer a more concentrated and immediately accessible market for budding industries than elsewhere, particularly in a nation where distribution facilities are limited and where low-income peasants are unlikely to provide a market for manufactured goods. The labour supply in large existing centres, while not necessarily trained for industrial pursuits, nevertheless contains artisans and others with skills who could form a nucleus for an industrial labour force.

Under a free enterprise system a significant factor of risk influences *entrepreneurial* choice of the large cities as a prime location.

In the early stages of a nation's industrial growth, with undeveloped markets, untrained labour and little in the way of infra-structure or communications to outlying regions, the factor of risk is minimized by maximum accessibility to opportunities for markets, labour, transport and utilities. In under-developed nations, location in the largest cities provides the best physical setting for effective industrialization and economic growth.

Time after time we have seen that if the initial industrial investments show signs of profitability, more development is stimulated, and this, too, tends to concentrate in the same cities. Advantages known as external economies are thus created (external in the sense that they are external to the individual enterprise and common to the environment), acting as an incentive to still further concentration. Demands from industries for services and utilities in the large centres require major public infra-structure investments, making these centres even more attractive to new industries. After the initial spurts of growth, a labour force becomes trained and available to train other workers. The concentration of demand credit provides a market for commercial, repair and transportation services. New institutions may be established to handle the demand, reinforcing the major centre's position as the main or sole source for financing new enterprises.

Clearly, an educational establishment is essential to train staff for the top echelons of industrial enterprise as well as those of government and commerce, now faced with increasing complexities of function. Therefore, it is at the centres of development that creation of universities, training schools and other specialized institutions tends to take place in the early stages of national growth.

Here, too, is the market for theatres, museums and other sophisticated forms of entertainment, and for major hospitals, law offices and enterprises offering other types of business and professional services which can build a clientele only where substantial basic employment and income levels exist. The populace at these national centres becomes endowed with an increasing diversity of skills and interests again contributing to the dominance of a limited number of cities in a nation's economic development process.

The rural hinterland near these great centres is also affected by development advance. For example, a growing urban market exerts pressure on subsistence agriculture to convert to cash crop farming which can supply the city's needs for perishable food-stuffs. Furthermore, capital from the city becomes available for agricultural investment in the surroundings. Often a nation's most profitable farmland is in the vicinity of the largest centres, even though soils elsewhere might have more potential, because the influence of the urban market is so pervasive.[21]

[21] Interestingly enough, intensive cultivation outside the centres frequently takes place in the same areas where speculation is rampant and where lands which could be farmed are held fallow in anticipation of profit.

Although little research has been conducted on this phenomenon of concentration, we have illustrative evidence which indicates the strength of economic and institutional dominance over the forces of modernization. Baghdad, for example, in 1954 accounted for 8 per cent of Iraq's population. At the same time it held 20 per cent of the country's industrial enterprises and 36 per cent of its industrial workers, over 50 per cent of the industries with 100 or more employees each, 58 per cent of the country's annual industrial payroll, and 66 per cent of the total value of machinery, excluding that of Iraq's oilfields.[22] A decade ago São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro accounted for 20 per cent of Brazil's population but almost 60 per cent of its professional workers.[23]

In some nations these centres have been single cities such as Buenos Aires for Argentina, Athens for Greece, Lisbon for Portugal. In others, two or more city regions have vied for dominance; Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in Brazil, for example, Cairo and Alexandria in the United Arab Republic. But in most cases of early industrial growth, countries seem to be similar in that the major impetus for, and the institutions of development themselves, are localized in a relatively small physical area of one or a few city centres.

Industrialization and the consequent accelerated movement of people from the countryside to a national centre magnify economic and social differences between the centre and the nation as a whole. The faster the progress at, and movement towards the centre, the faster these differences become magnified. The few national centres develop increasing economic strength and cultural diversity while hinterland regions still engaged in traditional patterns of life and economy appear to stagnate. An entire nation becomes peripheral to the main urban areas, contributing men and material to their continuing progress and receiving little in return.

The experience of the developed nations

The now developed nations went through a similar process of concentrated urbanization in their early development period. If their experience were the only guide to prospects, the newly developing nations would have little cause to worry. For example, once a strong economic base operated within the large centres of Europe and North America, demands grew for new markets and new sources of raw material and labour that could not be filled by the chief cities. Governments' welfare and infra-structure activities also increased and broadened. Both urbanization and productive activity spread away from their initial points of confluence. Pressures for attention from peripheral areas through political agitation combined with the lure of *entrepreneurial* profit and a growing sense of governmental responsibility to reduce the inequities that had occurred.

In addition to such private expansionist efforts as the westward movement in the United States, there are classic examples of public commitment to the physical spread of modernization: the Soviet development of Siberia and its cities, the incentives to western railway expansion established by the United States in the nineteenth century, and the British new towns programme of the 1930s and the postwar period. Each represents a public effort to spread the bounties of development beyond the highly concentrated national centres and in the process to exploit resources that were not being brought into full production but were essential to continued national growth.

In more advanced stages of national development, many more urban centres with specialized industrial enterprises and with external economies of their own become established, extending the benefits of modernization to still other areas of the nation and providing alternatives to investment beyond those offered by the national centres themselves.

According to John Friedmann, one of the leading theorists in area development, in the most advanced stages of national growth (when secondary and service activity outdistance industry as the main source of employment, and agriculture becomes highly mechanized), the influence areas of national and regional centres tend to flow into one another and work to eliminate the remaining pockets of backwardness.[24] The lower densities and expanding space consumption of urban areas characteristic of present-day North America and Europe become apparent. What Friedmann calls an "integrated space economy" comes into being on a national scale, and a relatively small proportion of a nation's population and economic activity is non-urban in character. Thus Friedmann links widespread urbanization with prosperity in the developed world.

If developing nations repeat the experience of the developed world, we might be more confident that major industry and other modernizing influences will eventually spread with force into the periphery. Yet there is much evidence to indicate that the developing nations today have peculiarly resistent difficulties on this score.

Some peculiar problems

On the economic front, investment opportunities at the centre have continued to be more attractive than elsewhere, regardless of valuable natural resources or other objective opportunities that go begging outside. Even in the face of special government efforts to encourage growth in outlying areas, unique attractions of the centres appear extremely resistent. It has been suggested that *entrepreneurs* in developing countries overvalue the payoff at central locations. An unwillingness to leave the amenities of the large cities may also discourage *entrepreneurs* and managers from locating elsewhere. As the centre continues to offer greater creature comforts and a wider variety of services, reluctance to invest outside the centre intensifies.

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[22] F. I. Qubain, *The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950-1957* (New York, Praeger, 1958), p. 165.

[23] John R. P. Friedmann, "Intellectuals in a developing society", *Kyklos*, vol. XIII (Bern, 1960), p. 520.

[24] John R. P. Friedmann, "Economic growth and urban structure in Venezuela, towards a dynamic theory of spatial organization" (Cambridge, Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1963) (mimeographed).

Per capita income at the centres also continues to be much higher than elsewhere, thus attracting younger and more ambitious rural migrants who might have stayed to help transform their own surroundings were opportunities available for them. This loss by peripheral areas of the younger, more vigorous elements is a particularly severe social consequence of urban concentration today. Another is the difficult period of adjustment the migrant faces as he joins thousands of others in attempting to come to terms with urban existence.

Often political tensions arise from these social and economic strains. On the one hand, peripheral areas are well aware of the centre's bounty and their own continued stagnation and decline. As the gap widens these areas afford breeding grounds for political agitation. On the other hand, joblessness and overcrowding in the cities also provide a breeding ground for political unrest, agitation and disturbance. The physical consequences of concentrated development are still another factor which contributes to disparity between the national centres and the periphery. In the main cities there are manifold and costly physical problems stemming from the need for adequate high-density housing and for the increasingly complex utility systems required for industry, commerce and residential areas.

Any solutions which bring adequate relief are extremely expensive, and attempts at such solutions may indeed draw even more funds into the growth process at the centre, leaving commensurately less for public investment elsewhere.

One factor which makes the present situation particularly difficult to cope with, except by skilful and ingenious public policies, is the relatively weak economic base which exists at many of these national centres. Even though concentration of industrial production in the main cities is high, the degree of industrial development is often insufficient either to support the resident labour force and the continuing flow of migrants or to act as a basis for expansionary forces extending investment to other areas. Many of the developing nations are urbanizing more rapidly than the industrial base can absorb, and the concentration of humanity in the chief cities far exceeds the ability of the industrial establishment to employ the people productively.

Tables 3 and 4 compare recent percentages of the labour force in the manufacturing industry in developing countries with those of European nations during their own early growth periods. The comparison indicates that the former nations are less industrialized than their nineteenth century European counterparts, even though in most cases they are more heavily urbanized.

It might be suggested that automation has reduced industrial manpower requirements, and that contemporary firms can operate more productively with a smaller component of workers, thus releasing manpower for profitable service trades. Yet in developing nations, much of the industrial base is labour intensive and fragmented into small and inefficient operations. Despite the larger enterprises at national centres, many metropolitan workers are marginally employed in inefficient plants or are underemployed in services such as petty trade, shoe-shining and office-running.

Table 3. — Labour force in manufacturing and level of urbanization in developing countries

(Percentage)

Country	*Year*	*Population in cities of 20,000 inhabitants and over (column 1)*	*Male economically active population employed in manufacturing (column 2)*
Algeria	1954	18.2	5.6
Morocco (southern zone)	1951	26.9	6.2
Tunisia	1956	17.5	6.8
United Arab Republic	1960	16.0	9.6
Costa Rica	1950	17.5	10.1
El Salvador	1950	12.9	9.1
Panama	1960	27.9	6.9
Brazil	1960	28.1	9.5
Chile	1952	42.5	16.9
Colombia	1951	45.8	9.9
Ecuador	1950	17.8	14.2
Venezuela	1961	47.2	8.8
Ceylon	1953	11.2	9.4
India[a]	1951	11.9	10.7
Federation of Malaya	1957	22.7	6.9
Republic of Korea	1957	29.2	6.7
Pakistan	1961	11.9	6.2
Turkey	1955	18.2	8.7

SOURCE: *column 1:* percentages calculated from figures in *Compendium of Social Statistics:* 1963, pp. 70-76; *column 2: ibid.*, pp. 396-399.

[a] For India, figures taken from Bert Hoselitz, " The role of urbanization in economic development: some international comparisons ", *op. cit.*, p. 165. The figures for India in column 2 refer to percentage of total working force.

Table 4. — Labour force in manufacturing and level of urbanization in European countries during the nineteenth century

(Percentage)

Country	*Year*	*Population in cities of 20,000 inhabitants and over*	*Working force in manufacturing*
Austria	1890	12.0	30
France	1856	10.7	29
Hungary	1900	10.6	17
Ireland	1851	8.7	34
Norway	1890	13.8	22
Portugal	1890	8.0	19
Sweden	1890	10.8	22
Switzerland	1888	13.2	45

SOURCE: Bert F. Hoselitz, " The role of urbanization in economic development ", p. 165.

Bert Hoselitz [25] points out that the industrial revolution in Europe coincided with a technological change in agriculture that raised productivity and released surplus labour for industrial employment and urban residence. In developing nations, however, urbanization often coincides with severe agricultural shortages and slow improvement in productivity. The data in table 5 indicate that only small increases in agricultural production were realized by five countries and that losses were

[25] Bert F. Hoselitz, "The role of urbanization in economic development: some international comparisons", in Roy Turner, ed., *India's Urban Future*, p. 169.

Table 5. — Changes in *per capita* food production and trade balances in food and feed in selected developing countries [a]

(Percentage)

Country	*Change in* per capita *food production* [b] *1954-1955 to 1962-1963 annual rate (column 1)*	*Trade balance in food and feed* [c] *1961-1962 average millions of dollars (column 2)*
Mexico	3.0	142
Venezuela	1.3	– 161
Brazil	0.9	– 131
Iran	0.6	– 32
China (Taiwan)	0.5	– 2
United Arab Republic	0.3	– 119
Philippines	0.2	81
India	– 0.1	– 191
Chile	– 0.3	– 65
Pakistan	– 0.3	– 75
Colombia	– 0.8	– 32
Indonesia	– 1.1	– 57

SOURCE: *column 1: World Economic Survey, 1964, Part II, Current Economic Developments* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.II.C.3) p. 126; *column 2: Ibid.*, p. 148.

[a] From the countries for which data were available, a selection was made of those with the largest populations in each region.

[b] Food includes grains, starchy roots, sugar, pulse, edible oil crops, nuts, fruits, vegetables, wine, cocoa and livestock products.

[c] Food and feed includes food and live animals, beverages, fats and oils.

shown by five. Two countries, Mexico and Venezuela, showed moderate gains. Column 2 indicates that ten of the twelve countries experienced deficits in the trade of food and feed. Although data in the two columns are not strictly comparable (since column 2 contains a greater number of commodities than column 1), the comparison indicates that in most cases, even when food production increased, gains were not sufficient to offset population increases.

The failure of many developing countries to achieve large increases in agricultural productivity indicated by these figures poses a significant barrier to their growth efforts. Nations unable to support either the growing urban population or those in agricultural areas must import food, thereby depleting their often short supplies of foreign exchange. The agricultural population is often unable to contribute to the development effort by providing markets and capital to the industrializing areas; and, since the land cannot support the peasants, many must flock to the cities as their only economic hope.

All migrants do not go to the national centres; many gravitate towards provincial capitals and other smaller cities where rates of urbanization are also high. But the flow of people to other "catch-basins" does not in itself relieve a nation of problems stemming from concentration at the metropolis, since migration is only one phase of the problem.

As long as the few large centres continue to attract a disproportionate share of the existing industry of commercial activity, professional people, and modernizing institutions, the gap between metropolis and the remainder of a nation will widen, for there will be proportionately fewer industrial jobs, educational opportunities or chances to learn new skills in the outlying areas. There will be proportionately fewer doctors and administrators, lawyers, teachers and so on able to handle the service and organizational apparatus of the smaller cities of the rural regions.

Many developing nations are thus faced with a particularly intractable dilemma which goes to the very heart of the relationship between economic development and urban physical planning. The great centres need strengthening if their *entrepreneurs* and institutions are one day to become potent enough for expansion into the periphery. Yet every investment to strengthen the centre's infra-structure with housing, with institutions and so on widens the gap between it and the area outside.

Considerable reliance must be placed on the activities and policies of national Governments in the developing countries if a spread of growth from the main centres is to occur, because only Governments possess sufficient power and funds to grapple with the issues and establish policies which might, over a period of time, allow the issues to be resolved.

THE TASKS OF GOVERNMENT

It has been pointed out that urbanization is crucial to the economic development process. The importance of urbanization is best recognized when a Government establishes investment policies which deal with the chief cities as economic entities and which also include attention to careful investment in outlying centres.

One set of policies would deal with the main cities. They would be directed towards a selective strengthening of economic base and allied infra-structure and services. Those productive activities best carried out at the central locations would be identified, and types and scales of enterprises would be determined and means of accommodating them set forth. The national Government should pay attention to supporting services — housing, education etc. — again with a view to channelling those investments which are made at the centres in the most productive manner. By using the city as a focus of development concern, problems such as urban land speculation might be examined within a suitable framework.

Efforts should be made to respond to the needs of the great centres constructively but not indiscriminately, carefully estimating what proportion of the nation's resources for investment would be directed to them and what specific activities and objectives they might be expected to nurture. In those areas which still lack a major urban centre to serve as the breeding ground for economic growth, the highest priority for public development effort might become the creation of a viable urban centre with its attendant institutions and infra-structure in as short a time as possible.

But in countries where the problem of concentrated migration and economic growth is severe, there must be a commensurate effort on the part of the national Government to select new loci for concentration away from the main centres. Some special activity on the part of a national Government to promote a decentralization of development is required, and a concentrated effort

by public authorities is needed to set in motion for other regions that process of dynamic growth which has thus far been restricted to the main national centres.

The choice of policies is not simple and it may vary from nation to nation. In general, however, the basic choice of approaches may fall somewhere between the two extremes of dispersion and selective concentration. The alternative of dispersion is based on assumptions that only a few devices are needed in a given area to correct imbalances and that once these remedies are installed, people in a region will be stimulated to shake off their torpor. Investment prospects will materialize automatically and obstacles to growth will have been removed.

A selective concentration policy contends that a great complex of factors prevents growth and assumes a necessity to create through intensive conscious effort an environment comparable with that at the national centre with external economies of complementary infrastructure, trained labour force, amenities, industry tailored to local resources, productive agriculture and so on. It sets out to create in a limited number of areas of high potential, conditions and climate comparable to that built up over time in each national centre and its *hinterland*. Selective concentration assumes that any outlying peripheral region will be hard pressed to amass enough advantages to generate dynamic growth.

Regional centres should be selected on the basis of an analysis of their economic and political assets. Preferably they will be towns or cities already established with some economic base and political character, situated on or accessible to transportation routes by rail, road or water and with access to adequate sources of electric power. Except in those cases of an entirely new development centre in an underpopulated and unexploited region requiring importation of population, they must have access to a labour supply suitable for training for the tasks of development. The primary criterion for selecting these centres should be potential economic viability — locational advantages of efficient and long-run low-cost operation for specified kinds of economic activities.

Another locational pattern may evolve from a new port, which then can become not only an *entrepôt* but a centre of processing imported materials, such as petroleum, metals, chemicals or grain, or of manufacture of local materials for export.

Still another locational pattern may emerge from an effort to exploit the economic resources of a region. This may take the form of a system of programmes for a defined area, such as a river valley or a geological or agricultural region, with a density of resources sufficient to justify heavy commitments of investment.

As in all planning decisions, implementation is the most difficult and uncertain stage in the process of selective concentration. The addition of another constraint — location — to the constraints of money, foreign exchange, markets and manpower may inhibit investment and enterprise unless offset by incentives and prospects of efficient, profitable operation. An array of fiscal measures is available as inducement to *entrepreneurs* to locate in chosen development centres; for example, tax abatements or exemptions from various excises or import taxes.

In any case, financial inducements and controls may have limited effectiveness in stimulating industry to locate in secondary urban centres unless they are accompanied by positive measures to stimulate the advantages of operation. The industrial park is one such device, providing facilities and buildings. A programme of recruitment and training of suitable labour is another. A facilitation of joint ventures with foreign firms or provision of technical assistance in engineering, production and marketing is still another. All of these are devices common enough in stimulating industrialization in developing countries. They can be used intensively and in combination to stimulate investment and efficient operation in those extremely promising areas that are selected for special treatment.

The process of selective concentration is receiving increasing acceptance in the developing world, although this acceptance is far from universal. One of the most successful examples of selective concentration tried in the developing world is the Turkish capital of Ankara, where the concentration process was begun over forty years ago. Many of the effects can now be measured. When Turkey became a republic in 1923, Ankara had a population of 25,000. It was decided that Ankara would be the new capital, and political and administrative power was completely transferred there. In addition, Ankara was made the cultural capital of Turkey, and the placement of certain key government industries established nearby provided the beginning of an industrial base. Infra-structure was installed to service the industries and was made available to private *entrepreneurs*. An intensive effort was initiated to improve agriculture in the surrounding areas. A city plan was commissioned early in the capital's development and was generally followed in terms of location of facilities, relationship between functions, open space and transportation. By 1966 the population of Ankara was close to 1 million.[26]

It would seem that this process of selective concentration should be built into the national economic policy mechanisms of developing countries which are faced with the imbalanced pattern of economic growth. Thus, efforts to alleviate the urban problems of developing nations revolve around means of strengthening the economic base and services of the chief cities, and channelling other investment in the most productive possible manner to a few key outlying centres, which become prime targets for public efforts to spread economic growth and cultural change throughout the nation as a whole.

Plans and planning

The national plan

Many developing nations have adopted a national economic development plan and a national planning process as a means for setting growth targets and establishing priorities for the allocation of resources.

[26] For a detailed description of the Turkish experience with selective concentration, see Malcolm D. Rivkin, *Area Development for National Growth* (New York, Praeger, 1965).

Often the plan-making institution is in a position close to the office of the prime minister, the national legislature or other chief decision-making bodies. Although its advice and prescriptions are not always followed, the plan-making institution is in an excellent position to influence actual assignment of resources. Thus, the development planning process may be a promising means by which the urban concentration problem can be approached, and the selective development of outlying growth areas encouraged. The sectoral approach in planning is probably the most effective for grappling with the over-all balance of national resources and needs, but while such plans are excellent instruments for programming the national budget, they are none the less usually not adapted to treating or creating the external economies which have been cited earlier as the fundamental contribution of urbanization to the development process. These external economies grow within an urban framework and they are created by combinations of sectors, i.e., industry, commerce, transportation etc., working together.

However, the planning process could pay attention to the "locational mix" of investments and activities as well as to the "sectoral mix". Whether the planning agency itself or some other body associated with it makes this analysis, the analysis should be made, and it should in some way be related to the over-all establishment of national priorities. Major investment programmes should be regarded in terms of their ability to contribute to the build-up of external economies within a city or its rural hinterland as well as their initial contribution to the growth of the national economy. Those supplementary investments in the infra-structure, housing, services etc., which are essential to the functioning of major productive investments, should be linked directly with the analysis and programming of the productive investment itself.

The planners could concern themselves with a total body of investments to be made in the chief national centre. By the same token, they could examine and propose any basic restrictive measures that might be required to direct the flow of investment in these cities. If the significance of urbanization is recognized by national planners, land speculation in the chief national centres which results in the immobilization of substantial domestic capital would be treated also in the process of policy making for economic growth.

At the same time that national planners consider means to stimulate and direct the growth of the major cities, the few key areas where concentrated investment and development effort might be placed outside of the major centre could be selected. This selection (made at the highest level of the Government) and the subsequent development of comprehensive investment programmes for the chosen key centre should also attract the attention of the national planners.

The approach does, indeed, present problems. The whole matter of priorities is a difficult one, with political constraints often far greater than those of economic considerations. Superimposition of the locational approach upon the sectoral analysis can well introduce complications and severe problems for the national economic planners. Nevertheless, when a nation is faced with an unbalanced pattern of urbanization and an urgent need to make its urban areas operate as productively as possible, some operationally effective effort to grapple with the difficulties is essential.

The physical plan

The process of physical planning is an attempt to order land uses and physical facilities in the environment so that they are adequate for the community's needs and can function efficiently together. All too often the physical planners are not sufficiently aware that the recommendations and decisions which they make will influence the course of a community's economic and social existence. Urban physical planners often lack sufficient awareness that the city whose fabric and structure they plan can itself influence the course of national development.

The facilities which the planners order and organize are themselves part of the external economies that make a city the seat of so many development processes. The priorities which the planners set for construction of facilities, the choice of standards by which industrial space is provided or utilities designed, and the relative costs of one type of housing project *versus* another are all matters that have potentially significant effects on a city's contribution to national development.

The speed with which supporting facilities are constructed to buttress a major productive investment in an urban centre may determine the effectiveness of the initial investment and of the supporting facilities themselves. Those difficulties that arise if services and facilities are not provided immediately may be illustrated by an example from a Latin American town where a government-run steel mill was constructed. Not even basic services were provided to stimulate urban growth, nor were roads built to nearby villages for transportation of workers. Journeys to work took three or four hours; land speculation was rife. Finally, housing was developed, but at a much higher cost than necessary.[27]

Certain countries have moved to supplement the traditional-design planning process for communities by adding skilled economists and sociologists within the plan-making organization. There are growing pains in this approach, however, and neither the designers nor the economists yet know precisely how their various skills will relate effectively in physical planning for complex environmental conditions. Some effort is being made in an increasing number of countries (e.g., India, Israel, Turkey, Venezuela) to recognize that the physical planning process can be a significant tool for a nation's economic development.[28]

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[27] "Housing construction and related community facilities within industrial development", p. 8. Also note on page 8 of the same source another example pertaining to India. See also Malcolm Rivkin, op. cit., p. 177.

[28] Integration of disciplines is one of the issues scheduled for study in the regional development research programme proposed to the United Nations by Resources for the Future. See Resources for the Future, *Design for a Worldwide Study of Regional Development* (report to the United Nations on a proposed research and training programme) (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

A note on the institutional context

A plan is only as good as its implementation. This is particularly true in a developing nation where ideas are many and, given the scarcity of resources and severe problems of poverty and distress, performance must be the measure of effectiveness. Many national plans have broken down because they have not been implemented successfully. Many fine physical plans have not been realized because the implementation process has been weak or faulty. If the full importance of urbanization to the national economic development process is to be appreciated, then the very highest authorities of a national Government should become committed to the task of exploiting that contribution. One might wish that those who are charged on the national level with preparing the economic programmes and on the city level with preparing physical programmes will be dedicated, sensitive and highly trained public servants with the authority to guide implementation of proposals. For only under these conditions, where the full energies of the nation are employed, can the critical problems of urbanization be effectively undertaken and the great possibilities which the process affords to a nation's development hopes be realized.

POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Urbanization and social development

While urbanization is a necessary condition for modernization, it may be questioned whether the kind of urban growth found in many developing countries today — in particular, the extremely rapid growth of primate cities often accompanied by stagnation or population decline in smaller towns — is economically and socially desirable. The social blight of the overcrowded large city — with its impact on the poor — is clearly in evidence. Many observers question whether the presumed economies of scale and social overhead advantages accruing from urbanization of this type are well-grounded. Though economies of scale are very real indeed for many industries, they may be, as Hirschman suggests, "consistently overestimated by the economic operators".[1] Some of these economies, moreover, may be secured at a high price which must be paid not by industry but by the community at large. This tends to be overlooked in economic computations that take account of the costs and benefits to industries but not of the costs and dis-benefits that may accrue to the community at large — many of these costs and dis-benefits cannot in fact be expressed in economic (monetary) terms in cost-benefit analysis.

Urbanization is not always accompanied by industrialization and does not necessarily result in development infra-structure.[2] In many cases what passes for an urbanized area is merely a collection of neighbourhoods and districts strung together in a line or circle with little economic integration. It has frequently happened that the demographic growth of large cities has not been matched by a corresponding growth of employment opportunity. In 1956, the unemployment rate in India's four largest cities (which have the heaviest concentration of industry) was twice that of the rest of the urban population.[3] Since urban migrants are characteristically young and job-demanding, urban growth requires a high rate of growth of job opportunities — higher than in the country at large.

As giant urban agglomerations continue to expand, it is believed by many experts that the marginal cost of accommodating added people increases significantly.[4] Real estate in and around the central city rises sharply in response to population pressures and rampant speculation absorbs funds that might better go into industry; housing costs, the largest items in social overhead expenditures, climb as apartment dwellings grow in height.[5] Efforts to minimize these costs by relocating people to the periphery of the city, where land values are lower, may well overtax public transit facilities, while an increase in fares, which constitutes a regressive form of taxation, is a potential source of political unrest.

Diseconomies of high population density are also reported in the rising cost of providing a safe and reliable supply of water for personal as well as industrial use. The spectre of a large-scale evacuation of Bombay, owing to the recent severe water shortage, dramatically revealed the precarious balance between the city's growing water needs and the available supply. High population density may raise the cost of distributing electric power while making it increasingly difficult to maintain a reliable flow of energy.[6] The influx of people has aggravated existing acute housing shortages, has extended the grey line of slums and produced shanty-towns which pock the face of the metropolis. The resulting overcrowding has produced serious environmental hazards in the form of polluted water, foul air and waste removal problems. These hazards to health have resulted in morbidity and mortality rates in the city that at times equal or exceed those prevailing in the countryside,[7] in spite of a great differential in availability of health services.

The overcrowding in the home, the poverty and unemployment — amid considerable wealth — are held responsible in great measure for the high incidence of crime, juvenile delinquency and prostitution among newcomers to the city. This high incidence of deviant social behaviour on the part of the newcomers and slum dwellers, moreover, has served to erect a barrier between them and the more established residents, who view the migrants as the source of the social ills afflicting the city. The latter, penned in their slums, view the established and better-off groups as antagonistic or indifferent to their plight. In the circumstances, a sense of powerlessness and alienation envelops many of the migrants who become victims of forces they cannot comprehend.

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[1] Alfred O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1958), p. 185.

[2] Sachin Chaudhure, "Centralization and the alternate forms of decentralization: a key issue", *India's Urban Future*, Roy Turner, ed. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962), p. 219.

[3] Wilfred Malenbaum, "Urban unemployment in India", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. XXX, No. 2 (June 1957), pp. 138-150.

[4] G. M. Neutze, *Economic Policy and the Size of Cities* (Canberra, the Australian National University, 1965), chaps. IV, V, VI.

[5] Catherine B. Wurster, "Urban living conditions, overhead costs, and the development pattern" in Roy Turner, ed., *India's Urban Future*, pp. 277-287.

[6] David E. Lilienthal, "300,000,000 Americans would be wrong", *New York Times Magazine Section*, 9 January 1966.

[7] Gwendolyn Z. Johnson, "Health conditions in rural and urban areas of developing countries", *Population Studies*, vol. XVII.

Development of a more rational urban network

Even if it were possible to shut off the flow of people moving into the city from the countryside, such a policy would be economically self-defeating, as well as politically unacceptable. The targets of planners should be some kind of control or influence over the urbanization process, so as to achieve a more desirable and rational distribution. Admittedly, this is a task, not only because of technical difficulties and differences of opinion, but also because of the common view that the size of the urban leviathan is the product of immutable forces against which purposeful policy and action would be futile.[8]

Measures to influence population movements

Some countries have undertaken extensive measures to deal with the problem of excess migration to large cities. Mainland China is an example. The following passage lists measures used in that country during the decade 1950-1960:

> "Mainland China...has carried out over the period of the decade a systematic and intensive campaign designed to 'round up' and return rural migrants to their villages and reverse or halt the blind movement of peasants to towns. A great variety of measures, some of them drastic, have been employed, including, for example, the transfer of 'surplus population of cities' to the countryside and to 'hilly areas' to engage in agriculture, forestry and other projects requiring the mass application of labour; requirements of prompt registration by peasants and rural migrants upon entering cities; instructions to agricultural producers' co-operatives to welcome migrants back to villages and to facilitate their readjustment to rural life through the provision of food and housing and other assistance; the application of the policy of 'return straight home' to 'inflowing' peasants in order to avoid costs of trans-shipment; instructions to urban workers not to flaunt the attractions of urban life during their periodic visits to villages; 'ideological education' in villages to help the rural population to understand the importance and significance of agricultural production; revision of various subsidies and social service provisions in cities which had tended to encourage rural-urban migration (for example, subsidized housing for workers, payment of one half of the medical expenses of workers' dependents, the issuance of food and clothing ration coupons etc.); the granting by civil affairs departments in cities of travel and subsistence allowances to enable peasants to return to their villages".[9]

In general, compulsory measures and direct controls over migration and urban residence, including the use of residence permits based on jobs, are not favoured today, except in such atypical instances as the application of the *apartheid* policy in South Africa. The most widely recommended measures are those that attempt to influence the migration flow by means of positive incentives such as by increasing income from agriculture, redistributing land to peasants, opening up new territories for settlement, expanding employment opportunities in rural areas and small towns (through decentralized industry, for example), and providing facilities for health, education, welfare and recreation in such areas. Programmes to improve commutation from rural areas and villages to towns, as an alternative to migration, are often urged, especially in the case of Asian and African countries.

In the Soviet Union and other eastern European countries, efforts to influence migratory movements have been tied to relocation of industry and to development of new regional programmes and carried out primarily through economic incentives and public appeals and persuasion. To this end, some areas may be marked off in the formulation of the national development plans as sources and others as recipients of manpower; incentives such as higher salary, special allowances and housing are established, and recruiting agents to contract the required labour force are sent to the out-migration areas. Public appeals may be used extensively in connexion with area development programmes.[10]

The provision of social services and facilities in rural and semi-rural areas is one means of influencing the urbanization process. This may operate directly by making it unnecessary for residents to live in the city in order to benefit from such services (although the rural provision of some of these services, especially education, can also increase motivation to move to the cities). The services may have a more indirect effect by making rural areas more attractive for technical and professional people, now city residents, who might be interested in a rural station but are reluctant to move to villages or small towns precisely because of the lack of social services there for themselves and their families — schooling for their children, hospital services for their wives during childbirth etc. There is evidence that the reluctance of technical and managerial personnel to move into rural and semi-rural areas devoid of modern facilities and social services is an important obstacle to decentralization of industry.[11]

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[8] "It too long has been taken for granted that the scale and character of the metropolis must be the end product of a multitude of separate decisions of firms and families — subject, some might add, to the proviso that whatever problems arise might be corrected later in the fullness of time." Lloyd Rodwin, "Metropolitan policy for developing areas", *Daedalus* (winter, 1961), p. 134.

[9] *Report on the World Social Situation, 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.4), pp. 170 and 171. (The footnotes citing sources have been omitted from this excerpt.)

[10] In the Soviet Union, such appeals, especially to younger people, have been instrumental in moving large numbers or workers to under-developed areas. Between 1954 and 1962, several hundreds of thousands of young persons went to work virgin lands in Kazakhstan and an even larger number took up employment in Siberia and in northern and far eastern regions of the country, while more than a million young workers helped in the development of animal husbandry. See F. S. Veselkov, *Material Incentives for Workers in the USSR* (Moscow, Gospolitizdat 1962), p. 26 as cited in *Report on the World Social Situation, 1965* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.IV.4), p. 57.

[11] See "Social aspects of industrial development" (E/C.5/138).

The provision of social services and facilities is an essential element in the attempt of planners, not to block the rural-urban flow as such, but rather to divert it from the larger, overcrowded metropolitan areas, through, for example, the creation of alternative growth centres in the small and middle-size range (the means ranging from industrial estate schemes to the complete building of new towns), the increase in the capacity of small centres to retain a larger part of the flow, and through various decentralization of industry schemes.

Thus, between the unworkable policy of attempting to regulate internal migration flow by compulsions and direct controls, on the one hand, and the fatalistic acceptance of uncontrolled urbanization, on the other, there is a middle ground, involving various indirect measures. These measures pursue two complementary objectives: (*a*) scaling down the growth rate of existing large urban centres, where the present rate is judged undesirable, and (*b*) decentralizing urban development through the establishment of a network of viable growth points away from the main cities.

Social services may be involved in the building up of points (poles) of attraction in different ways. Individual villages or towns may be selected and favoured for the combined establishment of a variety of facilities and services, along with economic opportunities. Or the facilities or services may be distributed within a given region among the different towns so that they will be available for the total region where it is intended to hold or attract population, although a resident (assuming transportation possibilities) would go to different places in the region for different kinds of services (e.g., central high-school, vocational training school, hospital etc.). In either case, the kinds of facilities that are most heavily built up should ideally be adjusted to the conditions that prompt migration from the area in question (or discourage immigration into it). Where employment is the major factor, emphasis must obviously be placed on economic investments. But if it is apparent that a major reason for out-migration is "provincialism" and lack of intellectual stimulation, emphasis on the establishment of a scientific centre, university or other intellectual institution may prove effective.

The task of attaining a more rational distribution of population through such indirect means is a formidable one, indeed. In some developing countries where urbanization has hardly begun to take hold, it would be of dubious value to scatter scarce social overhead capital on numerous growth points, with little likelihood of getting in return minimum external economies in any one of them. A deliberate policy of distribution of facilities to influence population distribution appears to be more relevant to those developing countries with one or few urban primates and a scattering of underdeveloped smaller towns and cities. They would also be relevant, however, to predominantly rural developing countries in which, although there is only a modest degree of urbanization existing, migration and industrial trends already portend a state of over-urbanization in the major city. Already in Mali, with 92 per cent of the people on the land, the Government is developing Djoliba to absorb rural-migrants and thereby forestall the dangers of over-concentrated urbanization in Bamako, the capital.[12]

The causes of internal migration

Where public policy aims to alter the volume and direction of rural–urban migration, it must take into account the factors causing migration. These are often complex and difficult to define and may differ from region to region. Among other complications is the fact that the migrant usually responds not to the reality of the city but to his conception or image of it; his motives are multiple rather than single, frequently unclear to himself, or at least diffuse ("seeking a better life") and not articulated in clear-cut categories; if certain amenities that he is seeking, such as better education, are brought to him in the village, his migratory tendency may paradoxically increase — a small taste of modernization creating a demand for more. A detailed review of the causes of rural – urban migration would require extensive research,[13] but it is useful to consider the major forces that influence the flow of migration.

Insecurity as a cause of migration

In a number of developing countries there are regions where the cause of out-migration has been relatively simple and obvious: the existence of considerable insecurity and lawlessness in the *hinterland.* Ethnic or tribal conflicts, insurgency, the short reach of government authority and irreconcilable political differences account for much of the violence that has driven rural residents to seek refuge in urban areas. Cali's rapid growth from 255,000 in 1951 to 645,000 in 1963, an annual rate of growth of 8.13 per cent, was in part a direct outgrowth of rural insecurity.[14,15]

Economic causes of migration

Economic motives are widely viewed as the major force behind cityward migration.[16] In the now developed countries, out-migration was often the result of urban industrial growth plus the application of capital-intensive machinery to farm production. Rationalization of agricultural production had the consequence of freeing large numbers of farm labourers and squeezing out inefficient operators. The surplus labour migrated to the city where it was mostly absorbed into expanding manufacturing industries and ancillary services. (At various

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[12] Thomas Callaway, "A counter magnet to the capital, the case of Djoliba", *International Development Review* (September 1966).

[13] Gino Germani, "Needed research on international migration in Latin America", *The Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, pp. 324-328.

[14] Richard S. Weinert, "Violence in pre-modern societies: rural Columbia", *American Political Science Review*, vol. IX, No. 2 (June 1966), pp. 341-347.

[15] See Social aspects of industrial development: note by the Secretariat (E/C.5/138).

[16] See D. J. Bogue and P. M. Hauser, "Population distribution, urbanism and internal migration", *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1965*, vol. IV (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.XIII.5).

times the expanding urban-industrial demand for labour was so acute that extensive migration, permanent or temporary, from foreign countries was encouraged in order to meet needs unfilled by domestic rural-urban migration — this has been the case in recent years in several Western European countries.)

Rural out-migration in the developing countries today very often has its origin in a somewhat different set of economic circumstances.[17] Fundamentally, these are rooted in the inability of an inefficient agricultural system to adapt to modern conditions and the vulnerability of that system to the vicissitude of foreign and domestic pricing practices. Three factors may be singled out for special attention:

(*a*) In a number of developing countries there has been increased pressure on the land as the result of the rapid rate of natural population increase in agricultural areas already densely populated and intensively cultivated;

(*b*) Public and private authorities have tended to allocate a greater share of social overhead and investment capital to urban areas, and attempted to raise economic production through an expansion of the industrial sector — while assigning a low priority to agriculture. In addition, pricing policies in certain developing countries have kept agricultural incomes low: in an effort to strike a balance between farmers and food-consuming urbanites, governments more often than not have favoured the latter, mainly out of fear of political reprisals in the cities;

(*c*) Reliance of many developing countries on one or several primary commodities as economic mainstays has heightened the vulnerability of the agricultural sector in these countries to fluctuations in world market prices and to declining terms of trade in the primary commodities. Efforts to diversify agricultural production have faced stiff international market conditions including competition with much more efficient producers.

All these factors have depressed income in the rural areas and widened the gap between the rural level and the urban level, particularly that of the "modern" urban sector.

Social causes of migration [18]

Since the decision — of an individual or family — to migrate, if only temporarily, often arises from a complex of causes and motivations, it is difficult to assess the relative importance of social and economic causes. In reality they are often joined; the individual seeks not just a new job but a new way of life as well. Many migrate simply to join members of their family who had quite different reasons for going. Young migrants who leave the rural household may be doing so ostensibly in search of a better income (an economic reason) but in fact may also be rebelling against the restraints and authoritarian character of the traditional family, which is both an economic and a social unit. Much migration of young people would appear to arise from restlessness, boredom and dissatisfaction with the traditional way of life in villages and small towns. Reports from various regions suggest that it is the more ambitious, energetic and better educated young people who tend to migrate.

The availability of a particular social service (medical care, environmental sanitation, various forms of education, housing, welfare, recreation etc.) in the city (but not in the rural village or small town) may operate as a specific reason for migration. The individual in question may migrate because of an existing need,[19] or a hope to improve possibilities of meeting the future needs (in education and health, for example) of himself or his family. Conversely, the city dweller may resist "decentralization" because of the absence of specific services in the countryside, for example, the lack of proper educational facilities for his children. The inadequate social services (along with non-existence of cultural facilities and public services like electricity, transport and communications) is identified with "backwardness", and it is against this general condition — rather than against any single deficiency — that the migrant often appears to react in a vague manner when he quits the countryside or small town for a new and modern life in the city.

In many developing countries, in Central and South America, Asia and Africa, the distribution of facilities between city and countryside is radically uneven. On the average there are in Latin America five times as many physicians in the capitals and large cities as in the rest of the country: about fifteen per 10,000 as against three per 10,000 [20] in Chile, which had a national average of six physicians per 10,000 of the population during the same year (1957), provides a typical though not the worst example of the imbalance in distribution.[21] Santiago had 30 per cent of the population but 64 per cent of all the doctors. In 1959, there were, in the capital, 12.7 per 10,000 in contrast to 1.4 per 10,000 in Malleco-Cautin. In Peru there was in 1957 a similarly heavy concentration in the Lima metropolitan area where three out of four doctors were established; while the national ratio was one doctor per 2,300 (compared to one per 750 in the United States of America and one per 540 in the USSR), the figure for Lima was one to 464.

For India, separate rural and urban doctor-population ratios are available for nine states.[22]

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[17] International Labour Office, "Why labour leaves the land: a comparative study of the movement of labour out of agriculture" (Geneva, 1960).

[18] The assistance of the World Health Organization and UNESCO in providing reference material for this section is gratefully acknowledged.

[19] The need can be temporary but result in permanent migration. Thus, villagers who do not have the means to travel to and from urban hospitals or clinics go and camp outside, and their stay in the city often becomes a permanent one (UNESCO, *Urban-Rural Differences in Southern Asia*, 1964) pp. 40 and 41.

[20] Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, *Health Conditions in the Americas, 1961-1962*, prepared for the XV Meeting of the Directing Council, Washington, D.C., 1964 (Scientific Publication No. 104), p. 62.

[21] Rudolph C. Blitz, "The Role of high-level manpower in the economic development of Chile", *Manpower and Education: Country Studies in Economic Development*, Harbison and Myers eds (N.Y. McGraw-Hill), 1965, pp. 79 and 80.

[22] Data for India, Nigeria, Uganda, from *Record of Proceedings of the Commonwealth Medical Conference, 1965*, annex I (Ministry of Overseas Development, London), pp. 75, 150, 193.

State	Population served by one doctor		
	Rural	Urban	State average
Assam	18,500	2,600	12,600
Jammu and Kashmir	34,000	5,000	17,300
Madhya Pradesh	26,300	2,900	12,100
Mysore	24,100	6,800	15,400
West Bengal	3,100	700	1,700
Himachal Pradesh	30,000	800	11,000
Manipur	65,000	1,700	16,000
Pondicherry	14,000	2,100	6,000
Tripura	10,000	2,000	7,500

The situation in many African countries is similar. In Nigeria in 1963 the doctor-population ratio was roughly one to 40,000; but in Lagos the ratio was about one to 4,000. In Uganda the ratio was estimated at one to 1,000 in the Kampala area and about one to 22,000 in the Ankole district in the Northern Region. Medical aid and health facilities of a reasonable standard in Tanzania are reported to be available only to urban dwellers. Bechuanaland (Botswana) is faced with special problems on account of its very low population density, which forces district medical officers to travel a hundred or more miles to visit dispensaries fortnightly or monthly; of eighty-three such dispensaries sixty are not staffed for lack of nursing personnel.[23]

According to a WHO report, "Perhaps the most formidable obstacle to the setting up of a comprehensive system of medical care in the rural communities of underdeveloped countries is the small number of medical practitioners who will agree to settle in such regions."[24] The shortage of doctors is rendered even more acute by the lack of nurses, medical technicians and paramedical personnel who could provide a minimum level of modern medical aid, as in childbirth and infant care. In the rural Venezuelan *municipios* in the period 1953-1957, infant mortality ranged from 1,000 to 5,000 per 100,000 live births.[25] Complications from pregnancy and childbirth were leading causes of death among women in the age range from fifteen to forty-four. Considering that doctor-supervised childbirth is a practical impossibility in many rural areas, there is an obvious need to assign high priority to expanded midwife training programmes.

While rural health services have improved considerably in a number of developing countries in recent years, it would be surprising, indeed, if the shortage of key medical personnel were not still one important reason why people leave for the city, and why city dwellers refuse to move to the rural areas even when there are good job offerings.

In education, as in health, there is a serious imbalance between the educational services available in the city and those to be found in the rural areas. Low population densities, inadequate secondary roads and a high proportion of rural children of school age are complicating factors.

The shortcomings of educational facilities in rural areas were summarized in a 1958 report based on a questionnaire survey in seventy-one countries.[26] There is, however, a dearth of systematic data on urban-rural differentials in educational facilities.[27]

A sample survey undertaken in Swaziland in July 1960 provides data on educational levels attained and on literacy.[28]

	Educational level attained (percentage in the sample)			
	None	Lower primary	Higher primary	Secondary
Males, rural	75	15	9	1
Males, urban/peri-urban	45	23	22	10
Females, rural	76	15	8	1
Females, urban/peri-urban	46	23	25	6

Age group	Percentage in sample literate	
	Rural	Urban/peri-urban
10-29	37.6	73.7
30 plus	15.4	54.2

According to a recent report on primary education prepared by UNESCO, "It is important to take into account the very considerable variations which may occur within a country. For example, what is happening in a rural district may be totally different from that in an urban area. Children whose parents are fairly high up in the socio-economic scale may show considerable holding power in school; the opposite may be true of those in lower socio-economic groups. Classes in rural areas are generally larger than in urban areas. In Chile, for example, the teacher - pupil ratio is one to 49.4 in rural areas and one to 33 in urban areas. In-Brazil, rural education has to be worked in shifts."[29]

Enrolment data quoted in the same report also indicate considerable urban-rural differentials. For the whole of Iran enrolment is quoted at 34 per cent, but at 61 per cent for urban areas. In Morocco, 80 per cent of males and 28 per cent of females were enrolled in primary education in urban areas, with 29 per cent for males and 3 per cent for females in rural areas. Similar data are available for El Salvador. Data for the Philippines show that cities nearest to and including the capital Manila, have the highest retention rate (pupils, initially enrolled, continuing through successive grades), while those further away show greater wastage (drop-outs);

[23] Information for Bechuanaland, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania and from *Records of Proceedings of the Commonwealth Medical Conference, 1965* (main volume) (London, Ministry of Overseas Development), pp. 79, 85, 93 and 94.

[24] R. F. Bridgman, *The Rural Hospital. Its Structure and Organization*, World Health Organization Monograph Series, No. 21 (1955), p. 23.

[25] Arnaldo Gabaldon, "Leading causes of death in Latin America", *Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, p. 249.

[26] See International Bureau of Education, "Facilities for education in rural areas", Publication No. 192 (Geneva, 1958).

[27] To some extent this is due to the fact that administrative boundaries for school districts tend to include both urban and rural areas.

[28] *Experiment in Swaziland* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1964).

[29] Data extracted from "A survey of wastage problems in elementary education", R. I. Brown, University of Bristol, June 1966, based on data supplied by UNESCO, pp. 40-41, 54-55, 64 and 67 of typed manuscript "Wastage in primary education" presented at UNESCO Technical Seminar on Education Wastage held in Bangkok, September 1966.

thus, the retention rate in grade six (compared with grade one) over the whole of the Philippines is 44.7 per cent, but 80.2 per cent for Manila.[30]

The high wastage rate characteristic of rural areas is the outgrowth not only of shortcomings of rural education but also of the severe economic conditions that beset most people living in these areas. There is very often a need for child labour to help supplement the subsistence income of the rural family.[31]

The uneven rural-urban distribution of educational facilities contributes directly to migration from the rural areas when, as in Mexico, rural primary schools tend to offer only two years of education, and secondary and preparatory schools are as a rule located in larger cities; primary school graduates have to move to the larger cities in order to pursue their education.[32] Finally, to secure higher education of high calibre and diversity, students generally tend to travel to the Federal District and, once having left the poorer states, are not likely to return.

Numerous reports describe the reluctance of qualified school-teachers to live in rural areas, and it can be expected that the more remote the area the greater the difficulty in staffing. The distributional problem affects not only the quantity but also the quality of services, since the best qualified personnel are likely to have a preference for and are generally able to obtain a good post in urban areas. Many rural teachers are reported to be barely literate. The inferior teaching staff is one of the most serious obstacles to rural education.[33]

In the case of services and facilities other than health and education, such as housing, employment services, welfare services, social security, libraries, museums, radio and television programmes, systematic data on rural-urban differences are even less available, but it seems clear that distribution is extremely uneven. Social security, for example, if available at all, tends to be restricted to urban workers (usually in modern industries) and the rural workers are historically about the last group to be covered. It is also evident that some of these services can have a considerable impact on migration. For example, the provision of really low-cost housing in urban areas (as contrasted with public housing, at rents that only higher-income workers can afford) sometimes in effect increases the urban housing problem because it steps up the flow of migration and brings in more new migrants than are taken care of by the new housing. The urban distribution of welfare payments or benefits in kind to the unemployed or unemployable, while not common in developing countries, is known to bring migrants into the cities of industrialized countries.

A recent survey of rural migrants in twelve European countries places much emphasis on the role of social factors. In Switzerland, "the better social provisions and other aid, the better schooling and training possibilities, the possibilities of entertainment and others which the town can offer and which are absent from rural regions or difficult of access, play just as large a part in motivating the decision to migrate as purely material considerations." In Norway also the young people move to the towns and cities, especially in the south, where "their demand for diversion and entertainment can be better satisfied". The advantages of the social welfare state and superior housing in urban areas are quoted as inducing migration from rural areas in Sweden. Possibilities of social advancement, better housing and schooling for children are factors influencing the flight from rural areas in Finland and in the Netherlands. In France, poor rural housing conditions are stated to act as a "push" factor and opportunities for recreation as a "pull" factor, especially for the young. In the Federal Republic of Germany also, the easier life and leisure amenities of towns attract migrants, influenced by lack of education and low standards of hygiene in rural areas.[34]

Strategy in social planning for population redistribution

A policy of redistribution of population flow rests on the assumption that the problems of urbanization are not just urban problems, and their solution is not just a matter of urban planning. It is also a matter of national planning, in which social policies should be joined with economic and physical policies in a geographical strategy of development. In practice, however, the national level may be too remote from the local communities to have much influence on them through an over-all national plan alone — at the same time that the city or local community, with its circumscribed political boundaries and limited resources, is not in a position to undertake planning of the necessary dimensions to cope (by itself) with problems of population flow affecting it. The possibility of dealing with the question of urbanization through integrated economic, social and physical planning at the regional level — itself tied to national policies and plans in one direction and to local plans in the other — has become an increasingly attractive proposal to many observers in recent years.[35] The new United Nations Research-Training Programme in Regional Development was originated partly as a means of dealing with problems of urbanization in developing countries.[36]

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] "Social research and rural life in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean region" (UNESCO, 1966), p. 62.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Marshall Wolfe, "Social and political problems of educational planning in Latin America", in Raymond F. Lyons, ed., *Problems and Strategies in Educational Planning* (UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 1965), pp. 19-27.

[34] See G. Beijer, *Rural Migrants in Urban Setting* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963): for Switzerland, p. 69; Norway, p. 110; Sweden pp. 123-124; Finland, p. 145; the Netherlands, p. 172; France, pp. 225-226; Germany, p. 258. Beijer questions the thesis "that economic motives are solely or largely responsible for the drift of rural people from the countryside to cities and industry" (see p. 315).

[35] "Regional" refers here to regions within countries. Very small countries, of course, may not have meaningful regional breakdowns for their purposes and there may be no point in interposing the concept of regional planning between national and local planning in these cases.

[36] See Economic and Social Council resolution 1086 C (XXXIX), also paper entitled "Research-training programme for regional development" (E/CN.5/403) and the background study prepared by Resources for the Future, Inc., entitled "Design for a world-wide study of regional development".

A planned approach in general runs counter to the assumption that urbanization results only from "natural" causes and cannot be influenced by deliberate policy and planning, an assumption belied by the fact that political decisions have quite often influenced urban growth in historical experience. Social overhead investments have in fact revealed an acute sensitivity to political pressures. The very rapid growth of Caracas, for example, to the virtual neglect of the rural areas and towns, was partly the product of a deliberate political policy, a policy that was reversed after the revolutionary government took power in 1958. Through planning, coupled with the support of political authorities, existing towns or even totally new sites may be designated as centres for a future urban complex. "Counter magnets" have to be set in place to offset existing pulls towards over-crowded cities. The location, composition and strength of these magnets can presumably establish the scale and pace of urban growth in pre-selected areas that are potentially hospitable to growth and development. At the same time it must be admitted that there is little hard knowledge as to what, in quantitative terms, constitutes a viable urban unit at which policy should be aimed in given circumstances, and what precise combination of industry and social services should be assembled to induce the desired stage of growth. Also, as indicated above, a strategy to influence the flow of rural-urban migration requires some understanding of the causes of migration.

A planned approach to urbanization will be confronted by the realities of political power, and the scarcity of resources. In some developing countries, political power resides largely in the primate cities, to which the provincial towns and rural areas often appear as mere appendages. Unless such power is accompanied by a broad vision of the interests of the nation as a whole, or is counteracted by the growth of local political authority — as through community development programmes involving popular participation and the awakening of popular demand, or through strengthening of local government — the political situation may appear to be an intractable obstacle to a rational geographical strategy of development. At the same time, existing political boundaries within the country and fierce local political loyalties can also make such planning difficult. Planners may be disposed to overlook these difficulties in their preoccupation with ideal models and "technical" problems, but they are facts of life that often upset the best of plans.

To date, much greater attention has been paid, in planning, to the pressing problems of increasing the total supply of social resources than to the parallel distribution problems. But, in view of the over-all scarcity of resources, it is not realistic to plan for a significant expansion of services and amenities in all rural areas during the same period.

General principles for distributional strategy in developing countries have not, however, been established. Many patterns are possible. Obviously, they depend in the first instance on the type of provision. Elementary schools, for example, must be distributed in a different pattern and at a greater density than colleges, universities and other institutions of higher education. Dispensaries, health centres and medical care provided by general practitioners must be distributed differently from facilities for specialist treatment. Some facilities, such as mobile health units, or secondary education boarding schools, are especially designed to serve populations in outlying districts, and expenditures on such facilities may constitute a distribution policy.

Problems of adequate staffing for social services and amenities in rural areas must be considered as part of the strategy of distribution. In the long run, it may be expected that over-all programmes of rural development and improved levels of rural living will help to increase the supply of rural personnel. More specific measures will probably still be needed and are in any case necessary as interim measures. Among the measures more commonly considered is the use of semi-professional or auxiliary personnel,[37] with a period (say, of two or more years) of service in rural areas either made compulsory or a condition for promotion or posting to certain more attractive areas. The use of auxiliary or para-medical personnel is reported as planned for India, Uganda and Sierra Leone.[38] Some of the more developed countries have used a third kind of measure, namely paying "hardship bonuses" or higher salaries for service in difficult rural areas. Some countries have appealed successfully to idealism, particularly of qualified young people, for service in the less developed parts of their territories. Foreign personnel, serving as rural schoolteachers, etc., under voluntary programmes like the Peace Corps have also had a substantial effect on the rural staffing problems of a number of developing countries.

At a general level it is possible to distinguish three broad alternatives of distribution of services and amenities in a situation of scarce resources. The first is to concentrate social provisions in areas of greatest economic growth to encourage their further development. The opposite approach, based on criteria of need and social justice, implies concentrating additional social provisions in the least developed and most neglected areas. The third approach is some intermediate distributional strategy, taking into account both economic and social criteria.[39] The latter approach is represented by efforts to introduce economic and social development simultaneously in selected "growth" areas in which resource development is feasible and the social expenditures will support the economic development and be supported by it.

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[37] See "The use and training of auxiliary personnel in medicinet nursing, midwifery and sanitation", WHO, Technical Repor, Series No. 212 (Geneva, 1961), pp. 5 and 6.

[38] See *Record of Proceedings of the Commonwealth Medical Conference, 1965*, annex I (London, Ministry of Overseas Development), pp. 67 and 149and 153, 181. For India, see alsopp.67 and 68, "Remedial steps for maldistribution", including one year's obligatory service in rural areas before full registration, two and five years' rural service for certain levels of promotion, and incentives such as help with housing and children's education.

[39] With respect to primary education, three such possibilities are discussed in: UNESCO, "Educational planning practice in developing countries" (February 1966), p. 43.

URBAN POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

A. *United States of America* *

In 1790, when the United States of America was a new nation, only 5 per cent of its people could be said to live in urban places. Since then, the urban population has steadily increased to more than 70 per cent of the present total.

More than three out of five persons live in metropolitan areas which consist of an older central city surrounded by politically independent suburban communities. The major surge of new urban growth in recent decades has been into the undeveloped suburban fringe; many central cities actually have declined in population and density.

The physical structure of the central city areas has been exposed to many forces of deterioration, in part by age and obsolesence and in part by changing and shifting functions. Retail and service facilities, formerly almost exclusively concentrated in central business districts, have been decentralized by the "pull" of the new residential growth on the urban periphery and by the "push" of uneconomic central sites. Industries, in their search for sites, have found them in the open spaces of suburbia which have good access to new highways. But the central city still retains a strong segment of the retail trade; employment in commercial and governmental offices has greatly increased; and its locational values for many metropolitan services — such as cultural and educational facilities — have not diminished.

At the same time, ugly shadows are cast by areas of residential and commercial blight, ranging from small, intensive slums to the more extensive drabness of "grey" areas where most structures are essentially sound, but where further deterioration is indicated unless some public action is undertaken. It is in these areas, vacated by middle and upper-income families who have moved to the suburbs, that the rural-urban migrants, the poor, and minority groups predominate and with them urban social ills and health problems.

As early as 1892 the United States Congress appropriated funds to study the problems of slums. It was not until the mid-1930s, however, that the low-income public housing programme provided federal subsidies for housing projects that would also demolish or eliminate some of the existing substandard housing. Shortly before this, in 1934, the Congress — largely as a result of the Great Depression — had created a national programme of housing mortgage insurance to increase the availability of housing mortgage money and to increase home ownership. To help overcome the abrupt decline in construction activity by sharply reducing the risk of loss, it attracted private investment funds into the housing field, and substantially succeeded in supporting home construction activity — which unquestionably contributed to the spread of urban areas at relatively low densities. Both the public housing programme and the mortgage insurance programme are still in operation.

Figure I. Urban and rural population in the United States



Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

The National Resources Committee undertook the first broad public study of national urban problems, as distinct from housing problems, and in 1937 the report was completed containing analyses and recommendations that later formed the basis for additional federal actions on urban matters after the Second World War.[1]

* Prepared by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.

[1] United States of America, National Resources Committee, *Our Cities : Their Role in the Economy, 1937.* The National Resources Committee replaced the National Resources Board and was itself replaced by the National Resources Planning Board.

The Housing Act of 1949 introduced the next important federal urban programmes. This provided aid to cities for slum clearance and urban development — acquiring and clearing deteriorating areas, constructing site improvements, supporting public facilities and disposing of cleared sites. The concept of slum clearance and urban redevelopment was broadened considerably and renamed "urban renewal" by legislative amendments in 1954. Urban renewal retained the concept of clearing and redeveloping slums, but it also embraced the objectives of preventing slums and rehabilitating blighted areas. The 1954 Act also established a new programme to help states, metropolitan regions and small cities to prepare and maintain comprehensive plans for urban growth and development.

The following data indicate some of the achievements:

(*a*) Since 1934, some 9.5 million dwelling units have been made available and some 28 million dwelling units have been improved through mortgage insurance programmes;

(*b*) Since 1937, federally assisted low-rent public housing has provided over 610,000 dwelling units for families and individuals;

(*c*) Since 1949, more than 800 cities have undertaken over 1,700 urban renewal projects involving about $5,000 million in federal grant funds. Within the 1,120 projects beyond the planning stage, over 41,000 acres have been or will be redeveloped, and some 37,000 acres have been brought under rehabilitation and related treatment;

(*d*) Since 1954, over $105 million in Urban Planning Assistance grants have been approved for the preparation of comprehensive development plans covering 5,200 communities (mostly small cities), 194 metropolitan and urban regional areas, and thirty-seven states;

(*e*) Since 1961, grants, under the Open-Space Land Program, have been made to 350 different state, metropolitan and local jurisdictions, to assist them in acquiring about 150,000 acres of land for preservation in park and other open-space uses;

(*f*) Since 1961, the Urban Mass Transportation Program has committed grants totalling nearly $125 million for capital improvements to local mass transportation systems.

Formulating national urban policy

In the United States, the President has become the focus of responsibility for formulating and initiating the nation's urban policies. He exercises this responsibility with the advice of several federal executive departments and agencies that are involved in urban area development. But the ultimate responsibility for officially establishing programmes is a legislative function of the Congress — and the Congress often works its will to change or recast the President's proposals.

Proposals for urban programmes sponsored by the Federal Government have usually originated in one of the departments or agencies having responsibility for some aspect of urban life. A proposal, if approved by the President, is introduced as an administration "bill" in Congress. Public hearings on the bill are held by congressional committees and, usually after some modification of the original proposal, it is voted on by the full membership of the Congress. The bill, as adopted by the Congress, becomes law when signed by the President.

The process has had its weaknesses, particularly in developing a consistent set of national policies. President Johnson has pointed to the fact that, "The goals of major Federal programs have often lacked cohesiveness. Some work for the revitalization of the central city. Some accelerate suburban growth. Some unite urban communities. Some disrupt them".[2]

A part of this problem undoubtedly is a result of the growth of national urban policies by gradual accretion. But a more fundamental cause is organizational. Except for a brief time when a national planning agency existed in the 1930s and early 1940s, the United States has not had — until 1965 — a single department in the executive branch responsible for federal programmes dealing with urban communities and regions. In 1965, the new Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was established to combine all federal efforts to improve urban living.

Other aids have emerged during 1965-1966 to foster a more rational process of developing national urban policy. The Department of Housing and Urban Development, in accord with a presidential directive, has initiated a system of integrated planning, programming and budgeting. There are signs that the national Government's contribution to urban research may be strengthened. Not only have more federal funds been allocated to this purpose in recent years, but, more importantly, the President has recommended the establishment of an Institute of Urban Development, within HUD, which can be expected to distribute a major portion of the federal research funds to universities and foundations.[3]

Research has its limitations, of course. Some urban problems require hard political judgements and decisions rather than more refinements in knowledge. We are sometimes prone to use research and "the need for more information" as an excuse for avoiding difficult decisions. Timely decisions and actions are particularly important during periods of rapid urban growth, such as many developing countries are now experiencing.

The principle of experimentation as a basis for formulating national policy is illustrated by the "Model Cities Act of 1966". This Act establishes a new programme for the purpose of discovering whether it is possible to create a decent living environment in entire sections of cities, at present blighted, if all available private and public resources are effectively used and

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[2] *Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for City Demonstration Programmes*, House of Representatives, document No. 336, 26 January 1966.

[3] Urban research has values extending well beyond national boundaries. The need for a focal point for study, education and the exchange of ideas was recognized by a White House Conference on International Co-operation, held in Washington in November 1965, which recommended that the United States establish and financially support a World Urban Development Research Laboratory and Institute.

supplemented with additional financing. By noting the value of trial and error in the development of urban policy, we do not wish to depreciate continuing, organized research. However, action programmes to resolve the urban crises cannot always await the results of a thoroughly researched plan.

Reorganizing and systematizing the urban policy formulation function, and providing more adequate research support, will in no way remove proposed policies from critical scrutiny and reshaping by the legislative branch and public and private interest groups — nor should it. Not only is this a basic process in a democratic society but, we believe, it is an extremely useful device for developing workable, and often more ingenious, policies. Moreover, since the execution of most of our federal urban programmes is dependent in large measure on local governments and the participation of private groups, their sharing in the development of policy is essential to its success.

Extensive participation and debate in the development of national policy run the risk, of course, of leading to something less than perfection. However, policy formulation is weighed in favour of the broadest interests by the fact that the President, chosen by a majority of the total electorate, has two key functions in the process, aside from his veto powers. He initiates policy, and can utilize the presidential powers of persuasion to influence the subsequent development of final policy.

Policies of administration of national urban programmes

Most United States urban programmes provide federal financial grants (covering part of the costs) or loans to state or local governments [4] which assume the major responsibility for planning and administering the specific programmes. The essential role of the Federal Government is to provide financial incentives; the local role is to provide initiative, detailed direction and administration.

This intergovernmental, federal-local system of programme administration is in part dictated by the distribution of governmental powers in the Constitution, in part by traditional political philosophy, and in part by geography. Legal authority to undertake or control urban development activities resides in municipal governments (through grants of authority under state-enabling statutes). Furthermore, our heritage and continuing political philosophy emphasize the desire to keep governmental authority close to the people. These considerations have been instrumental in creating a decentralized operation of urban programmes supported by the Federal Administration.

Although these factors could be considered a limitation, the United States of America believes that this highly decentralized administrative organization has proved that the benefits outweigh the costs. A decentralized system, of course, depends upon ample skilled manpower. Although there is a perennial shortage of professionally trained urbanists in the United States of America, the problem is probably less acute than in many developing countries.

The essence of the system of urban programme administration is indicated in the term "creative federalism", which was introduced by President Johnson. It is not that a centrally controlled effort cannot be creative; it is simply that the opportunities for creativeness are vastly multiplied when control is decentralized and the number of participants is increased. Moreover, this concept recognizes that wiser choices are likely to be made when authority is close to the people and their problems. As stated by Dr. Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, "creative federalism stresses local initiative, local solutions to local problems".[5]

Under the urban renewal programme there are some 1,700 urban renewal projects assisted from federal sources in about 800 cities, located in all parts of the nation, in diverse geographic settings, and dependent on a wide range of economic resources and functions. No two projects are alike; each is designed to serve local conditions and different purposes. Those that excel become well known and stimulate better design in other projects.

Our faith in local governments is supplemented by a belief that citizens should participate in the decisions. Since 1954, assistance for urban renewal projects has been contingent on an applicant city establishing a citizens' committee on urban renewal to advise the chief municipal executive. These committees are composed of representatives of diverse community interests such as labour unions, minority groups and business organizations. They ensure that renewal decisions shall be made only after the full range of citizens' interests has been heard, especially the interests of the residents of the areas to be renewed. It is important not to confuse "participation" with "control". The citizen participation requirement in the urban renewal programme in no way relieves, or usurps, the control over the final programme decisions by the elected or appointed municipal officials.

The federal role is to identify the national interest in urban problems and needs, and to provide financial incentives and support to stimulate local action. This federal responsibility includes the establishment of national goals, the allocation of some of the nation's resources in accordance with the priority of goals, and the provision of technical as well as financial support.

The role of a federal programme administrator is not an easy one. He is constantly aware of, and at times plagued by, the problem of maintaining the integrity of local decisions while at the same time safeguarding the expenditure of federal funds in accordance with national objectives. It requires a delicate and continually shifting balance between too much national interference in local affairs and unwise or potentially irresponsible administration.

[4] Because most of the programmes administered by HUD provide assistance directly to local governments — towns, cities and counties — the discussion in the remainder of this article will be in reference to federal-local programmes, unless otherwise noted.

[5] "Creative federalism and great cities", speech before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 16 February 1966.

In general the dilemma is resolved by: emphasizing the responsibility of the local recipient to create an organizational structure and planning processes that will raise the proper issues and develop a number of alternative solutions, and de-emphasizing the federal interests in the specific results of these processes. The national concern is for the capacity of a city to make wise decisions, rather than for the decisions themselves. There are only general minimum standards, for example, governing the width of streets and the construction of public facilities in urban renewal projects.

But decisions involving federal programmes must be reached through some logical and systematic process. For example, many federal-city programmes now require that a city have a comprehensive development plan. And it must be shown that the functional facility to be constructed with this financing conforms to the comprehensive plan. There are no strong qualitative controls, although most programme administrators will establish some quantitative requirements — such as specifying the sub-plans that must be included. Thus, a city is required to go through a reasonably complete planning process, but the kind of plan that is produced is subject primarily to its own judgement.

Incentives may sometimes be more effective than requirements. The incentive approach in used in an attempt to bring about the co-ordinated development of metropolitan areas which, as in many countries, are fragmented by a multitude of independent local jurisdictions. When, in 1961, the Congress enacted the Open-Space Land Program providing for local acquisition of parks and other open lands, it established two grant levels. The basic grant covered 20 per cent of the land acquisition costs, but a 30 per cent grant was authorized to a community that signed an intergovernmental agreement arranging for the co-ordination of both plans and acquisition proposals for open-space land in an entire urban area.

Under the Model Cities Program incentives will be used more comprehensively. A city that qualifies for a demonstration grant will be helped to cover the costs of a broad range of entirely local as well as federally aided programmes of urban development and redevelopment. City demonstration programmes would be expected to show that co-ordinated, concentrated programmes of physical reconstruction or rehabilitation and social services can revitalize entire sections of our cities. To qualify, a city must satisfy the following requirements:

(*a*) That the demonstration be of sufficient magnitude, physically and socially, to arrest blight in entire neighbourhoods;

(*b*) That it make use of every available social programme;

(*c*) That it narrow the housing gap between the deprived and the rest of the community;

(*d*) That it make major improvements in the quality of the environment;

(*e*) That the city have a single organization with the authority to co-ordinate all phases of the programme;

(*f*) That the city's demonstration be consistent with existing development plans for the metropolitan area;

(*g*) That the demonstration foster the development of local and private initiative and widespread citizen participation.

The incentive of an additional federal grant is thus combined with requirements demanding improved local performance.

In any mixed public-private economic system such as that of the United States, governmental programmes must involve the skills and productive power of the private sector to carry out some phases of the programmes. Implicit is a principle of providing governmental assistance only to the extent necessary and only where unaided private *entrepreneurs* cannot fulfil the need. This principle means that governmental assistance generally decreases as the scale of family incomes increases: take, for example data on the 1.5 million dwelling units started in 1965. About 3 per cent of the units were in public housing projects — housing owned by local public authorities, subsidized by federal payments, and occupied by low-income families paying rents based on a percentage of their incomes. These families require — and receive — the highest level of government housing assistance. Except for the private contractors who construct such low-rent public housing, private enterprise does not, and cannot, fulfil this portion of the total need for new housing.[6]

Some 16 per cent of the housing units began in 1965 were financed with mortgages insured or guaranteed by the Federal Government. This type of minimal governmental assistance, by lowering the cost of financing to a home purchaser, permits private builders and private financial institutions to fulfil a need for middle-income housing which would not otherwise be met. The remaining 81 per cent received no governmental aid in the form of direct subsidies or mortgage insurance.

Slum clearance and urban redevelopment projects assisted by the Federal Government represent a more complex public-private partnership. A local government initiates such a project by indicating a slum or blighted area to be redeveloped. It uses local powers, under state law, to acquire and assemble properties, to assist the occupants to relocate, to clear the deteriorating buildings and, in accordance with a public plan, to construct site improvements or public facilities needed to serve the area. Some of the cleared land may be retained for public housing or other public uses, but most of the land is sold to private redevelopers who agree to construct new buildings in conformity with the plan. Three major contributions of the local government to redevelopment are its powers to assemble properties into meaningful parcels, its ability to absorb, with federal aid, economic "losses" incurred by demolishing structures, and its authority to redevelop the land in accordance with a sound public plan.

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[6] It should be noted that the proportion of public housing starts to the total number of starts is not related to the proportion of low-income families to the total number of families. The percentage given here relates only to *new* construction; it does not relate to *existing* housing which, of course, provides the major housing resources for low- and middle-income families.

It is expected that the experience gained from efforts to overcome urban problems will continue to disclose a need for changes in existing policies and programmes as well as a need to create new approaches. Although these changes cannot be predicted with any precision, it is believed that certain policy trends, or difficulties raising policy issues can be discerned.

There is continuing uneasiness over the kinds of urban patterns that are rapidly being fixed upon the land. Traditionally, the public's main control over these patterns has been exercised through various land development regulations, principally local zoning laws. But such laws have inherent weaknesses. Regulations tend to bend or give way entirely at the critical points of development pressures. And such regulations, being locally conceived and enforced, often are ineffectual at the larger scale of metropolitan development. There are four new or improved approaches to this problem, all involving the national Government.

1. *Better use of the public infra-structure*

Government authority to provide or withhold sewer and water facilities and access to streets has become recognized as a positive means of directing urbanization, wherever and whenever it is needed. Federal-aid programmes are increasing their support for this concept. A procedure has been established for blending the previously separate planning programmes for highways and other public facilities to produce comprehensive transportation-land use studies and plans in urban regions. More and more of these studies are focusing on the known interdependency of transportation facilities and land development as a means of achieving a desired structure for the metropolitan area. HUD's programme of grants for basic sewer and water facilities, established in 1965, should strengthen these efforts.

2. *Increasing use of federal incentives*

It is expected that additional ways will be found of creating federal incentives to foster more rational urban patterns in metropolitan complexes. Most federal aid programmes now require the assisted facilities to conform to comprehensive urban area plans. A beginning has been made in proposing legislation to provide supplemental federal aid to municipalities and agencies in metropolitan areas where all major public and private development programmes are consistent with planned metropolitan growth, and where established governmental or institutional bodies have arrangements to co-ordinate local public development activities.

3. *More ingenious use of open-space lands*

One of the purposes of the Open-Space Land Program is to "help curb urban sprawl" and "to encourage more economic and desirable urban development". Although the lands acquired are usually developed for park, historic preservation, or conservation uses, it is possible to plan and programme the acquisition to channel private development to desired areas. The selective removal of land from potential development provides a means of selecting land for development. It is expected that the development of more ingenious methods of designing open-space systems will make them more effective urban development tools.

4. *Increasing governmental participation in large-scale development*

The strongest method of implementing public plans for urban areas is under a system of governmental ownership and development of land. Although such a system is contrary to basic American philosophies about the division of public and private responsibilities, the dividing line between these responsibilities may shift when the benefits outweigh the costs. It is agreed, for example, that the benefits of urban renewal warrant governmental acquisition of private property for redevelopment. When it was first established in 1949, the urban renewal programme was considered to be a rather sharp departure from traditional public-private relationships.

The same principles of public acquisition and planning, and later private development, could be applied to large-scale development of suburban vacant land. In fact, under the Model Cities Act of 1966 federal loans could be made to state and metropolitan agencies for the acquisition of land for later resale to private builders of well-planned developments on a scale to include entire new communities. The same Act also proposes an alternative kind of federal participation in the development of new communities — a programme of federal insurance of private loans to developers to finance their land acquisition and land development costs.

Most national urban programmes initially concentrated on the physical aspects of city life. The public housing programme, for example, aimed at the limited objective of providing decent housing — adequate space and facilities — for low-income families. Subsequently, the urban renewal programme added the development of decent neighbourhood environments — in a physical sense. Experience under both programmes has taught that a "comprehensive" plan for housing and neighbourhoods missed entirely some of the more complex underlying economic and social issues. To be comprehensive, a plan not only must define proposed physical relationships but must be concerned also with human, social and economic relationships.[7]

The concept of the urban renewal programme has been expanded steadily until it is now seen as a means of resolving urban social ills and economic problems. Today, diagnostic surveys identifying human renewal needs are the usual components of urban renewal planning. Thus, urban renewal is becoming a much more comprehensive tool for achieving a better urban life.

[7] This does not, of course, constitute a claim to have discovered these relationships.

In recent years many new programmes have been established in response to specific problems — physical, social or economic. Although co-ordination of these various programmes is improving, the techniques for being truly comprehensive have yet to be fully mastered — both in planning and in executing this wide range of programmes.

The new Model Cities Program should sharpen these techniques and, it is hoped, explore new concepts. It seems likely that experience under this and other programmes will lead to significant improvements in the ability of the United States to unravel the complexities of all the interrelated aspects of the urban "problem", and apply a range of solutions that is truly comprehensive.

B. *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* *

CONSTRUCTION OF NEW CITIES is one of the most important phases of urban development in the Soviet Union.

The continuous development of the national economy, based on industrialization and agricultural mechanization, entails a rapid growth of the urban population. During the period 1926-1966, the urban population of the USSR rose from 26.3 million to 124.8 million, while the rural population decreased from 120.7 million to 107.1 million. Fifty-four per cent of the country's population resides in urban developments. According to estimates, by 1980 the urban population will be at 190 million, or 70.0 per cent of the country's population.

The USSR has twenty-nine cities with a population of more than 500,000; 341 cities with a population ranging from 50,000 to 500,000; 1,432 towns with less than 50,000 inhabitants, and 3,391 urban-type villages.

More than 900 new towns were created between 1917 and 1965, some 400 of which were erected on completely new territory and 500 through the development and radical reconstruction of small settlements. It is apparent that the creation of new towns and villages is progressing at a rapid rate. During the twenty-year period from 1939 to 1959, eighty-eight towns and urban-type villages were created annually; during the period 1959-1963, ninety-eight towns and villages. An average of more than twenty new cities are erected annually.

The economic impact of the new towns and villages is varied. The majority of the towns developed around enterprises providing raw materials or finished products and around the sites of scientific institutions, health resorts and rest homes. Many new cities are the administrative and cultural centres of important areas of the country. Thus, the cities of Dushanbe and Frunze became the capitals of Soviet Republics. The former mining town of Karaganda is currently a new important regional scientific and industrial centre, and many settlements of the 1930s (Komsomolsk-on-the-Amur, Novokuznetsk, Magnitogorsk and others) now rank as prominent industrial and commercial centres.

During its fifty years of development, the USSR has amassed extensive experience in the planning, distribution, design and building of new cities, and this may prove to be of definite interest to developing countries.

ECONOMIC BASIS FOR THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CITIES

The collective ownership of the land and of the means of production is the determining factor in the planning of the Soviet economy and in the development of its productive forces. The basic planning for the development of the economy consists of long-term and annual state plans. After the general plans are adopted, the planning agencies work out schedules for the distribution of productive forces among the large sections of the country. These schedules define all important projects: industrial, transport, power plants, and other types of construction. The geographic distribution is determined by the following considerations: (1) the ratio of existing and potential hydraulic power in the region; (2) the size of the urban population; (3) the size of the working population and (4) the long-term general plans regarding the distribution of new cities and the development of existing ones.

Government planning institutes, specializing in city building, plan regional industrial, agricultural and health resort centres, as well as larger areas (provinces, territories, even republics) concerned with complex problems of development and territorial distribution of industrial, power, transportation, health and recreational and agricultural programmes. This includes site location of cities and other settlements and the development of existing towns and villages. Regional planning is based on a twenty to twenty-five year perspective with special emphasis on the first five to ten years.

Thus, the planned basis for the development of the national economy in the USSR and the large-scale programmes for regional planning provide the means for improving the settlement pattern of population throughout the country, including the best location for new towns and villages and the scope of their development.

The greatest number of new towns are emerging in eastern and western Siberia, the far east, the Urals and central Asia, in connexion with the extraction of oil, gas, coal and ore, the construction of major hydroelectric stations and the establishment of manufacturing industries. Over the past few years, these areas have witnessed the birth of such cities as Angarsk, Bratsk, Mirnyi, Temir-Tau, Sumgait, Nijnekamsk, Voljskyi, Nakhodka and Baikalsk. New cities are also sprouting throughout the European USSR, as, for example, Kakhovka, Dnerorudnyi (Ukrainian SSR), Novopolotsk, Soligorsk

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(Byelorussia), Sumgait (Azerbaijan), and Rustavi (Georgia).

The population of new industrial cities falls in most cases between 100,000 and 150,000. It is expected that the population of the new towns which arise at the centres of metallurgic and power-consuming enterprises may reach 200,000 inhabitants on even 300,000.

New towns represent an active attempt to limit the growth of large cities and, by means of utilizing existing conditions, to distribute industrial and other enterprises and institutions in the less populated areas. The State scientific and planning institutes are studying the possibilities for developing other sparsely populated areas. Therefore, special attention is given to the availability of water resources and transport facilities capable of further development; to natural and hygienic conditions, labour and other elements conducive to further economic and physical growth.

The growth of science is another economic factor in the creation of new cities. Over the past several years, the following new towns came into existence in association with scientific institutions: the centre of the Siberia Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences which is 25 kilometres from the city of Novosibirsk, the towns of Obninsk, Dubno, Pushchino, Zhukovskyi, Krasnaya Pakhra in Podmoskovie etc.

The building of new resort towns is particularly extensive on the shores of the Black Sea, in the Caucasus, the Crimea, on the Gulf of Riga, in the mountains and other regions. Among them are Bakuriani, Ashe, the children's health resort at Kabardinka, the spa at Kemeri, and the sports centre in the Dambaisk Valley. Rest and tourist towns are being planned and built in Kirghizia (Lake Issyk-Kul), in the Pamir mountains, on Lake Baikal, in the far east etc.

Principles in selecting new town sites

In planning the location of new towns, the distribution of basic urbanizing enterprises and institutions must be considered. For example, in choosing locations for new towns as centres of extractive and manufacturing industries, the following conditions must be met: (*a*) the proximity of raw materials (for the metallurgic industry, wood-working and other industries with a high consumption of raw materials); (*b*) proximity of consumer industries (industries whose products are not as easily transportable as raw materials); (*c*) transport conditions (particularly when building in sparsely populated regions); (*d*) adequate water supplies; (*e*) proximity to sources of heat and energy; (*f*) availability of labour, and (*g*) indigenous building materials (sand, gravel, rock).

In new towns, the residential areas are considered as well as the construction of industrial enterprises. The locations with the most comfortable and favourable sanitary conditions are allocated for residential building. Enterprises discharging harmful gases, ashes (chemical and metallurgical plants, electro-generating stations etc.) are separated from the new towns by a sanitary space of three to eight kilometres. In all instances the new towns are placed in areas with territory in reserve for the long-term growth of industry and population.

In the diverse and rich natural conditions of the USSR, the most picturesque areas with adequate water supplies are chosen as sites for new towns. Considering the diverse climatic conditions of the regions where new towns are being built — from the far north to the tropics — the Soviet Union has adopted special methods for evaluating micro-climatic and building construction conditions of any given territory revealing districts with the most favourable sanitary-hygienic and micro-climatic conditions.

The engineering evaluation is conducted by means of topo-geodetic and aero-photographic research in engineering geology, hydrology, orography and topography. The result is a special map and graph indicating the advantages and limitations of the territory for construction. Certain sites are rejected, according to the building regulations: those with soil containing mineral resources; locations subject to landslides and settling, swamping or flooding; cavernous areas, steep (more than 20 per cent) slopes and others. In case of necessity places with lesser planning limitations are brought up to standard by engineering improvements (embankments, draining of swamps, reinforcement of gullies, dredging etc.).

Principles of planned structure of new towns

Soviet architects and planners aim to incorporate in the new towns the maximum advantages of organized social life, including care for the health of the people, excellence of architecture, and rational use of material resources. Work, social activity, living conditions and rest for the Soviet people are the basic purposes of the towns. This finds expression in the planned structure of the new towns, consisting of zones of production, residential zones and rest zones.

Industrial zones are usually the basic element of the planned structure. According to state regulations, industrial enterprises are not placed singly on separate sites, but in groups, forming the town's industrial district. Enterprises that are part of the industrial complex are connected technologically. They use a common transport and warehouse system, common power and sanitary-technical equipment and buildings. This provides for more effective use of costly equipment, diminishes the necessary mileage of train tracks, automobile roads, waterways and canals and, lastly, considerably lowers the cost of construction

Many contemporary industrial enterprises (chemical and metallurgical in particular) require isolation from the other industries. Special plans are prepared for these regions selected for these plants and they are built according to technological rules — in such new towns as, for example, Nijnekamsk, Bratsk and Novomozyr. As is well known, harmful waste materials create unfavourable sanitary conditions for the inhabitants of a region. Therefore, new technological methods have been adopted to trap and neutralize the waste.

Along with this, the structure of the new towns provides means for neutralization of waste materials. Chemical and metallurgical plants are placed at a significant

distance from the residential areas, with the sanitary protection zone between. The width of the sanitary protection zone is indicated for each of five classes of industries. At the same time, new cities with industries which are not harmful in a sanitary sense provide for combined industrial and residential areas, which enables the centres of population, recreation, and employment to be within walking distance of one another.

In planning the residential portion of a city an effort is made to create the best possible living and service conditions. The initial and basic unit of a residential area is a micro-district, or neighbourhood accommodating from 8,000 to 12,000 people. A micro-district comprises residential buildings as well as ordinary services, such as schools, kindergartens and nurseries, food stores, receiving stations or small repair shops for household appliances, dry-cleaning.

Several micro-districts constitute a residential district accommodating from 25,000 to 50,000 people, the centres of which include facilities used only at certain times (cinemas, clinics, department stores, coffee shops etc.). Facilities for city-wide use are located in the general city centre (administrative buildings, a theatre, restaurants, a city trade centre etc.).

An important task in planning a new city is the formation of an integrated system of public centres. The system of centres in our cities comprises a general city centre district and micro-district public centres. A general city centre of a new Soviet city is a concentration of the principal aspects of urban, social, political, administrative and cultural life, one of the most important social tasks of Soviet urban development. In addition, to a principal city centre, new cities will have special centres for educational, medical and sports purposes.

Trees and greenery in general, as well as public parks in residential areas, constitute one distinctive aspect of city planning. Special emphasis is placed on the landscaping of the city. Public parks of the micro-district serve an area with a radius of 500 metres; residential district parks serve an area within a radius of 1,000-1,200 metres; city parks serve an area included in a radius of two to three kilometres. An experiment in new cities, such as Bratsk and Angarsk, has shown that the effective solution of this problem largely depends on the preservation of existing natural growth during construction.

The structure of a new city is largely determined by a system of city streets and highways which assure fast and convenient transport as well as safety. Our planning practice has adopted this differentiation of the transport system: city highways for continuous traffic, thoroughfares of municipal range and local residential streets.

The principal form of municipal passenger traffic is public transportation (bus, trolley bus, taxi, trolley car). However, during recent years the number of privately owned passenger automobiles has increased and is expected to continue increasing. Planning the capacity of streets and thoroughfares for automobiles in addition to public transport is based on an estimate of 150 private cars per 1,000 inhabitants.

In the planning and construction of new cities with a considerable division between residential and industrial areas, rapid public transport (express buses, express trolleys) greatly reduces travel time through the sanitary zone.

New cities are successfully solving the problem of separating pedestrian and vehicular traffic on thoroughfares and in public centres, as well as of providing key points with grade separations, thereby increasing the safety of transport and minimizing traffic noise.

The quality of city planning is determined by: (*a*) optimal distribution of basic functional areas in a city; (*b*) rational organization of city streets and thoroughfares, providing for passenger traffic and transport in all areas; (*c*) creation of a system of public centres, organizing various parts of the city; (*d*) creation of an over-all system of vegetation and irrigation in the city and in suburban areas; (*e*) an architectural and space composition of interconnected elements of city structure and (*f*) maximum accommodation of natural and climatic conditions.

Soviet city building uses various methods for the expansion of city areas. A number of towns grew by continuous outward development of industrial and residential areas (for example, Zelinograd, Volzhskiy, Elektrostal, Kritovo). More commonly nowadays, semi-autonomous areas are added to a city as complete units. Thus, Soviet city builders aim to plan and build new cities with a rational and compact organization of industrial areas, residential districts, public and cultural buildings and agencies, transport, and engineering equipment and improvements, providing the best living and working conditions for the people. The optimal use of capital investment is, of course, a primary requirement.

Problems connected with the planning of new cities

The location of new cities, the scale of their development and their influence upon the pattern of population of a given area are determined in advance by regional planning. These are based on long-term economic plans and scientific prognoses of the development of important industries. General plans of cities are worked out for a period of from twenty-five to thirty years. Building priorities are decided on a basis of five to ten years. The planning comprises two stages: technical and economic consideration, and planning design.

The technical and economic bases include perspectives for the economic development of the city, its population, the size of the area involved, functional zoning and basic planning decisions, as well as capital investment in the construction of a city. A plan design covers the architecture and planning of a city, the layout of city thoroughfares and streets, the location of engineering equipment, and the architectural concept of city neighbourhood centres and parks. Detailed planning projects as well as building construction projects are based on the urban general plan.

City planning in the USSR is done by special institutes of the Soviet Republics or of regional or municipal councils, and is based upon binding government regulations and norms for city planning. The central scientific research and planning institute for city building (in

Moscow) is in charge of methods for city planning, assisted by similar institutes in Leningrad, Kiev, Tashkent, Tbilisi, Novosibirsk and elsewhere. The general city plan, calculated in perspective, is regarded as a binding regulatory document, subject to periodic correction.

Given the rapid development of industry when large manufacturing complexes crop up within two or three years, the building of new cities in conjunction with such complexes must also take place at a rapid pace and, as a rule, precede the construction of industrial installations. This is achieved by:

(*a*) The timely development of complex project designs and specifications;

(*b*) Prompt preparatory engineering for the areas earmarked for the city;

(*c*) The rapid construction of buildings serving residential and industrial installations;

(*d*) The use of industrial construction methods with mechanized fabrication of installations;

(*e*) The choice of appropriate types of residential and public buildings for construction, and

(*f*) Simultaneous construction of public buildings and residential buildings.

To house the initial construction workers, permanent one- or two-storey residential buildings are built first. When construction of a large number of multistorey residential buildings has been completed, the original one- or two-storey buildings are revamped and assigned to entire families. Depending on the volume, typical home-building organizations construct from 35,000 to 140,000 square metres of residential space per year.

Experience of large-panel building construction has proved it to be technically, and economically effective. In comparison with brick structures, the average construction time for large-panel residential structures is reduced by an average of 30-35 per cent (thus, a five-storey building takes four months to build), man-hours are reduced by 30-40 per cent, construction cost drops by 10-12 per cent. This ensures rapid and high-quality home-building. The implementation of priority building projects provided for by the general plan ensures a compactness of improvements in residential, cultural and civic micro-districts very early in town development. The cultural and civic centre of the first residential micro-district in the initial stages of construction becomes the cultural centre of the new settlement. Subsequently, as the construction of other micro-areas proceeds and a centre for the whole residential district is created, the functions of the cultural centre of the new residential area are taken over by the centre of the residential district. At the same time, construction begins on a number of public buildings in the city centre. With the completion of the first stage of construction, the centre of a new city is equipped with a complete set of service agencies. Associated with subsequent development of the city, the centre develops as new units are built and the operating ones expanded. Reserved space at the city centre, for the building of new units makes this possible, while existing service agencies are constructed to allow for increased capacity.

Examples of Soviet cities planned in this way are Angarsk, Novolipetsk, the centre of the Siberia Division of the USSR Academy of Science near Novosibirsk, Novopolotsk and Bratsk. All of these were established in new areas. Bratsk and Angarsk were founded in remote areas which were little explored at the time.

Owing to preliminary planning (schematic zone planning, general city planning, detailed project planning and improvement projects), consistent fulfilment of construction assignments, highly mechanized industrial methods of construction, the use of standardized residential and public buildings, new cities feature permanent residential buildings and no temporary units. This makes it possible to build well-equipped, comfortable and economical living quarters in the new cities of the Soviet Union.

The problem of slums and shantytowns

UNCONTROLLED URBAN SETTLEMENT: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES *

Introduction

For tens of millions of people in the world today urban settlement is the only hope of bettering a miserable lot. For many it is their only hope of survival. The United Nations has estimated that 200 million people will have moved into cities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the 1960s alone (*5*) and even more are being born within the cities, many as poor as the rural migrants. Hundreds of millions are living through experiences that radically alter their lives and that are revolutionizing two thirds of the world. The demographers have successfully raised the alarm and have called the world's attention to the facts of the population explosion and to the colossal scale of contemporary urbanization. Planners, too, have begun to recognize that an increasing proportion of urban settlement today is occurring "spontaneously" in totally unplanned ways, beyond the control of the authorities charged with the regulation of land uses and building construction. The marginal urban growth of today — the inner rings of tomorrow's cities — is largely caused by squatters and illegal developers in the rapidly urbanizing countries.[1] Over one third of the population of Mexico City, 1.5 million people, live in the *colonias proletarias* — known originally as *barrios paracaidistas* or "parachutists' neighbourhoods"; nearly half of Ankara's population of 1.5 million in *gecekondu* districts — the squatter settlements whose name describes a house built over-night; the area of the *villes extra-coutumiers* of Leopoldville is greater than that of the city itself. Apart from a relatively abundant literature on the more general demographic and statistical aspects of the urbanization process, there is remarkably little information easily accessible to those working on these problems. A few books and several dozen articles apart, only official documents with a limited circulation and unpublished studies and reports are available. Owing to the limited data, the most that can be done, at present, is to formulate working hypotheses as a basis for a systematic evaluation of the areas concerned, and also to learn through the experience of Governments and others directly concerned. The hypotheses presented in this paper are based more on first-hand observations, research into field reports and project evaluation studies than on deductions from rigorous academic investigation.

The first problem is one of definition. It is assumed that the problem has two elements which do not necessarily coincide: urban "uncontrol" and the "shantytown" environment in itself. There are millions of shacks that are neither built nor occupied by squatters and there are hundreds of thousands of squatters who do not live in shacks but in solidly built houses. (*3*) The squatter shantytowns — the really dense and slummy kind referred to as "provisional squatter settlements" — often have far more in common with the traditional downtown slumlord tenements than with the self-improving squatter settlement which is transforming itself into a soundly built neighbourhood. And the latter — "self-improving" settlements — often have far more in common with orthodox residential suburbs than they do with shantytowns. By "uncontrolled urban settlement" we mean urban settlement, whatever its duration or expectations may be, that takes place independently of the authorities charged with the "control" of local building and planning.[2]

The processes of uncontrolled urban settlements

Uncontrolled urban settlement is a manifestation of normal urban growth processes under historically unprecedented conditions. It is not the existence of urban settlements which is the problem, but the fact that they are uncontrolled and that their forms are so often distorted.

The function and the social composition of most major cities throughout the urbanizing world have changed: they are no longer the residential neigh-

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* The original paper was prepared by John C. Turner, ARIBA, Research Associate at the Joint Center for Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, in collaboration with the United Nations Centre for Housing, Building and Planning.

[1] There is an important difference between three main demographic contexts: one, the slow-growing predominantly rural countries; two, the rapidly growing and rapidly urbanizing, and, three, the slow-growing predominantly urban countries. Uncontrolled settlement is most acute in the second category, as Lowdon Wingo has established for Latin America in "Some aspects of recent urbanization in Latin America" (mimeographed), 1966.

[2] In addition to the confusions that arise from those generally unrecognized facts there is the fact that a "squatter" (except in Australia) is commonly assumed to mean: a "person who settles on new especially public land without title; a person who takes unauthorized possession of unoccupied premises". This is the definition given in *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* (fifth edition, 1964). So, unless or until it is generally agreed and understood that squatting can also mean in the urban sense what it means in Australia and, until recently anyway, in North America, namely, a "person who gets right of pasturage from government on easy terms", the use of the term "squatter settlement" to define our field tends to carry with it a rather narrow legal connotation. This can obscure the issues by lumping together essentially dissimilar "provisional" and "incipient" squatter settlements and separating essentially similar "incipient squatter" and "incipient semi-squatter" or even fully legal settlements. We have, therefore, in spite of its awkwardness, substituted the phrase "uncontrolled urban settlement" for the more attractive "squatter settlement" with all the expressive contractions into "squatment" or the variation of "squatterdom" that Charles Abrams has given it.

bourhoods of the political and cultural *élite*. In Lima, for example, the middle-class and, especially, the lower-middle and lower-class voters now constitute the vast majority of the urban population — they are no longer merely the servants of an aristocracy. The city itself is no longer the cultural and social seat of a tiny urbane minority wielding secular and religious power but the refuge of the swollen popular masses whose only hope for continued survival and progress is in the urban melting-pot. A roof, of course, is the first thing that anyone who has not already got somewhere to sleep — such as the rural immigrant — will look for. Until enough capital is available for better housing, an increasing number must be housed in shacks or subdivided and sub-subdivided tenements. Such pressures are virtually unprecedented and their scale and the breadth of their distribution entirely so. The city, in the urbanizing world, is increasingly the refuge of large numbers of the poor and it is the poor who now determine a great part of its physical growth.

The circumstances in which the poor are erecting their provisional shacks and improvizing their houses are historically unprecedented — abnormal — even though the ways in which many of them build are entirely traditional. Because of this new and "abnormal" situation, existing institutional structures and traditional courses have proved inadequate for the increased demand. Some of the most important channels — the supply of land, for instance — have not merely failed to open up but have actually shrunk as the result of economically impractical regulations and building standards combined with land speculation. Thwarted and frustrated by barriers such as these, new settlers have established themselves wherever they could, and unscrupulous speculators have profited by the demand — so that the *forms* into which resultant settlements have been forced have frequently been badly distorted.

Squatter and other forms of uncontrolled urban settlement are not "social aberrations" [3] but a perfectly natural and very often a surprisingly adequate response to the situation. The tragedy is not that settlements exist — which is inevitable — but that many are so much worse than they need have been.

As the illustrations show, and as many reports confirm, there is a great variety of types and qualities of uncontrolled urban settlement — bewildering to those who have been led to suppose that all fall into much the same category. As the diversity of settlement types forbids generalization, it is essential to have some common and meaningful categories for the purposes of comparison and analysis. A simple chart is made by correlating physical state with the direction of change. All structures and settlements must be in some observable state, whether very poor and provisional or as permanent and complete as modern construction allows. But — and especially when dealing with settlements in the rapidly urbanizing context — appearances at the lower end of

[3] The only publication on sale to the general public in Peru on the *barriadas* is entitled *Barriadas Marginales: Una Aberración Social.*

Figure I. Typification of settlements by state and trend





the scale can be quite misleading. Unless the direction of change is also known, it is difficult to assess the real value of a particular settlement. In their initial stages, all three settlements shown in the photographs would have looked much the same to the outside observer; each has demonstrated a very different development trajectory, however, placing each in a distinctly different category. By combining trend with present state, therefore, a much more useful framework is provided and one that will be used for the analyses that follow.

The characteristics of uncontrolled urban settlements

The traditional pattern

Sjoberg, describing the findings at Ur, one of the earliest known cities, writes in *The Pre-Industrial City:*[4]

Houses were jumbled together, forming an irregular mass broken at intervals by open spaces in front of a temple or govern-

[4] Gideon Sjoberg, *The Pre-Industrial City* (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1960).

ment building. Streets were narrow, winding and unpaved and lacked adequate drainage. They became they chief repositories of refuse thrown from the houses...

and later in the same book:

The disadvantaged members of the city fan out toward the periphery, with the very poorest and the outcasts living in the suburbs, the farthest removed from the center. Houses toward the city's fringes are small, flimsily constructed, often one-room hovels into which whole families crowd....

Except for the government buildings and temples, these descriptions fit any of thousands of poorer kinds of squatter settlements in sixteenth century London, nineteenth century New York, and today throughout the world.

There is however, at least one radical difference between the pre-twentieth century cities and the metropolitan areas from which many contemporary examples are drawn: most principal modern cities are many times larger than the largest cities before modern industrialization and present urbanization rates began. The very poor of Ur, of sixteenth century London or of nineteenth century Manhattan even, had no difficulty in walking to their work places from their marginal settlements. But the very poor of Calcutta or Mexico City — with populations of six million — or of Delhi or Lima, with populations of around two million — cannot live on the periphery and work in the city centre.

Stages of settlement development

Although the information obtained on settlements throughout the urbanizing world (from over forty major cities and a dozen smaller ones) is fragmentary it supports the hypothesis of universal urban growth processes, rather than the notion of some marginal and passing peculiarity. The data indicate a correlation between the types and stages of uncontrolled settlement in a given region or city and the income levels of the population. With the partial exception of West and Central Africa — where urbanization has only recently begun — the lower the *per capita* income levels the greater the preponderance of the "provisional" levels of settlement. In areas with appreciably higher *per capita* income levels, the bulk

Figure II. Cuevas: incipient settlement

Progressive self-improvement — fired by hope, unhampered by built-in blight — has led to an evolving modern settlement

[continued

1961 — Dense provisional encampment houses settlers while plans are being made for this site

1962 — Incipient settlement developing — school in allocated area

[*continued*

Figure II (continued)

1963 — New school, lining with settlement plan, replaces aborted attempts built without technical guidance

of the uncontrolled low-income settlement is in the "incipient" or "incomplete modern" category. There are, of course, important modifying variables such as government policy and the exercise of police power.

The available data do not permit generalizations as to the frequency and regional distribution of "provisional" settlements. It is fairly safe to assume, however, that most of the settlements which are established through organized invasion must pass through the phase rapidly if there is any effective police opposition. But an initial encampment, however primitive it may be, is not necessarily temporary; if it is the first stage of a future settlement, it may prove to be either a permanent one, a semi-permanent one or, indeed, provisional. Settlements at this stage of development show wide differences in the relative wealth of their inhabitants as well as in their locations and site potential. The *bustee* dwellers referred to in "Slums of Old Delhi"(*27*) are among the poorest. On the other hand, the original invaders and settlers of the Cuevas *barriada* appear to be of the average working-class level of Lima — by no means the poorest sector of the local population and with far higher living standards than the *bustee* dwellers. These socio-economic differences correlate with location, topography and density. In settlements near the central business districts or industrial zones, density will tend to be very high — over 12,000 persons per hectare have been reported in Hong Kong. (*16*) "Safety in numbers" may ensure a degree of security of tenure or, at least, guarantee a degree of consideration for their plight by the political authorities. The facts available suggest that the "transient" settlements that manage to establish themselves become semi-permanent "provisional" settlements if the settlers have very low or unstable incomes (by local standards) or if they are located on land of high or potentially high value and of limited area. Successful squatter settlements established by relatively stable, urbanized wage-earners on land of low value tend rapidly to become "incipient" squatter settlements.

Incipient squatter settlements

While we have abundant evidence of self-improving settlements throughout Latin America, North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, very little has been obtained that shows their existence in the other developing regions. A number of modern standard houses are built in at least some of the Manila settlements (*36*) but most of them seem unlikely to progress very far

Figure III. El Augustino



Self-improvement efforts prove futile because the original settlement was too dense



Initial clustering has rapidly become dense, planless settlement

◀ Settlers unite to lay utilities — in vain, because of built-in blight

owing to the extremely high densities and apparently total lack of street alignments and open space. The Commissioner for Redevelopment reports a similar situation in Hong Kong. (*17*)

Self-improving incipient squatter settlements occur predominantly in the countries where urbanization is in full swing and where industrialization has made a significant start. The incipient squatter (and semi-squatter) [5] settlements in Latin America, North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean have many characteristics in common. To a greater or less extent, most of these conflict with the traditional image of the squatter settlement. Only in the narrowest and most literal sense are the majority of these "incipiently modern" settlements slums. In many cases development is slow enough and conditions are bad enough to justify the label but in many other cases — in that of the Cuevas settlement in Lima, for example — the word "slum" is no more apt than it would be if applied to any building works in progress. Is is, after all, only the wealthy minority — outside the industrialized countries — who have ever been able to afford to finish a dwelling of relatively high standard *before* moving into it.

When topography and density permit, settlements tend to be orderly, which suggests that squatter organization is more frequent than appearances imply. Direct evidence for internal organization among squatter groups is scarce and even where it is reported, as among the Ankara *gecekondu* inhabitants (*58*) their ability to control physical development to provide material facilities appears to be very limited.

Although in the *villes extra-coutumiers* of Leopoldville, (*45*) many of the *colonias proletarias* of Mexico

[5] See footnote to the present article.

Figure IV. Mendocita: clandestine settlement
Built-in blight has produced progressive degeneration internally and interrupted surrounding city development

1942 — Although settlement is outside urban fringe in agricultural land, it is threatened by the spread of the city (see bottom of photo)

[*continued*

Figure IV (continued)

◀ 1953 — Planned city growth engulfs clandestine settlement

1961 — Settlement and area surrounding it are blighted because it opposes rigid city plan

City, (*83*) the *barriadas* of Lima, Arequipa and other Peruvian cities and some of the *ranchos* of Venezuela, (*107*) where squatting has been organized, layouts are regular and at least some provision is made for public open space and community facilities. This not very surprising coincidence of topographical conditions and physical order supports the deduction that settler organization is more common than is often supposed.

Squatter settlement layouts indicating some degree of premeditated order also occur in Panama City (Panama), Buenaventura (Colombia), Buenos Aires (Argentina) and Fortaleza (Brazil) and there are, no doubt, "planned" settlements elsewhere. Many would assume that the squatters have little respect for planning since the land has been taken illegally and by force in the first place — they expect squatters would take land from one another, especially if, at any time, a plot is left unguarded. However, plans are respected to a surprising degree and the initial layout is, perhaps, more influential than is commonly supposed.

Sewell reports that in Ankara squatters take their "rights" so seriously that, when conflicts arise between claimants, they will often turn to government authorities in order to resolve them. The Ankara incident Sewell reports could well have occurred in a Peruvian *barriada*.

> The man had "bought" building rights from another person who purported to own some land in the *gecekondu*. The "purchaser" had waited until a dark night, then had begun to build his house. At this point another claimant to the land appeared, a claimant supported by many neighbouring *gecekondu* settlers. A pitched battle ensued and the "purchaser" received a gash on his head with a shovel. Police located and arrested the swindler. The author subsequently visited the "purchaser" in the hospital and found him relating his adventures with gusto to visitors packed three deep around his bed. A few weeks later he built his house on another site. (*58*)

The eleven unplanned but nevertheless developing or already developed settlements for which information is available are all situated on marginal land which, through geological accident, happens to be centrally located. The four relatively well-planned squatter or semi-squatter settlements from different areas for which we have detailed information are all situated on more or less level marginal land of little commercial value at the peripheries of the cities. The only settlement of the incipient squatter category which does not fall into either of these groups is the *barriada bruja* Villa de los Reyes of Panama City. This settlement is peripheral and occupies land of poor quality which is flat and relatively extensive — the density is quite low. But, with the exception of two fairly well-aligned streets, it does not appear to have been planned. There was apparently no community organization until the government housing agency (the INVU) stepped in to provide technical assistance, which resulted in considerable improvements. The correlations observed between the geographic, administrative and physical planning characteristics of the developing incipient squatter settlements in central and peripheral locations are hardly surprising when one takes the local situation of the settlers themselves into consideration.

Semi-squatter settlements

In the urbanizing world, incomplete modern or incipient semi-squatter (or "semi-legal") settlements are often occupied by middle-income families. Relative to their socio-economic and cultural status the middle-income sector is often badly served for housing as a result of inflated land costs and interest rates. But, because of their standards and status, the middle classes are rarely tempted to take the direct action of the low-income squatter.

It is more usual for this middle-income group, when it cannot afford to build in accordance with all legal requirements, to build in developments that circumvent cost-inflating regulations, unnecessary from their point of view. It is common to find suburban developments where fair or good-quality dellings are being built, even lived in, although they lack public utilities, paved roads and so on. More seriously, these developments are sometimes very badly laid out with quite inadequate lots. Partly because of the difficulties of deciding what is "squatting" and what is "clandestine" (but not squatting) and of knowing just where to draw the line between "clandestine", "customary" and "legal", it is even more difficult to obtain information on settlement areas in this stage than the more spectacular squatter and slum areas. To limit the field to "squatter" settlements in the strict sense, however, would effectively camouflage the processes which must be pin-pointed if we are to understand the structure of events well enough to predict them.

The world-wide view of "incomplete semi-squatter" settlement shows that its inhabitants are from an extremely wide range of social classes, occurring commonly in areas where the middle class is a very new one. With the exception of Leopoldville there is no information on suburban residential settlement by average low-income families that can be described as "advanced" in countries where the annual *per capita* income is around the $100 level. But where incomes are appreciably higher — or where suburban building can be achieved exceptionally cheaply as in Peru — "working class" suburban development is quite common. Where income levels are very low, settlement of much the same kind may often be found but it will generally prove to be that of the middle class.

Provisional squatter settlements

Squatters are motivated basically by the need for minimum cost. The "provisional" settlements are the refuge of many of the unemployed or underemployed, who naturally tend to congregate as near as they can to sources of employment. Physical improvement to modern standards tends, therefore, to be incompatible with the *raison d'être* of the provisional settlement. Few are either intended to become permanent modern settlements or do, in fact, achieve anything approaching that status. The provisional squatter settlements are refuges of the urban poor. Not all provisional squatter settlers are poor, however. In Hong Kong, for example, their are instances of squatter settlement dwellers who prove to have saved for a modern house. (*14*) Where data

are available, income levels in the provisional settlements are shown to be consistently very low. A detailed analysis of income levels in eight squatter settlements of Manila in 1963 shows that no less than 85 per cent have incomes below subsistence level. (*35*) Settlement studies from Caracas (*104*) and the famous Rooiyard study in Johannesburg confirm that the settlers are from the least prepared urban groups and have the lowest income levels.

Exceptional provisional settlements may nevertheless develop into integrated parts of the city. The Plaka settlement in Athens, was probably a provisional squatter settlement some 130 years ago. It is now a delightful area where accommodation is sought by writers, artists and even architects. Descloitres and Reverdy point out the similarity between the *bidonvilles urbains* and the traditional *casbah* of Algiers (*49*) and the *gourbivilles* of Tunis, surveyed in detail by Sebag and others, (*53-55*) suggest that the same process is taking place in spite of the intensified pace and demands of modern city life. However, the great majority of provisional settlements existing today will be eradicated eventually if only because they are on land of potentially high value.

Although the traditional provisional squatter settlement model persists, it is no longer always situated on the periphery in the larger cities. The provisional squatter settlements in the sixteen major cities for which information is available are near centres of employment for unskilled or semi-skilled labour. If these centres are the central markets or around the central business districts, then provisional settlements will occur on marginal lands nearby — on hillsides or rocky outcrops, as in Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Ankara and Hong Kong; on marshes and areas liable to flooding or, even, out into the sea itself as in Santiago de Chile, Guayaquil, Karachi and Davao (Philippines); or filling up the interstices of the cities — unguarded and unused plots of private land, public land, verges, ravines, embankments and even bombed sites — as has occurred in Caracas, Mexico City, Algiers, Delhi and Manila. Where provisional settlements do occur on the periphery — as in Istanbul, Cairo and Paris — they are near peripherally located industrial areas.

It seems probable that the temporary provisional or transient settlements in centrally located areas tend to have a higher proportion of recent provincial immigrants than those established on the periphery, since these areas generally provide the cheapest accommodation and locations within walking distance of casual employment centres. Location, as well as the social convenience of living near relatives and friends from the same village who may be depended upon for help in times of acute need, may well balance the lack of privacy, space and cleanliness. The processes of urban accommodation will also reflect an improvement in economic status although this may not be apparent from the condition of the environment — except, perhaps, where it bristles with television antennae.

The polarity of settlement types

Data from cities in seven countries allow a comparison of income levels among squatters or slum dwellers in central locations and squatters or semi-squatters in peripheral areas. The difference is marked: the peripheral settlers are almost always of a higher socio-economic status than central city slum or provisional settlement dwellers. And, in every case where records are available, the majority of the settlers — who are building permanent houses — were previously resident in the city. A survey carried out in the San Martin settlement in Lima in 1960, for instance, revealed that only 5 per cent of the then inhabitants of that very large squatter settlement (with a population at that time of approximately 60,000) were recent rural migrants. But this situation is likely to change in settlement areas that have become so large. Two separate settlement areas, initially "peripheral", have populations of well over 100,000 each — one area (Carabayllo-Comas) has already become, in effect, the third largest city of Peru. If the centres of such areas are distinctly separate from the rest of the city, if they form a species of urban satellite, then they will naturally tend to reproduce many urban functions such as markets which provide casual labour for the very poor. These settlement areas will, therefore, attract the very poor — especially rural migrants with established settler relatives. The initial differentiation may tend to become obscured with time but it is clearly most important to recognize the distinctly different nature and function which the peripheral settlement has in contrast to centrally located settlements.

Very cheap or even free-for-the-taking marginal land, within commuting distance of workplaces, is highly convenient for the regular wage-earner. The regular wage-earner is unlikely to be a newcomer to city life, so it would be surprising to find a large number of recent immigrants from rural areas in distant peripheral settlements. In a number of studies there are statements that explicitly support the deduction which one can hardly avoid when faced with these facts: that the essential difference between the provisional squatter settlement (which is a slum by any definition) and the actively progressing incipient squatter (or semi-squatter) suburban settlement is precisely that between the orthodox central city slum and the orthodox residential suburb.

The social function and physical nature of the more centrally located incipient settlements is less clear. The marginal outcrop sites which they occupy are often equally suitable for the very poor man — providing him with a rent-free location for his shack, and for the less poor wage-earner — providing him with an inexpensive or free plot for a permanent dwelling. The very poor shanty-dweller may very well become a wage-earner, quite able to afford a few dollars' worth of building materials every week. If this change of economic status takes place without a change of location, and if the original shanty site is large enough and sufficiently accessible, the shanty will be replaced by a more solidly built house, which results in a mixture of shacks and solid structures. As settlements with these mixed characteristics are among the most common — and are easily the most visible in the cities where they do occur — it is hardly surprising that they should provoke so many and such contradictory observations.

Hypothesis

That data suggest that uncontrolled urban settlement is the product of and the vehicle for activities which are essential to the process of modernization, that uncontrolled urban settlements provide "bridgeheads" for the economically unestablished and "consolidation settlements" for those with a status to defend. The corollary of the hypothesis that uncontrolled urban settlement is the manifestation of traditional urban processes under historically unprecedented conditions is that these manifestations, in spite of distortions resulting from the conditions under which they are produced, fulfil socially and economically necessary functions. The functions which the different types of settlement perform for different social situations are illustrated by settlement evaluations in this paper.

Provisional and generally deteriorating settlements provide the very poor with strategically located "bridgeheads" from which they stand their best chance of getting jobs and of solving their immediate and overwhelming problem — survival. All the "bridgeheader" and his dependents need is a place to sleep and leave their few belongings while looking for and picking up the odd jobs on which their immediate survival and ultimate progress depend. It is essential for the extremely poor, aspiring to become fully participating citizens with relatively adequate and secure living standards, to concentrate whatever energies they may have on getting and holding jobs. At the other end of this process of "urban accommodation" is the problem of securing or consolidating the urban status achieved. Just as the most provisional and primitive "bridgehead" types of settlement suit the very insecure and the very poor, the permanently established, self-improving settlements suit the more regularly employed. These settlers, new but often somewhat marginal and insecure citizens, are less troubled by hunger and the problems of physical survival than they are by the danger of losing their jobs or their savings and of sliding back down into the depths of poverty. The self-improving settlements of securely held land and permanent building construction are the means by which these "consolidators" invest their savings and protect themselves from some of the consequences of unemployment — eviction and homelessness, which can have far more serious social and psychological consequences for the established and self-respecting household than for the unestablished very poor who have nothing to lose and no status to defend.

Three variables, dependent on the life-situation of the person or family, determine the nature of the demand for a given housing environment: *location*, interpreted most directly in terms of proximity to workplaces, to neighbours and to community facilities (such as schools and markets); *stability* in terms of the required expectation or duration of tenure (varying from the short-term residence of the "bridgeheaders" — to the life-long duration of tenure required by the "consolidators") and *modernity* the degree to which the dwelling environment itself should be of modern material standards. Three other independent variables determine the nature of direct action, self-help or autonomous satisfaction of the demand: the *income levels*, which the interested socio-economic sector has and can achieve and the savings margin available for investment in housing; *land availability* for low and very low-income settlement (largely determined by the topography and climate and the existence of marginal lands near employment) and effective *police power*, the extent to which land-use and settlement are effectively controlled by the political powers.

The polarity of "bridgehead" and "consolidation" functions and their frequent correspondence of settler and settlement types [6] can be most clearly observed in the juxtaposition of countries and regions at different stages of the process of modernization; just as they can be seen within cities where local conditions have provided for the physical polarization of these typical situations and settlements, revealing a correlation of dominant settlement types with low and high *per capita* income. "Consolidation" settlements established by the direct action of low-income groups are apparently exceptional in all countries with very low *per capita* incomes, and occur commonly only in countries with relatively high *per capita* incomes, which are urbanizing rapidly. In the cities where local topographic conditions have permitted a physical differentiation — where land has been available for both types of settlement in separate, suitable areas as in Lima, Mexico City and Athens, the results are interesting. Not only have "consolidation" settlements predominated but the number and size of "provisional" and "bridgehead" settlements seem directly proportional to income levels. In Athens there is a relatively small proportion of very low-income households in the city by "under-developed" standards, and the provisional type of settlement has all but disappeared (it is said they were common in the city in the years immediately following the civil war in the late 1940s). In Lima, on the other hand, with lower income levels there is a relatively high proportion of provisional squatter settlements, although the proportion is decreasing. This polarity of settlement types reflects the distribution of the city population by income level. An income distribution curve for a city will correlate with the varying needs for urban accommodation.

While correlations between cultural situations and settlement types are evident, great care must be taken in drawing conclusions from any one factor such as location or physical condition. The physical/cultural correlations are generally more confused where local topographical conditions have provided sites that are suitable for both "bridgeheaders" and "consolidators", for example, hillsides occurring near the major centres of employment — as in Lima, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, Ankara, and Hong Kong. In any of these a fortunate "bridgeheader" might get hold of a piece of land as suitable for a permanent dwelling as for a provisional shack. Over time these settlements develop from predominantly "bridgehead" to "consolidation" settlements. Settlements

[6] It is vital to distinguish between the characteristics of habitat and inhabitant. The most common and one of the most damaging errors is the assumption that inhabitants have the same character as their habitat and *vice versa*. This is a tendency which recognition of the variables and their independent variability should help to correct.

with mixed characteristics pose the most difficult physical problems owing to their socio-economic heterogeneity and their extreme physical irregularity. But this variety is also their strength — stimulating the development of the poorer by maintaining a reasonable range of levels and skills. Homogeneity may well inhibit growth.

The problems of uncontrolled urban settlement

Aspects of the problem

To this point the positive aspect of uncontrolled urban settlement has been emphasized; to most of their inhabitants the settlements are steps toward the solution of their problems, they are not problems *per se*. Yet from the government viewpoint, uncontrolled urban settlement is a very serious problem even where it presents no serious or immediate problems for the inhabitants. The situation has two different sides to it so that which is seen depends on whether one is looking up at it from below or down on it from above.

Economic and physical aspects

To take Lima as an example: twenty-five years ago it was a smallish and quite compact city of some 600,000 people. Looking forward twenty-five years it will be a sprawling metropolis of some 6 million. Barring world catastrophe, Lima will have grown 1,000 per cent or more in less than a modern man's lifetime and this will be typical of most of the major cities in urbanizing countries. Based on a simple extrapolation of growth trends from 1940 to the present, by 1990, three quarters of the population of the entire city — 4,500,000 people — would be living in areas originally settled by squatters — in *barriadas* or in ex-*barriadas* if the trends of the past twenty-five years continue. In 1940 a quite insignificant proportion of the city population lived in marginal and squatter type settlements — probably less than 5 per cent. Now, in 1966, at least 25 per cent of the population lives in *barriadas* (including those that have since become incorporated municipalities) and the city, meanwhile, has trebled in size. Not only is this situation paralleled by that of many other cities, such as Mexico City, Caracas and Istanbul, but it is emphasized even more in smaller cities that are also swept up in the present flood of urbanization.

Criteria and techniques for the economic and social evaluation of urban growth patterns are, as yet, ill-defined and undeveloped: very little is really known, especially when it comes to the study of newly urbanizing areas. The only two direct references, to this question, so far, are both quoted by Charles Abrams, who reports that in Cali, Colombia, the scale and violence of the squatter problem " precipitated an emigration of industry". (*1*) In a report on Ciudad Guayana, the new industrial city in Venezuela, Abrams refers to a study of factory workers' excessive journey to work (from squatter settlement area) which showed that the workers' demands for compensation, when measured in terms of the effect on dividends, reduced profits by 7 per cent. (*103*) No hard facts or figures are available on the additional costs of providing water mains and other essential utilities to settlements in outlying areas or difficult terrain but, undoubtedly, these are very considerably in excess of normal costs. It is, therefore, inevitable that these high infra-structure and servicing costs will be reflected in the local tax structure and in general increases of overheads at the expense of production and investment in fixed capital. To these costs one must add the losses involved in the non-participation and non-contribution of the administratively unincorporated marginal areas.

Totally uncontrolled and unplanned but largely permanent development occurs in many major cities. While a small area — such as the Plaka or Ilissos settlements in Athens, can easily integrate fully with the city, and additional costs of development can be absorbed over time without undue economic strain, it is an entirely different matter when the scale is multiplied hundreds of times. Estimates indicate that nearly half the entire population of Ankara is housed in *gecekondu*. (*56*) The population of the *ranchos* of Caracas in 1961 was twenty-one per cent of the total urban population of 1,330,000. (*104*) Both the *gecekondu* areas and the *ranchos* are almost totally lacking in all public utilities and services; the greater number are situated on steep hillsides without plan forms adjusted to the demands of gravity, drainage or vehicular access. Large numbers of solidly built dwellings have been erected especially in the *gecekondu* settlements, and the demands of this increasingly influential sector, politically speaking, are unlikely to diminish as time goes on and as their individual dwellings are completed, except for the services and utilities.

An equally serious problem is illustrated by Arequipa, the second city of Peru, with a population of approximately 200,000. In 1960 the built-up area of the incorporated city was approximately 900 hectares. At that time the *urbanizationes populares (barriadas)* occupied an area of 1,100 hectares with an average gross density of approximately twenty-two persons per hectare, though it has increased very considerably during the past five years during which the proportion of population in settlements has grown from between 20 and 25 per cent — an absolute increase of 300 per cent. Even if the area claimed by squatters does not increase there is a considerable amount of waste involved in the extremely low densities during the development period. Construction as well as public transportation costs are bound to be appreciably higher.

The eradication of centrally located settlements, which is sometimes necessary, can be costly even where their existence does not cause commercial loss by lowering land values. The costs of these settlements are reflected in depressed land values as well as in the relocation costs involved in their eradication. Provisional squatter settlements often interfere with city development by blocking it — the case of Mendocita is typical. Although it will almost certainly be eradicated, the damage that the settlement has done already is not inconsiderable. Local land values have been greatly reduced and commercial enterprise in the area kept at a low level (the photograph, bottom left, page 114, shows that the building lots along the truncated street are vacant and are being used

as bus depots). Eradication, especially when it involves relocation, can be very expensive and can precipitate all manner of conflicts. The eradication and resettlement of the Intramuros settlement in downtown Manila not only involved a very expensive relocation project but also caused a great deal of friction between the different authorities involved. (*34*, *36*)

Poor design is a form of built-in blight. Initial standards can be of great importance to the people themselves, especially if they are building with permanent materials. Inadequate design is certainly the more serious and common problem in the Peruvian *barriadas*. Construction, though frequently poor and wasteful of cement and steel, is better than generally assumed, partly because of the high proportion of construction workers who live in *barriadas* — a phenomenon common to many uncontrolled settlement areas. While a great deal could be done through properly administered technical assistance in order to improve skills, still more can be effected through the improvement of design. People will build only in accordance with the models that they know and they frequently lack suitable models for self-help, that is to say single family urban houses. (Charles Abrams has emphasized that the most permanent part of settlement is its layout. There are city streets today that were laid out several thousand years ago, while the buildings on these streets have changed many times.)

That "bridgehead" settlements are necessary and bound to persist as long as no alternatives are available for those whom they serve, is undeniable. In some instances the actual location of the slum settlements, over garbage dumps, flooded areas and polluted streams, defies any attempt to introduce rational physical planning. The cost alone would be staggering, if indeed the locations could be used. The basic problem of the slum areas in the developing countries, however, is not how to eradicate them but how to make them livable.

Socio-economic and political aspects

The gap between rich and poor in the developing countries is many times as wide as in the more industrialized nations. There are very great differences between classes of the low-income or "popular" sector of the urban populations: between those at or below subsistence and those who manage to sustain life at levels which are tolerable by local standards. These quantitative differences are relatively subtle in societies where income differentials are so extreme: in the newly urbanizing economies it is usual for the managerial class to earn fifteen to twenty times more than the workers whom they manage. In the United States of America, for instance, or in the Soviet Union, the differential is far less. Without an appreciation of these vital differences between the semi-employed "bridgeheader" and the more or less regular wage-earning "consolidator", it is impossible to see any significant patterns in the massive and fast-growing popular sector.

While these striking differences of income levels have led to many sweeping generalizations and projections of imminent violence, these often tend to be oversimplifications.

Myron Wiener, disproves the theory (*29*) that the inhabitants of the "ghastly alleys" are less prone to vote against the local system than are other, much better-off sectors. Similar investigations in other areas where squatters are well entrenched also bear out his argument. G. H. Sewell suggests why squatters frequently have quite conservative attitudes toward their Governments:

> "Government officials and intellectuals in Turkey have frequently expressed concern that the residents of the *gecekondu* will become dangerous radicals of the left.... Despite the substandard living conditions, however, several forces are operating to counter such a trend at this juncture. The migrants are principally villagers with a deep devotion to their religion and a surprisingly powerful sense of Turkish nationalism.... Secondly, the vast majority of the *gecekondu* residents have accomplished significant social and economic mobility in a relatively short period of time.... Thirdly, these migrants have developed a sense of responsibility towards their sizable investment in the *gecekondu*, and they seem anxious to avoid any action or suggestion that would jeopardize themselves, their houses or their community". (*60*)

These observations from the Turkish *gecekondu* inhabitants hold also for Peruvian *barriada* dwellers (who vote more conservatively than the middle classes) and only to a slightly less degree for the *ranchos* of Venezuela.

If the larger and more peripheral areas fail to maintain a discernible rate of improvement or if, for other reasons, their inhabitants lose heart and cease to invest their savings and efforts in the improvement of their homes and local community, then the fear that the huge belt of recent city growth is peopled by disaffected slum dwellers might well turn out to be true. Should the air of hope vanish and expectations continue to be frustrated, the predicted uprising might occur. In the first place, wealth is badly distributed. In the second place, the upper and middle classes, by persisting long enough, can make people become ashamed of living in them. Some young British volunteers, living and working in Pampa de Comas, a fairly well advanced *barriada* in Lima, reported that young women, daughters of original settlers who have done relatively well, are embarrassed to admit that they live in that area. The mud that is thrown at the settlers and their settlements by the national and international Press is apt to stick.

On the basis of deductions from the information actually available, it would appear that the political attitudes of the settlers fall into two main groups at present: that of the "bridgeheaders" and the "consolidators". The bridgeheaders seem too preoccupied with their immediate problems to concern themselves actively with political matters; the consolidators, however are conservative but have a vested interest in the community. Rather than being a "misery belt" of the dispossessed, waiting only for that revolutionary spark to drive them to the destruction of the citadels of society which they surround, the settlements could more accurately be described as social safety belts. As long as urbanization and modernization are progressing, the slums and settlements of the cities involved are, in Stokes's terms, "slums of hope" rather than "slums

of despair". But this will remain true only as long as the settlements are vehicles of social change — and change for the better. As soon as they become traps the infamous ghetto slums of more stable societies, like Harlem and Watts, then they are sure to become the "breeding grounds of discontent and violence" that all squatter settlements are so often supposed to be irrespective of the actual material standards.

The problems felt most strongly by the settlers have to do with the frustration of their capacity to work and build. The first step is to secure possession of the land. The high priority attached to land titles explains why so many low-income families are prepared to risk their lives for a piece of their own land — and will, thereupon, proceed to invest a very high proportion of their earnings in building on it — while they are extremely reluctant to buy, on easier terms, a mortgaged house built for them by a public authority. A family in secure possession of a plot of land feels free to invest its efforts and resources to create the one concrete symbol of its identity — the dwelling.

Where it is apparent that a house can result from hard work and sacrifice, hidden resources and efforts are revealed. Although surveys show that the settlers are happier in their present locations, it does not mean an absence of serious social and economic as well as physical problems. Apart from the discomforts of living in half-built or provisional structures and the lack of public utilities and services, many families suffer even more from economic deprivation than before. But the deprivation is generally voluntary, being the result of the extra costs of suburban living — mainly transportation and drinking water — and the voluntary sacrifices made in order to build.

Given the risks and sacrifices that are so frequently made, the advantages of settlements are evidently considerable. The basic motive and reward is socio-economic security. A primary reason for moving to a settlement is the satisfaction of not having to pay rent. The next most common reason given is to build (or own) a house. Others are to improve physical conditions — to have more space, light and air, especially for the children — to have more privacy, and to get away from the often violent life of the city slums. (*93*) One very great advantage expressed in some settlement areas is the security of the settled community and the proximity of blood relatives — perhaps a deeply seated motive for secure tenure and permanent settlement. Typical of these are the *gecekondu* districts of Ankara, where settlement patterns are closely allied to village origins.

Community organization is needed, but even where it exists, it often cannot overcome the obstacles. It is usually weak — except for obtaining and defending the land which the settlers hope to possess, or for the generally sporadic efforts to obtain specific improvements such as a water supply. From the limited evidence available, settlement organization tends to evaporate as security of tenure rises. Community action is generally less effective than the action of individual households. This does not mean that the potential is poor — on the contrary, this resource should be developed, because it is very considerable even in areas where little has been achieved, as emerges from a study by Sewell in Turkey:

> "A new community organization, the Aktepe Help and Improvement Association, was established in 1962. As its president explained, "The association has nothing to do with the government; the government gave no help in setting it up. It is a result of the social needs of the Aktepe people. We have three hundred registered members, but we hope to include everyone living in Aktepe soon. The Board of Directors has seven members and now meets once a week.
>
> "Houses have been built in Aktepe before and after the 6188th law (passed in 1960 and prohibiting extension of services to *gecekondu*). If the law is to be enforced, let it be enforced properly. Does it say tear down all the houses? Then tear them down! But what happens? The houses are not torn down. The people are taxed, but the municipality does not assume responsibility for Aktepe. Either the law should be enforced or we should be accepted as a part of the city.
>
> "The first things we want to accomplish are the construction of a school and a road. We are willing to help the municipality in every way we can. If they say find 20,000 liras ($2,000) and we will build a school for you, then we will find the 20,000 liras for them. The association does not depend upon dues from members but is financed by contributions. When we need a certain amount of money for the school, for example, we ask people to give contributions, each according to his ability.
>
> "We have already consulted the city electricity and water departments. They came, saw our houses, and told us that the 6188th law prevented them from doing anything. Now we are going to higher authorities, the President if necessary." (*58*)

Hypothesis

The argument of this paper can be summarized in the statement that uncontrolled urban settlement is the product of the difference between the popular demand for housing and that demanded and supplied by institutional society. The values and priorities of the popular sectors are different from those which they are required to adopt by society's institutions. Policy objectives and the institutional framework for their fulfilment are too often geared to one sector of society (the relatively wealthy minority) which makes them economically and culturally unacceptable to the remainder — the "remainder" being composed of four fifths of the urban populations. Any family accommodating itself in the city is obliged to conform to modern standards and procedures or, if it cannot afford to do so, to accept urban housing standards that are as low as they ever have been. It is argued that the loss of control over urban settlement — as distinct from the deficit of modern standard housing units — is a consequence of institutional maladjustments due, in part at least, to erroneous beliefs and social attitudes. But while the "modern housing unit deficit" is only indirectly an institutional problem, the extremely bad physical conditions in which the poor

of many cities live are certainly exacerbated by institutional demands and failures. Guided, very often, by erroneous notions of slum clearance and the prohibition of any forms of building which are not considered to be "modern" enough for the city, official policies have frequently contributed directly to the worsening of housing conditions and to the precipitation of squatting and clandestine development as the only alternatives for the masses.

If the premises and interpretations in this paper are correct, it is evident that uncontrolled settlement is not the product of wilful lawlessness. It is clear that squatting and clandestine urbanization are the only solution for large and often dominant sectors of the urban populations whose housing needs are inadequately served by society's formal institutions. Low-income residential zoning often ignores the relationship between geographic place and social situation; planning and building regulations also ignore the natural priorities between the basic components of housing. The home builder or purchaser is obliged to follow financing and construction procedures which conflict with popular needs, interfering with opportunities for social betterment, even where they are financially feasible. It is more of an understatement than an exaggeration to say that uncontrolled urban settlement is the product of a non-coincidence between the popular values determining the nature of the demand and others which determine the nature of the official supply.

Orthodox urban building and planning standards, by determining both locations and procedures, clearly reflect the value systems which control, or are designed to control, what people do in society and how they are to do it. Minimum standards for urban sub-divisions and dwellings in recently urbanizing countries vary little, in principle, from those of the more fully urbanized and industrialized countries with *per capita* incomes that are many times higher. Maximum densities tend to be low, and these are lowered even further by over-generous requirements for streets and public open spaces — whatever the scale of the sub-division.

Whether considered from the social angle of the priorities of need or of cultural preparedness to follow such procedures, or from the angle of economic feasibility, it is obvious that the standards required for contemporary urban development are both inappropriate and unattainable for the vast majority of the urbanizing populations. Translated into material component terms, the functional priorities for popular housing are generally the reverse of those required by official regulations. Low-income house-builders need a building lot in the first place — one on which they can, if necessary, live in a temporary shack. If, along with reasonably secure possession, the low-income family also had direct access to basic community facilities — especially to markets and primary schools — then a major part of their "housing" problem would be immediately solved. With the increased security of their status and with the opportunities for the capitalization of their savings and spare time, given to them by a properly located and designed plot of building land, families with very low incomes can and do achieve or even surpass minimum modern standards — over time. This traditional "progressive development" procedure — which allows for the full use of existing resources and which, if properly applied, guarantees orderly development while minimizing the ill-effects of low material standards — is prohibited by orthodox modern regulations.

If this is correct, it is evident that quantitative adjustments to physical standards cannot accommodate different demands either functionally or economically. The recent immigrants' needs are not satisfied with a small house, however modern; even if it were supplied free, such a house would exacerbate rather than ease their problems — especially if it meant locating the immigrants or the very poor at considerable distances from their work places. In a different way this is also true for the intermediate wage-earning class. For them a modern house is desirable, but its premature acquisition may create serious problems. The process of squatter and clandestine settlement shows, the world over, that settlers aim at a dwelling environment adjusted to modern standards, and their approach is logical, both socially and economically. It is extremely important to recognize that, for an increasingly large and influential sector of the urban populations, cultural change — including a considerable degree of socio-economic mobility — takes place in the same location. The concept of housing and building standards, however, implies an essentially different process: a series of fixed quantitative standards or classes of dwellings presupposes a supply of different types so that people can move between them as their needs and status change. This may (or may not) operate satisfactorily, in a culturally stable society, even for the poor, but the assumption is evidently false in most urbanizing and modernizing cities.

Uncontrolled settlement cannot be blamed on legislation alone. Even if anyone who so wished could live on his land while he built, most of the people in many cities would still be frustrated by high land costs. Land speculation is notorious, especially in the developing countries. In general the ratio between land and structure values is distorted in comparison with the norms of the developing countries:

> "In many developing countries urban land is priced far beyond its apparent economic value as a result of the propensity of some high-income groups to invest surplus savings in a safe commodity. This propensity is encouraged by traditional social values, scarcity of other outlets for investible funds and as a hedge against inflation. Many examples exist of land costs in urban areas in Latin America equalling or exceeding costs of similar land in densely populated cities in the United States and other high-income countries." (*5*)

If the "housing problem" is defined in minimum modern-standard housing unit terms, then it is plainly insoluble. But in that case, on the basis of the arguments put forward in this paper, the problem has been stated in the wrong terms. The following quotation from a paper by Ruben Utria leaves this point in no doubt: " It is estimated that, in general, a modest but adequate urban dwelling for low-income families costs between $US3,000 and 6,000 on the traditional market and

between $US8,000 and 18,000 for middle-income families". These high costs, based on a well-documented analysis, include the following percentages: 10-20 per cent for designers' fees and contractors' profits and 10-24 per cent interest rates for private financing; when built by public agencies, the agencies' administrative costs are generally between 15 and 25 per cent (in addition to contractors' profits) but financing is less — between 6 and 12 per cent per annum. The monthly payments required — assuming twenty year loans — are $US40-84 for "low"-income housing and $US100-224 for "medium"-income units. Consequently:

> "...between 81 and 85 per cent of the low income sector (of Latin America) and between 73 and 81 per cent of the medium income sector do not have the purchasing capacity required..." (*64*)

An evaluation of policy on uncontrolled urban settlement

A review of government action

Until recently, uncontrolled settlement was rarely regarded as anything but a temporary problem involving marginal sectors of the population and limited to the interstices and margins of the cities. Until very recently, the only deliberate policies formulated to solve squatting and slum development have been aimed at the control of population movements. Land reform policies (the redistribution of land to peasants, virgin land colonization) and urban-industrial decentralization are also projected and sometimes attempted as solutions to the problems of the "over-population" or "unbalanced growth" of cities. Comprehensive policies to deal with causes as well as symptoms of the problem are rarely formulated.

Government policies on uncontrolled settlement reflect accumulated experience. The most common "policy" in countries where rapid urbanization is taking place and where the surplus peasant population is migrating is, in effect, *laissez-faire*. The only serious efforts that have been made to deal with squatting and slums in general have taken a negative form. In extreme cases, Governments drive settlers away by tearing down their shacks, but with the increasing attention given to "housing of social interest", eradication has been more commonly coupled with attempts to relocate. For example a few Governments in Latin America, notably Peru, are attempting settlement improvement procedures phased with the relocation of unimprovable settlements. The present trend appears to be in the direction of an increased respect for and support of what the common people themselves need and are prepared to do.

Eradication, resettlement and improvement are all procedures designed to deal with existing settlements — with problems created by past action. If provision is not made for the accommodation of current and future immigrants and for the natural increase of the poor of the city, as well as for the settlement of the growing number of the somewhat less poor, the effects of any resettlement or improvement programme will soon be drowned by the continually rising demand. Plans for decentralization, rural development or colonization, or even birth control, are most unlikely to have any appreciable effect in the immediate future. Proposals aimed at the manipulation of population growth have no immediate bearing on current housing and urban development problems. There are four basic and complementary spheres of practical action in the housing field:

(1) The relocation of settlements that damage the city's growth to a greater extent than would be the cost of removing them;

(2) The improvement of existing and improvable settlements that will otherwise deteriorate and create severe problems in the future;

(3) The accommodation of those who have no interest in or resources for building for themselves and who cannot afford the alternatives currently offered; and, finally but perhaps most important of all,

(4) The settlement of those who do have the interest and resources sufficient for building and who will build whatever and however they can, anyway, if they are not provided with equal or better alternatives.

Eradication and relocation projects

There is immense variety among the types of projects that Governments have adopted and carried out for relocation purposes: from the high-rise apartments *superbloques* in Caracas, and the "H" blocks of rented one-room family units in Hong Kong, to the physically complete new satellite town of Korangi in Karachi and the raw agricultural land of Sapang Palay near Manila. Many different financing and tenancy conditions have been employed, siting varies from central urban areas to those beyond the periphery of the city, and the extent of settler participation ranges from all to almost total responsibility. But without evaluations of the social economic and administrative aspects, the relatively abundant data on the design and specifications of the works are of little value as a guide for future action.

(a) *Caracas and Hong Kong*

The excellent annual reports issued by the Government of Hong Kong (*16*) and the detailed evaluation study of the *superbloques* of Caracas (*108*) yield valuable information on two physically similar resettlement solutions that are otherwise quite different. Both are within the urban areas near quarters where employment is obtainable and sited on or near the squatter settlements they have replaced. Thirty-eight *superbloques* — fifteen-storey apartment units — were built in Caracas between 1954 and 1958. The seven-storey "H" blocks, most with sixty-two "domestic rooms" per floor, accommodated 575,000 people between 1954 and 1964. But there the similarities end. The Hong Kong housing programme has been well administered and is financially self-supporting while the *superbloque* programme is notorious for its administrative failures: it has proved to be a major drain on the State's resources — the monthly maintenance cost per apartment was $US53.44 in 1959, and the average construction cost of each apartment was in the order of $US10,000. Since the average monthly income of the employed tenants (55 per cent were either unemployed or semi-employed in 1959) was around

$US170, even the very small minority who were both able and willing to pay were unable to pay their share of the upkeep and administration costs, let alone amortize the capital investment. The designs of the two projects are radically different: a typical *superbloque* apartment has five habitable rooms, excluding a kitchen, and bathroom and water closet unit — a total area of seventy-six square metres. A family "dwelling" in the "H" blocks has one room with an area of twelve square metres. Lavatories are communal and cooking is usually done on the corridors which run around each floor. The "H" block structures are, however, designed for subsequent conversion into larger apartments. The tenants are more effectively screened and rent arrears are negligible. In Hong Kong, the excess people who cannot be accommodated — whether they are unwilling or economically incapable — are located temporarily in "controlled squatter settlements".

The labour demand created by the *superbloque* programme significantly increased migration into Caracas, so it is doubtful whether it reduced the population of the *ranchos* by 160,000 — the *superbloque* population in 1959. It is also doubtful whether their inhabitants experience any real improvement in their living conditions — the lifts were usually out of order, the stairwells were frequently used as latrines, garbage was thrown indiscriminately from the building (from considerable heights) and the blocks were dominated by gangs, which effectively prevented police surveillance. While they have not succeeded in eradicating the squatter settlements of Hong Kong, the "H" blocks have at least reduced the growth rate.

Central high-rise urban "accommodation" has not yet provided a satisfactory answer to permanent family resettlement. Relocation projects, however, are more frequently sited on peripheral land of low value. With exceptions such as the Valdivieso (Lima) and the *Lot évolutif* projects of Casablanca, the locations of resettlement projects are commonly inappropriate for an important sector of their populations. Since relocatees are generally from among the poorest urban sectors, the majority of the relocation project "beneficiaries" are those that can least afford to live at appreciable distances from their natural, and necessary, habitat in or very near the thick of urban things. Consequently it has to be expected that those who have been prematurely suburbanized will either return to their proper habitat or will stagnate. In either case the losses involved — both to the State and to the households directly concerned — are considerable.

(b) *The Philippines: Sapang Palay*

In 1954 the Philippine authorities attempted to relocate squatters in Manila eight kilometres from where they lived, but the squatters returned — having sold their subsidized plots at a profit. In 1963 a more attractive resettlement plan was produced. On the assumption that 50 per cent of the squatters wanted to be resettled rurally if given agricultural land, 1,000 families were to be relocated at Sapang Palay, thirty-seven kilometres and a two-hour bus ride from Manila. Notwithstanding many difficulties, a new settlement has now been created. A United Nations observer reports that 2,900 of the 4,000 families initially relocated have remained and that, aided by a community development programme, the area is improving. In spite of the distance, however, some 60 per cent of the working population commute to Manila.

(c) *Chile: Jose Maria Caro settlement*

The Cardinal Jose Maria Caro settlement in Santiago de Chile illustrates a different approach. It is situated ten kilometres from the centre of Santiago and has a population of about 100,000. With the exception of one area, it was settled under government auspices. Many of the settlers are from eradicated *callampas* (meaning "mushrooms"), the Chilean word for squatter settlement. Unemployment among the ex-*callampa* dwellers is high and 25 per cent of the households lack one of the principal members. (*75*) Cultural and educational levels are very low and the area is unrelieved by minorities with appreciably higher levels or by any truly urban nuclei. Community facilities are conspicuously absent — there is neither a cinema nor a sports stadium. (*72*) Except for the squatters in Valledor Sur, who dissociate themselves as much as they possibly can from the Caro projects, there is a very low level of civic participation or activity. This contrast between viable and active squatter settlement communities and socially problematic public housing projects is apparently very widespread. Reports on the political behaviour of the Caro project inhabitants imply that they are much more of a threat to law and order than those of the major squatter settlements, in spite of their illegal status.

(d) *Pakistan: Korangi*

Another instructive resettlement project is the Korangi satellite town near Karachi. This settlement now accommodates some 200,000 people, but is designed for an eventual population of 500,000 and planned as an industrial centre with many road and rail links with the central city and existing industrial areas. These, however, were not provided before the massive transfer of inhabitants to the satellite, some sixteen kilometres from downtown Karachi and over twenty kilometres from the main industrial zone, and communications are further complicated by the seasonal flooding of the river Malir. Very inexpensive expansible houses were built *en masse* for hire-purchase rentals varying between 7 per cent and 36 per cent of the average family income (PRs 100). The average rent together with "sweepers' services" is PRs 13.13 monthly. (*31*) Transportation costs, however, are much higher — PRs 20.00 monthly — which means a total expenditure of one third of the average family's income for the privilege of living in Korangi. Although the housing and environmental standards are incomparably higher than in the *jhuggis* from which many of the inhabitants came (and even though 75 per cent were reported as being satisfied with their housing in 1961), there are serious problems: 80 per cent of the rent cannot be collected to be paid back into the revolving fund; of the 42,000 families rehoused most do not pay their hire-purchase instalments back into the revolving fund supplied by USAID and the Government. This

prevents further developments on the lines of Korangi. (*30*)

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the new-town principle for housing the homeless. It appears that the main cause of the difficulties experienced at Korangi was the failure to provide the jobs and the communications.

(e) *Lagos*

The slum clearance and relocation programme carried out in Lagos between 1955 and 1960 illustrates the limitations imposed on resettlement by the economic limits of cultural adaptation to suburbanization although it does not deal with squatters. (*44*) Lagos, like most cities in West and Central Africa, has barely started to industrialize; it exists as a commercial and administrative centre. *Per capita* incomes are extremely low by modern standards so that the major part of the city is composed of housing that is poor and overcrowded. When it was decided to clear an area of central Lagos, the original landowners were given two alternatives: either to purchase improved land in the clearance area or to accept new housing provided at Suru-Lere, a government-sponsored housing scheme several kilometres from the city centre — a distance that is greatly increased in time owing to the bottle-neck created by the single bridge connecting downtown Lagos to the mainland. A minority of the original inhabitants resettled in Suru-Lere — principally the younger and the better off. Some time after resettlement, the transplanted and acculturated inhabitants were reported to be happy with the change. But for many the clearance was a major tragedy which ruined many small businesses and worsened local housing conditions. The local people, to whom the redeveloped plots were offered, simply could not afford to repurchase and rebuild as well as re-establish their businesses. The net result of this clearance scheme was somewhat different from either that of Jose Maria Caro — where the people were indeed resettled but apparently stagnating — or of the earlier Manila projects, whence the settlers promptly returned. Local circumstances precipitated a division between those Lagos inhabitants able to suburbanize and those forced to remain in central or relatively central areas.

(f) *Peru: Valdivieso*

The permanent resettlement of families with a very low but reasonably regular income may be practical where sufficiently cheap building land is available near enough to the city. The Valdivieso project in Lima is one such case. This project, initiated in 1960, was devised for the relocation of "provisional settlement" dwellers and for those eradicated as a result of "incipient" settlement improvements, many of whom have extremely low incomes. This project, situated only a few kilometres from the downtown area on agricultural land expropriated for the purpose, provides sites and semi-provisional dwellings for 700 families. The only other facility initially provided was a series of drinking water spigots at frequent intervals. At the bottom of the 8 × 20 metre lots, accommodated within a U-shaped, permanent brick party-wall shared with the neighbouring lots, a provisional dwelling of cane matting and bamboo was provided. The structure — which included a concrete floor — cost approximately $US260, the land $US75 and the water $US115, a total of approximately $US450 for which a credit was provided of up to a maximum of twelve years at 6 per cent interest per annum. Few families are unable or unwilling to accept such a modest loan on such easy terms and many still have a sufficient savings margin to commence the permanent building. If, however, instead of providing the relatively costly "provisional" dwellings (many of which have been converted into permanent and most inadequate back-to-back houses) the agency had provided a simple courtyard, enclosing a part of the lot and later to be used as part of the permanent dwelling, the inhabitants would have had much more privacy and more effective living space from the start. Neither would they have been tempted to rest content with a modified "provisional" dwelling as, apparently, many have in this case.

Settlement incorporation and improvement projects

In spite of the very considerable proportion of squatter settlements that are plainly permanent, remarkably little has been done to determine how they can be incorporated administratively and improved physically. Fortunately, there is a growing awareness of the wastage and danger of overlooking the possibilities contained in that which already exists but, until it is learned how the potential of incipiently developing settlements can be realized, the wastage of present investment and the costs of ultimate improvement — or clearance — will continue to increase. It seems that the most advanced effort to tackle this problem on a national scale is the Peruvian marginal settlement law and its implementation. A special commission, appointed in 1956 by then President of Peru, prepared and published an exceptionally thorough and perceptive analysis of the housing and urban situation in Peru. (88) Among its many highly relevant recommendations, the commission recognized the high potential of the *barriada* settlers and emphasized the importance of mobilizing and capitalizing their resources. As a result of the commission's work, a law was prepared which provided for the legalization of physically improvable *barriadas*, for the relocation of those that could not be improved economically and for the provision of land at low cost for new, but legal, settlement.

In Lima, where approximately 25 per cent of the total population (now about 2 million) are *barriada* residents, four new municipalities have been created incorporating *barriadas*, with a total population of over 300,000, into the administrative structure of the city and granting to most of the inhabitants provisional title to the land they occupy. That the *barriadas* have continued to increase — in both density and in area — is due to the fact that the complementary provisions for new settlements were not made on an adequate scale. The two main reasons for this are the resistance of many technicians and administrators to the idea of allowing — let alone of encouraging — people to build in accordance with the "progressive development" principle; the second — and probably secondary — reason, is the resistance of landowners to the enforced sale (at fair market

prices) of their lands. Apart from the impressive progress made in some of the Peruvian *barriadas*, successful projects have been carried out as a result of official intervention in Colombia, at the Siloe project in Cali, for example. (*78*)

At the San Martin de Porres *barriada* the water supply, sewerage and electric power and lighting utilities, together with the pavement of the principal avenue (and its planting with trees) have been carried out under the provisions of this Peruvian law. With the exception of the electrical installations, these improvements are charged to the inhabitants. They will obtain full title to their land when they have paid off the improvement costs. For this reason, they have been given only provisional title — the Government maintains a mortgage on the property. The prime cause for present problems, which may intensify before they are fully resolved, is political. Hastily prepared contracts and piecemeal contracting procedures have led to delays in completion; inadequate public relations and the failure to obtain at least a nominal participation from the citizens has inevitably led to misunderstanding and resistance which may greatly delay and complicate the recovery of the investment.

The attitudes of squatter populations with regard to what they expect of their Government or the local authorities are discussed in G. H. Sewell's thesis on the *gecekondu* phenomenon (*58*) and Talton Ray's unpublished book on politics and the settlements in Venezuela. (*107*) Expectations of *rancho* inhabitants are higher than among Turkish *gecekondu* dwellers as Venezuela's *per capita* income (inflated by the oil revenues) is several times that of Turkey. However, the *rancho* populations appear to have more filial-paternalist attitudes than those of Turkey and, even, than those of the *barriada* dwellers of Peru. Ray discusses the tendency of the Venezuelan masses to regard a democratically elected government as a provider for those who gave it its mandate. Together with the internal resistance to attempting communal action, this has tended to inhibit community development (community development policy has been oriented primarily towards the rural areas). The internal resistance to local action in the *barrios* reported by Ray are, basically, the justifiable fear of failure — and the consequent loss of prestige on the part of the leaders — and of more material losses on the part of the inhabitants. In Peru this is true to a less extent as the Peruvians have inherited stronger traditions of community action from an older culture based on the discipline of irrigation. The contradiction between the anarchic, independent action of squatters and their assumption that it is the Government's duty to do everything for them, seems to be quite common and is often overlooked by administrators. The temptation for political administrators to make offers and the temptation for the inhabitants to believe in them are often too strong. The economic and social consequences of hasty (and unfulfilled) promises are, of course, disastrous; it is the easiest and surest way of inhibiting action and of cultivating mutual distrust between the people and their Governments, a common and vicious circle, which throttles development.

The urban accommodation projects

Little attention has been paid to the problems of the urban accommodation of the very poor. Important exceptions are the "sanitary slums" projects in India (also in Morocco) where this particular problem is distressingly great. The government of Delhi has devised an interesting scheme for the provision of very small lots for rent, at nominal sums, to families or households who may erect their own shelters on the plots but who may not carry out any permanent building.

> A scheme for a "sanitary slum" was devised in one city in India, which illustrates the dilemma one faces if an interim slum improvement plan is designed without this special kind of investment. Occupants of an inlying slum were moved a very short distance to an area which the authority had planned, where it had installed utilities and built individual sanitary cores (water closet and shower). The families rented the land and, with the assistance of loans and materials, constructed dwellings according to plan. "Interim" in this scheme meant twenty years. Two things happened: one group of families immediately started improving their property with paint, fences, landscaping and additions to the dwellings. These families refused to believe that they only rented the land — they were certain they owned home and land. At first the authority forbade these improvements on the theory that any family that had made its home so attractive, with its own labour, would be quite impossible to move at the end of twenty years. The authority changed this regulation, in part because of what a second group of families was doing. This group, believing that residence was temporary, took no care of their property. Their buildings all but crumbled. (*8*)

The problems arising out of this project can be interpreted as the consequence of failing to differentiate clearly enough between the "bridgehead" and "consolidation" functions. Twenty years is much too long a period of residence at the "bridgehead" stage — at any rate, in one place; but it is much too short a period, as reported, to justify investment. The scheme is exceptionally interesting, however, as it is at least a step towards a type of project which is clearly needed but for which there are very few precedents: the controlled "sanitary slum"

Projects and policies for the settlement of potential squatters

Many low-cost housing programmes are designed to provide for those who have sufficient resources and interest to build and who will build whatever and however they can, anyway, if they are not provided with better alternatives, but most of them have met with little success. Corvi, the Chilean national housing agency, claims that the squatter settlement in Santiago has been effectively checked and that the number of *callampas* has been very greatly reduced through the popular housing programme, which provides a limited range of alternative accommodations. These projects, designed principally for the relocation and anticipation of *callampas* squatters, have included lots with minimum services, core houses with an area of eighteen square metres and complete minimum houses of seventy square metres. (*72*) The other major national housing effort in Latin America is that of the Instituto de Credito Territorial (ICT) of Colombia. Although this institution has also practised self-help on a relatively large scale and has built a large number

of dwellings well below the average "low-cost "levels in the continent, it has been admitted that little impression has been made on the squatter problem, which appears to have been gathering momentum during the past few years. An analysis of applications for ICT projects revealed that only a small proportion of those with income levels corresponding to the squatter populations even bothered to apply. Similarly, in Lima, where the squatter population is at least a quarter of the total and where it is growing considerably faster than the non-squatter sectors, only 28 per cent of the applicants for a very low-interest, low-cost housing programme have incomes at or below the squatter settlement average. If these are the figures for Latin America, which has an appreciably higher *per capita* income than most developing regions, it is unlikely that the impact of government housing programmes in other areas is any greater — the somewhat extreme case of one Central African State, for example, where 17 per cent of the gross capital formation was invested in housing, which produced just 676 housing units.

Perhaps the most interesting "settlement strategy" is being tried out in Ciudad Guayana — a new industrial city, based on rich iron ore deposits in eastern Venezuela. The city is being promoted by the Government of Venezuela to open up and tap the resources of a relatively distant and sparsely inhabited, but richly endowed region. The new city, started officially in 1961, now has a population of about 85,000, but of those some 50,000 lived there beforehand in scattered, disorganized settlements. Arrangements for those squatters constituted the first and major problem.

Two difficulties are reported. The first is speculation by opportunistic squatters with the compensation paid to those who have to be relocated. (It is clear from reports that the squatters have felt secure enough to invest not inconsiderable sums in the improvement of their *ranchos*). The second is the extreme inefficiency of the pilot credit and technical assistance procedures designed to "determine the feasibility of guiding and replacing shacks". The pilot project, which can be counted a success as "many adequacies were disclosed", showed just how easily a simple idea could be addled by paternalistic and bureaucratic attitudes. With the notion of creating "uncorrupted communities" procedures were designed to screen "anti-social" families. Consequently only half of the 80 per cent who were qualified persisted until negotiations for the loan were completed, and of these only half initiated construction afterwards.

As a result of this experience, procedures had to be modified and it was decided that:

1. Lots in settlement communities should be granted on the basis of first come, first served. Land speculation can continue to be controlled by a lease arrangement that grants title to the squatter only after building an adequate house. Families should not be checked for need or screened for social acceptability, but kept track of, to avoid granting more than one lot to the same individual;

2. Shack replacement should be encouraged by eliminating income requirements for the purpose of granting construction loans. Anybody physically able, including the unemployed, should be permitted to build houses in settlement communities. This seems possible since building techniques are simplified and controlled by stages on the basis of a simplified construction manual. On the other hand, to maintain sound financing, the squatters would have to build initially for a housing agency, not for themselves. Construction manuals can be provided which expose the families to a choice of novel housing types. This does not violate democratic principles; it simply postpones the moment of choice until after construction. The house has to be completed according to specifications and accepted by the agency. Then, the ownership of the house can be decided between the agency and the squatter. A self-help contract was developed to provide a legal basis to this arrangement, which offers four options to the squatter:

(*a*) To receive payment for his labour equity according to the price pre-stipulated in the contract after building the house and turning it over to the agency;

(*b*) To continue building other houses and receive one free of charge for every three built for the agency. This alternative is based on current cost estimates, $324 for the settlement lot, $1,000 for construction materials and $668 for labour equity;

(*c*) To buy the construction materials and thelot according to a long-term loan provided he has the required payment capacity;

(*d*) To lease the house and pay the lease with his labour equity. This would carry him for three years assuming a monthly rent of one per cent of invested capital and 10 per cent depreciation for construction materials. During this period he is likely to get a job in the city and be able to buy the house if he so wishes. The selling price would include the lot, the construction materials and the amount of the labour equity consumed in rent up to the purchasing date.

Whether or not the proposed control through financing and turning the self-helpers into contract labour is administratively practical remains to be seen. Experience in other areas suggests that it may not work out very well.

> "... by claiming for itself the main executive responsibility in this way, the agency frequently finds itself acting as general contractor in the building work, and to play this role on a nationally effective scale is often quite beyond the resources of such bodies, with their limited funds, staff and experience; this presents a formidable problem to most underdeveloped countries. This short-coming is often put forward to discredit the whole co-operative housing policy, and indeed its cause is an error common among this policy's protagonists: while they accept, of course, the basic idea of using the contribution of the participants, they suppose that the contribution lies mainly in spare-time labour. Yet a few questions in any progressive squatter settlement will confirm the impression that only a small — often very small — part of the actual building work is normally done by owner-occupiers themselves. The owner's role in building these houses is not that of skilled or unskilled labourer, but that of general contractor: he begs, buys or scrounges materials, engages workers and supervises the building work — usually very closely

indeed. In fact the greatest resource of these remarkable people is in their initiative and ability to organize: whole new towns and their multitudinous new houses stand as evidence of this ability." (*63*)

In three cases, at Villa del Rey, Panama City, Tahuantisuyo in Lima and municipal housing in Piura, northern Peru, the only items offered initially were a plot of land, basic technical assistance with plans and specifications for house construction. In Tahuantisuyo (a settlement within the Carabayllo *barriada* zone for some 4,000 families, started in 1961) administrative assistance was given to the inhabitants who were consequently able to form a credit union. This has played a major development role — economically by generating funds for short-term loans for building and for the establishment of local business and socially as well. Recently the credit co-operative has been involved in negotiating an international loan for the installation of public utilities.

If the economic efficiency of a government investment is measured by the value of the fixed capital investment it produces, then there is no doubt that these projects are among the most efficient direct-investments of public funds that have been made in the housing field. The only public capital required was funds to obtain and grade the land and to administer its allocation and the technical assistance. The rest — together with the repayment of the minimal initial costs — is provided by the inhabitants themselves and in their own time. The most interesting thing about the Piura case, one that makes it somewhat comparable to the Guayana experiment, is that a local authority has managed to control settlement quite effectively, by making land available as needed in ways that the settlers can afford. As the city is in a desert, and as desert lands in Peru belong to the State, the municipality has a great advantage in that it can claim control over all marginal lands. All that is provided for the first years is the land, water cisterns and primary schools. The oldest of these "controlled squatter" developments was established about ten years ago. Many houses in that area are now completed to reasonable standards and public utilities have been installed. Piura is the only rapidly growing city in Peru that now has no squatter problem.

The gap between supply and demand is so great that it is unreasonable to expect ordinary low-cost housing programmes to have a major effect on uncontrolled urban settlement. The most pertinent government schemes provide only basic components — land, utilities and community facilities, credits and technical assistance and, perhaps, core or shell houses. It is not only essential that the cost of services be within the economic reach of those to whom they are offered; it is equally important that the offer coincide with the ways in which the recipients are prepared to use them. Potential solutions will be projects which are geared to the life-situations of the people concerned and which their Governments have resources to implement on a sufficient scale.

Conclusions and recommendations

The idea that a modern city can develop from relatively primitive beginnings, over a very short period in relation to the city's history, seems to be unacceptable to many planners and decision makers. This is strange, for there is nothing new about the concept of "progressive development". It is only very recently and only in the most developed countries that new towns have been built completely before occupation. The sequence of operations that most squatters attempt to follow — and that many succeed in to a remarkable extent — is wholly traditional and it is also logical and economic.

The most promising approach to the problems of uncontrol lies in government legislation and technical resources complementing the initiative and not inconsiderable investment capacity of the common people. As long as the criteria and norms on which government action is based fail to coincide with the real needs and resources of the governed, they cannot work together.

Unless Governments with their legislative and technical resources complement the initiative and collective investment capacity of the common people, orderly urban settlement and rapid housing improvement cannot be achieved.

Housing must be viewed as an activity environment producing a change in attitude not just as physical shelter. Traditional attitudes have led to the development of institutions which are slow to adapt themselves to changing circumstances. Neither attitudes nor institutions will be changed without changes in modes of perception. Differentiating between the human settlement — that of man's relationship with his environment — and building construction problems, provides an anwer to the interminable arguments of the traditionally production-oriented economists, and the orthodox political revolutionists who both see "housing" only in its more concrete and visible aspect. For most people waiting for future prosperity or social revolution means prolonged discomfort or even misery. And what is to happen under either of these policies meanwhile, to the growth and form of the cities in which at least four fifths of the world's enormously increased future population will be living in relatively few years' time?

If the problem is restated in settlement terms, the resources available for the solution of the problems greatly increase. A poor man's dignity is not damaged by his poor house but by his poverty (a modern house exacerbates rather than eliminates the problem). But enable the poor man to get a job by helping him to live (no matter how poorly) where he can find one or, if he already has one, provide him with a piece of building land and advice where needed, and he will then make the best use of his opportunities and, slowly but surely, will cease to be poor. As he ceases to be poor, he will cease to live in a poor house. Is any Government, considering the technical and even financial support that it can get from international agencies and wealthier countries, incapable of providing the necessary planning and technical assistance to ensure proper development?

A revised view of resources for urban settlement makes it impossible to focus clearly with the "public/private sector" concept in mind. The common people use money in limited ways and often independently of the financial institutions; practices which prevent the free flow of credit. To comprehend the situation, it is necessary

to add a third "popular" sector, revealing, however, not three separate elements, but a bi-polar situation within which accommodation takes place. One extreme is fully institutionalized, with its headquarters in the principal cities, and the other is in the economic system of the subsistence agriculture communities. The former uses a money economy that is becoming increasingly urban and industrial, widening the gap between it and the subsistence economy, which scarcely uses money at all. By definition, an "urbanizing" country is in transition so that these systems are mixed, creating all sorts of anomalies and tensions of which the loss of control and of orderly urban settlement is one symptom. Rapid development, however, depends on the successful co-ordination of the two economic systems. No housing agency in any newly urbanizing country can even begin to make an impression on the "housing problem" without the active participation of the people themselves. As their resources cannot be metamorphosed into money, they cannot be collected by the State and then used at the State's discretion. These "popular" resources consist mainly of initiative, effort, skills and very small savings, difficult to collect or mobilize unless one works with those who have them.

The crucial difference between "working with" and "working for" must be understood by anyone who wishes to "mobilize the resources of the common people". The paternalist concept of the State as a provider has to give way to the concept of the State as the servant — providing tools. Pioneers in the community development field like Carola Ravell, the Directors of CORDIPLAN in Venezuela, Cooperacion Popular in Peru and the new programme of the Frei administration in Chile — influenced by community development projects in Africa and India — have shown that both attitudes and institutions are indeed capable of rapid and revolutionary change.

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